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Abstract 
 
The thesis examines the politics of economic policy-making during the Wilson / 
Callaghan administration with a specific focus on the 1976 IMF crisis.  It offers a 
critique of existing accounts that are based on an artificial distinction between state 
and market, in which there is an assumed power relationship that allows market 
actors to discipline state managers when policies diverge from accepted principles 
and norms, and argue that the fall in the value of sterling and IMF conditionality 
were examples of this disciplinary potential at work during 1976.   This thesis 
presents a substantial, archive-based re-assessment of events from an open Marxist 
perspective.  It argues that the state is an inherent feature of the social relations of 
capitalist accumulation, and that whilst this means state managers must pursue 
policies generally favouring the reproduction of the social relations of production, 
this constraint is not disciplinary or deterministic.  The thesis shows that the Labour 
government had long established preferences for deflationary policies and argues 
that they were implemented through the politics of depoliticisation.  On this basis, 
the fall in the value of the pound and ultimately, IMF conditionality, are not 
understood to be the key determinants of policy outputs.  Rather, market rhetoric and 
IMF conditionality are seen to have provided the Labour government with 
substantial room for manoeuvre to implement policies aimed at creating favourable 
conditions for accumulation whilst minimising political dissent by acting as a 
buttress between the government and its policies.  The argument is developed in 
three phases.  Firstly, it demonstrates how despite the manifesto commitments of the 
Labour Party, significant elements of the core executive had consistent and 
established preferences for the depreciation of sterling, a transfer of resources into 
the balance of payments, cuts in expenditure, and incomes policies.  Secondly, it 
shows how austerity measures were justified during 1975 and the first half of 1976 
by a slide in the exchange rate and expected external financing pressures, despite a 
wish to see the pound fall.  Finally, it shows how in the final quarter of 1976, the 
core executive delayed taking fiscal action until after the IMF negotiations because 
of expectations of conditionality, that it broadly agreed with the Fund’s 
prescriptions, and argued that this course was preferable to an alternative strategy 
because if an alternative was implemented, financial markets would force an even 
greater degree of austerity. 
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Note on the referencing 
 
The thesis uses a Harvard referencing system that identifies the author, year of 
publication and page number in parenthesis in the text.  Full references are contained 
in the bibliography.  Archival sources are referenced from the general to the specific 
(archive, file, document, date) in the text, and are included to file level in the 
bibliography. Ibid has been used to indicate reference to the source cited 
immediately prior, however where the same source is cited continuously over a 
number of pages, the full reference has been repeated periodically for ease of 
identification by the reader.  
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
 
The 1970s was a decade of fundamental restructuring in both the British and global 
economies, and as a result is a natural focal point for the study of public policy-
making in Britain.  Between 1970 and 1979 there were four general elections and 
three Prime Ministers in the United Kingdom, which creates an understandable 
impression that this was a period, at least of transition, if not profound political 
change.  In the world economy, too, there was a great deal of uncertainty, caused by 
the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the startling 
disequilibrium in international payments caused by the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) price increases in 1971 and 1973.  Studying British 
responses to the challenges thrown up by the domestic political landscape and the 
evolving global economy are therefore essential in developing an understanding of 
both the origins of policies that emerged from this turbulent period, and how the 
events themselves fit into a broader picture of British economic management and 
attempts to address the problem of relative economic decline, which Gamble (1994, 
xiii) notes has been a problem faced by British policy-makers for a hundred years. 
 
The Wilson / Callaghan government is perhaps of the greatest interest, as not only 
did it directly precede the election of the Conservative government that heralded the 
beginning of Thatcherism, but it was also an administration during which the 
government made significant retreats from its manifesto commitments because they 
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did not accord with the kinds of policies that overseas opinion, the Treasury, and the 
Labour Party leadership, believed were necessary if Britain was to successfully 
reverse its economic fortunes.  Understanding the origins of these preferences, the 
way in which attempts were made to reconcile them, and why ultimately they failed, 
resulting in Britain’s winter of discontent and the election of Mrs. Thatcher, has 
therefore received considerable academic attention.   
 
Much of the work written contemporaneously with events in the 1970s has focussed 
on the problems of fiscal overload, ungovernability, and the contradictions inherent 
in social democracy.  King (1975, 286-92) for instance, argued that governing 
Britain in the 1970s became more difficult because the range of government 
responsibilities grew to the extent that people had become insensitive to the demands 
placed on it, and that the ability of the government to exercise a range of 
responsibilities had declined because of an increase in the number of dependency 
relationships existing in the British economy.  Samuel Brittan (1975, 129-40) 
likewise asserted that the nature of democratic party-political competition had 
contributed to undermining the ability to govern by encouraging unrealistic 
expectations through a process tantamount to bidding for office.  Rose (1984, 358) 
later argued that these problems were amplified by the practice of building 
inefficiencies into structural practices, which was a product of the prioritisation of 
full-employment over other economic and political objectives. 
 
An alternative perspective has been to consider events in the 1970s in terms of the 
decline of the post-war consensus in British policy-making.  Addison (1977, 278) 
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notes that during the 1940s, ‘the Conservatives were obliged to integrate some of 
Labour’s most important demands into their own philosophy.’  On this basis, it has 
been argued that it is appropriate to speak of the post-war period in terms of a 
consensus during which there was ‘widespread elite agreement on policy goals and 
broad continuity in government policy’ (Kavanagh, 1992, 175), which appeared to 
have been called into question by the 1970s by the failure of Keynesian economics 
to account for the simultaneous occurrence of inflation and unemployment, and the 
advancement and popularisation of monetarist economic theory.  Kevin Hickson 
(2004, 150) endorses such a view on the basis that, until the late 1970s, it was 
possible to observe ‘a fairly high degree of policy continuity based around the 
welfare state, the mixed economy [and] the use of Keynesian demand management.’ 
 
These frameworks for understanding change in 1970s however, have proved to be 
insufficient for the purposes of either describing or explaining events.  As Birch 
(1984, 158) notes, explanations of the problems of governing Britain from 1945-79 
based on the idea of overload lack universal applicability, either across countries or 
within Britain over time, whilst Grant (2000, 54) has asserted that the 
ungovernability thesis has ‘not stood the test of time very well given that Mrs. 
Thatcher showed that the British state has considerable powers at its disposal if it is 
directed by someone with strong and clear political convictions.’  The postwar 
consensus thesis has fared no better, on the grounds that it is conceptually ill-defined 
and empirically questionable, which has led Bulpitt (1995, 513) to suggest that 
although the consensus view ‘of post 1945 British politics is accepted by […] 
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“normal” political science […] there is no point engaging in “heavy petting” with 
this thesis’.   
 
A Re-assessment of the 1976 IMF crisis 
 
Existing accounts of the 1976 IMF crisis have broadly shared an acceptance of 
analytical frameworks that accept the logic of a ‘states and markets’ approach.  The 
key characteristic of these frameworks is the artificial analytical separation of state 
and market.  This emphasis on the autonomy of state and market at the point of 
constitution is coupled with the assumption of a power relationship that allows 
market actors to discipline state managers or act as a catalyst for policy learning 
when policies diverge from accepted principles and norms.  These accounts 
understand the fall in the value of sterling and IMF conditionality as evidence of the 
disciplinary potential of markets at work during 1976.  However, conclusions based 
on an analytical separation of the state and the economy are theoretically 
questionable.  As Matthew Watson (2006, 21) notes, ‘the rule of law and systems of 
exchange [are] experienced as a totality within everyday life’, which indicates that 
the analytical separation of states and markets is unhelpful and artificial.  
Furthermore, by opposing the state and market in such a reified way, these accounts 
implicitly accept a questionable rationalist ontology, which reduces governments to 
simple vote winners, and markets to rational profit seekers, and therefore fail to 
account for the complexity of the social relationships experienced in every day life. 
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In addition to these theoretical weaknesses, existing accounts of the IMF crisis have 
taken a broadly hermeneutical approach to studying the events of 1976, and focus 
principally on interpretations of the Labour Party’s policy documents, and the 
memoirs, diaries and published statements of individuals involved in policy-making, 
but have excluded the examination of the official papers of the Cabinet, the Treasury 
and the Bank of England.  The exclusion of a substantial range of primary sources 
from the analysis has led to a skewed interpretation of events based on an 
inappropriately narrow principal actor focus, because in failing to account for 
official views on policy-making in a systematic and falsifiable way, existing 
accounts have tended to simply associate the preferences of the British government 
with the published statements and manifestos of the Labour Party.  Not only does 
this fail to account for discrepancies between political arguments and the 
achievement of governing competence that may arise because of party statecraft, 
they exclude the views of a significant portion of the British state’s economic policy-
making apparatus from the analysis.   This has served to exacerbate the extent to 
which market forces appear to have played a key role in determining policy outputs 
in the run up to and during the 1976 IMF crisis.  
 
Whilst Hickson (2005, 227) has argued that the IMF ‘discussions were so widely 
leaked that it can be said that the debate over the IMF application was one of the 
most open in postwar history’, it is clear that a reliance on information reported by 
the press on the basis of leaks from official sources cannot be guaranteed to provide 
a thorough, balanced account of events that appreciates the diversity of activities 
undertaken by the civil service and the government.  As Burnham et al. (2004, 172) 
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note, ‘the reliability and accuracy of newspaper material cannot be presumed’, on the 
grounds that material is shaped by the views of editors and journalists in the 
production process.   As such, the assertion that ‘the contents of national archives, if 
used with skill and judgement, can make a significant contribution to understanding 
the workings of modern government’ (Burnham et al., 2004, 177) is astute, even if 
the only contribution archival sources make is to confirm initial judgements.  As 
Lowe (1997, 240-1) notes, ‘the great advantage of government records – properly 
used – is that, in their fullness, they reveal not only the complete range of influences 
to which government was subject at any given time but also what did not change.’  
 
Douglas Wass’ account of events in 1976 has gone some way to filling this gap in 
the literature, but despite his attempt to ‘detach [himself] from events and to record 
facts, minutes, and memoranda irrespective of whether [he does or does not] emerge 
with a great deal of credit’ (Wass, 2008, xii), his proximity to the events as the 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, will have undoubtedly shaped his selection of 
sources and interpretation of events.  As he acknowledges, ‘I do not believe that 
anyone as closely involved as I was can be wholly objective, and I confess to a 
lurking desire now that records are on public display not to be found wanting in what 
I did – and that I did not do – that eventful year’ (ibid, xii).  In addition to the 
problem of neutrality of authorship, which is enough to necessitate an independent 
examination of the archival sources of itself, Wass’ account leaves many questions 
unanswered as a result of its heavy reliance on Treasury documents at the expense of 
other sources, the most notable of which is a failure to engage with substantive 
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questions about the relative role of state and market actors in shaping policy outputs 
in a fashion that goes beyond an explanation and defence of the Treasury’s actions. 
 
This thesis is therefore able to make a valuable contribution to the literature on the 
1976 IMF crisis in two respects.  Firstly, by making extensive use of archival 
sources, it is possible to offer a fuller account of events and report how policy 
preferences were implemented from a more ‘neutral’ position, in terms of my 
involvement in the events themselves, than has previously been possible.   And 
secondly, by approaching the topic from an open Marxist perspective that 
understands the state as social form, it is possible to avoid presenting conclusions 
that rely on an artificial distinction between state and market.  In contrast to existing 
accounts, the thesis argues that the state is an inherent feature of the social relations 
of capitalist accumulation, and that whilst this shapes state managers’ preferences for 
policies generally geared towards renewing conditions for accumulation, the 
constraints of accumulation are not disciplinary and do not force convergence when 
policy diverges from accepted principles and norms through the exercise of 
structural power.  It demonstrates that policy was not determined by market forces in 
the run up to and during the 1976 IMF crisis, but that state managers had clearly 
identifiable preferences for policies geared towards restoring the profitability of 
British industries throughout the 1974-76 period, and that these could not 
immediately be pursued because of their potential to exacerbate class antagonisms 
and call into question the political legitimacy of the Labour government.  However, 
the fall in the value of the pound and IMF conditionality ultimately allowed the 
government to use market rhetoric and the rules of international institutions as 
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justification for implementing policies aimed at restoring conditions for profitable 
accumulation through the politics of depoliticisation.  Far from determining policy 
outcomes therefore, currency instability and IMF conditionality provided strong and 
credible justifications for the implementation of policies aimed at reversing Britain’s 
relative economic decline, and acted as a buttress between the government and the 
consequences of its policies.  On this basis, the thesis is an original re-assessment of 
the 1976 crisis that is both methodologically and empirically robust.  
 
Methodology 
 
The principal research methods used in this study are the analysis and interpretation 
of a broad range of primary documents from various UK archives, the analysis and 
interpretation of a broad range of secondary sources such as government legislation, 
Hansard, and newspaper articles, and the critical analysis of tertiary literature.   
 
The majority of the primary sources consulted are the relevant public records held at 
the National Archives (TNA) in Kew, which were released under the thirty-year rule 
in January 2007.  I have consulted a broad range of documents that include the 
minutes and memoranda of relevant Cabinet meetings and Cabinet committee 
meetings, as well as files from the Office of the Prime Minister and other ministers 
closely involved with the economic policy-making process such as the Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster.  In addition to these files, which principally cover issues 
with the direct involvement of ministers, I have made extensive use of Treasury 
sources from the Home Finance Division, the Overseas Finance Division, and the 
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papers of the Permanent Secretary, Sir Douglas Wass.  In order to incorporate as 
broad a spectrum of views in the analysis as possible, and to act as counterweight 
and corroboration, I have also referred to documents in the archive of the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) at the Modern Records Centre (MRC) at the University of 
Warwick, the Bank of England archive at Threadneedle Street, and sources from the 
archive of the International Monetary Fund.1 
 
In addition to the benefits of using archival sources referred to above, it has been 
necessary to be aware of the potential pitfalls of an extensive documentary analysis, 
which are frequently discussed in terms of authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning (Scott, 1990, 19-25; Bryman, 2001, 375; Burnham 
et al., 2004, 185-86).  Burnham et al. (2004, 186) note that the ‘authenticity of a 
document concerns its genuineness’, which requires the researcher to assess whether 
the document has been altered or compromised in any way.  Examining credibility 
then makes it necessary to question the prerogatives of the author, and ‘requires that 
the researcher pay particular attention to the conditions under which the document 
was produced and the material interests that may have driven the author to write the 
document’ (ibid, 186).  In the case of public records, the challenges posed by the 
need to assess the authenticity and credibility of public records are minimal, and 
limited to the identification of dates and authorship by virtue of the fact ‘the form 
and content of such records are usually compatible with the procedures known to 
have been used by the government department responsible for its creation’ (ibid,                                                         
1 Dr. Ben Clift kindly supplied electronic versions of documents relating to the 1976 
IMF crisis from the International Monetary Fund archive in Washington D. C. 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186).  During this study, whilst assessing the authenticity of documents posed 
minimal difficulties, it was at times difficult to identify the author of certain 
documents and to locate their role within the civil service, especially where 
documents are initialled rather than signed.  I have made every effort to identify 
individuals by using resources at the National Archives and Civil Service Year 
Books, and have included this information to the greatest possible degree of 
accuracy in an index of names and offices in the annex.  
 
It has been noted that ‘the most serious challenge facing users of documentary 
sources concerns their response to questions of representativeness and meaning’ 
(ibid, 187), and Scott (1990, 24) notes that it is essential to be sure that the 
documents used reflect the complete range of documentary sources relevant to the 
topic.  This is particularly problematic, and Bryman (2001, 375) has argued that in 
the case of public records, the issue of representativeness ‘is complicated in that 
materials like this are in a sense unique and it is precisely their official or quasi-
official character that makes them interesting in their own right.’  Furthermore, he 
notes that ‘in the context of qualitative research this is not a meaningful question, 
because no case can be representative in a statistical sense’ (ibid, 375).  The 
challenge for the researcher, he argues, is in ‘establishing a cogent theoretical 
account and possibly examining that account in other contexts’ (ibid, 375).   
 
Burnham et al. (2004, 187) have also noted that the issue of representativeness is 
significantly more problematic when dealing with collections that are not a matter of 
public record, because ‘the selection of public records is formalized and carried out 
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according to established and accountable procedures’, but in other archives, holdings 
may be collected on a rather more ad hoc basis.  As the majority of sources 
consulted for this study are a matter of public record, this has not been a significant 
challenge, although where I have used materials from the TUC archive at the 
Modern Records Centre at the University of Warwick, I have tried to consult a broad 
range of secondary sources, such as the annual reports of the Trades Unions 
Congress, and its published statements, in order to support my archival findings.  
 
The criterion of meaning also poses problems for the researcher, despite Burnham et 
al.’s (ibid, 187) assertion that ‘for students of modern politics and international 
relations there should be little difficulty establishing the literal meaning of 
documents (unlike the situation facing the mediaeval historian).’  Nevertheless, the 
use of qualitative research methods remains an exercise in interpretation, which 
necessarily opens up the possibility of bias in the research.  As May (1997, 176) 
notes: 
History itself and our understanding of it can be informed by a selective 
reading of documents […] What people decide to record, to leave in or take 
out, is itself informed by decisions which relate to the social, political and 
economic environment of which they are a part.  
As such, he suggests that history, ‘like all social and natural sciences, it amenable to 
manipulation and selective influence’ (ibid, 176).  This reflects the concerns 
expressed by Sir Douglas Wass in his account of the IMF crisis referred to above, 
and there is no simple way to ensure that interpretations do not reflect inherent 
prejudices and personal beliefs in a process that is reliant on an individual’s reading 
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for its outputs.  However, I have given the relevant consideration to this potential 
pitfall of using documentary sources in the preparation of this study, and aimed to 
choose, read and reference my sources in a considered and conscientious way by 
consulting a range of archives that is as broad as possible, and examining a broad 
range of materials from within those archives so as to avoid using an 
unrepresentative selection of sources that simply reflects my own inherent beliefs 
about the policy-making process in the United Kingdom.     
 
The extent to which this study relies heavily on documents from the National 
Archives may also be said to have contributed to a ‘top down bias’ that Lowe (1997, 
245) argues can be corrected by reference to other public and private archival 
holdings. How important this is considered to be however, is fundamentally 
dependent on what Bulpitt (1995, 517) refers to as ‘a problem of whose governing 
behaviour we decide to examine’, or to use a colloquialism, the researcher’s 
understanding of the answer to the question: ‘who governs?’  Bulpitt (ibid, 517-8) 
contends that from a historical politics perspective, focus should necessarily include 
those ‘constantly close to high political issues’, and he identifies the concept of the 
Court, defined as ‘the formal Chief Executive plus his/her political friends and 
advisors’ as the appropriate focal point for investigation.  Whilst this study does not 
apply the concept of the Court in the strict sense applied by Bulpitt, it has a 
deliberate focus on the highest echelons of government and the civil service.  This 
reflects my agreement with the assertions that power in Britain ‘is highly 
concentrated in the executive branch, and within that, in the Treasury and the office 
of the Prime Minister’ (Bernstein, 1983, 147), and that ‘in economic policy-making 
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terms the most important set of actors within the state are those of the “core 
executive”’, defined as ‘a shorthand term for referring to the leading figures within 
the government, and for the senior officials in the state finance department and the 
national central bank’ (Kettell, 2004, 24).  This thesis pays a considerable degree of 
attention to the actions of civil servants, however this is not a reflection of my views 
about the relative importance of actors within the official and political spheres.   
Rather, it reflects the fact that a great deal of contingency planning examining the 
feasibility and legality of policy proposals is never raised explicitly at a political 
level because of the degree of expertise required in order to reach these judgements.  
This means that the civil service often plays a more substantial role, in terms of the 
volume of its work, in designing policy proposals and assessing the desirability of 
their implementation on legal and political grounds, than ministers.2   
 
In addition to the methodological issues associated with documentary analysis are 
some practical difficulties that arise in carrying out archival research, which are 
related to access and the identification of relevant files.  Once again, as the majority 
of sources used for this study are a matter of public record, I was able to access them 
freely at the National Archives in Kew, and because they were over thirty-years old, 
it was not necessary to request the release of any of these documents under the                                                         
2 Of course, there are notable exceptions when policy proposals do stem largely from 
the ministerial level.  For the purposes of this study, Tony Benn’s advocacy of the 
Alternative Economic Strategy is a prime example.  Nevertheless, the majority of the 
examination of legal and practical issues relating to implementation of the plan fell 
to the civil service.  
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Freedom of Information Act.  Records from the Bank of England are subject to 
slightly stricter access conditions, and may be consulted only by permission of the 
archivist for genuine research purposes.  Due to staffing constraints it is also 
necessary to organise visits to the Bank’s archive several weeks in advance, and 
given the fact that the Bank’s full archive can only be searched from within the 
archive itself, there remains the possibility that researchers may have to wait for a 
considerable amount of time before visiting the archive, only to find that the records 
they wish to view have not yet been transferred to the archive or have been retained 
beyond the normal thirty-year closure period. After providing verifiable 
identification I was granted access to the archive, although I did find that whilst the 
Bank’s files relating to the 1976 IMF crisis were open for consultation, the papers of 
the Bank’s Governor in this period were not available.3  This proved to be slightly 
problematic because by the time that I was able to visit the archive, it was not                                                         
3 At the conclusion of my visits I remained unsure on what grounds these documents 
had not been transferred to the archive.  The archivists informed me that all of the 
Governor’s files and duplicate letters from this year, with the exception of minutes 
of meetings with the Committee of London Clearing Bankers, had been retained on 
the grounds that the material contained therein had been deemed of sufficient 
sensitivity to extend closure beyond thirty years.  My own judgement however, 
based on a review of the files in these series up to 1978 which also contain very few 
entries, and on the grounds that it is unlikely that the majority of these files 
contained sufficiently sensitive information for extended closure, was that they had 
not yet been catalogued as a result of the staffing shortages that also necessitate 
planning a visit to the archive so far in advance.  
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possible to complete a freedom of information request within the timeframe of the 
thesis.  However, as the Governor’s views are frequently reported in correspondence 
and memoranda retained in files held by the National Archives and elsewhere in the 
Bank of England archive, this has not proved to be a major constraint, even though 
access to the files would, of course, have been desirable for the purposes of 
establishing the representativeness of the files I was able to read and have referenced 
in the thesis.    
 
In addition to problems of access, the task of finding relevant files within the 
archives can also be challenging, and there is a significant barrier to the researcher 
represented by the size of the National Archives’ holdings (Burnham et al., 2004, 
178).  The identification of relevant files at the TUC archive was difficult in light of 
the fact that at the time I conducted my research, the catalogue was not searchable, 
which meant that the identification of documents relied on my reading whole 
sections of the catalogue.4  At the National Archives the process has been made 
significantly easier by the sophisticated online search-engine, which allows files to 
be isolated by department, date range and key-words.  However, this system is only 
as effective as allowed by the degree of precision contained in the description of files 
contained in the catalogue, and the search terms employed by the researcher.  As 
Vickers (1997, 172) discovered during her research, this problem meant that she 
sometimes found that files she believed would be particularly relevant were of little                                                         
4 The catalogue of the TUC archive at the Modern Records Centre at the University 
of Warwick has now been updated, and it is now possible to conduct simple searches 
of the holdings online. 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interest, whereas others that were consulted with less hope of containing useful 
information turned out to be of great value.  She therefore commented that: ‘this 
would suggest that there were files I did not look at which may have contained 
useful information’ (ibid, 172).  Despite my attempts to review the relevant 
catalogues in as much detail as possible, and to use a variety of finding aids in order 
to isolate relevant files, there remains a possibility that there are files containing 
relevant information in the archives I used that have not been consulted.   
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters.  Chapter two frames the thesis analytically 
by reviewing various theoretical understandings of the nature of the relationship 
between the state and market, and the implications this is perceived to have for the 
politics of economic policy-making. It aims to critically review positions that 
identify sources of structural power as significant determinants in national 
economic-policy making from a states and markets perspective, and Marxist variants 
of state-theory based on the ‘relative autonomy thesis.’  It then demonstrates the 
benefits of approaching the topic from an open Marxist perspective, and viewing the 
state as social form.  It argues that the state is an intrinsic feature of the class 
antagonism inherent in the social relations of capitalist production, which means that 
state managers must act in order to renew conditions for accumulation, but that these 
constraints are not disciplinary.  Within these constraints, policy makers retain a 
considerable degree of policy autonomy, but because actions to renew conditions for 
profitable accumulation have the potential to intensify class antagonisms, it argues 
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that state managers can gain significant political benefits by depoliticising difficult 
aspects of economic policy.  Chapter three then reviews the existing literature on the 
IMF crisis in detail.   It demonstrates the extent to which this literature has broadly 
reflected the logic of states and markets approaches, and emphasises the disciplinary 
potential of market forces and market institutions in determining British policy 
outputs.   
 
Chapters four and five provide context and begin the historical narrative by 
identifying the broad range of preferences faced by the Labour government after its 
election in February 1974.  Chapter four focuses on the period between the 1974 
general elections, outlines the Labour government’s political inheritance in the 
Social Contract, the general economic situation with which it was faced, and 
demonstrates that despite substantial Treasury sympathy for the political constraints 
the government faced, which prevented a wholesale review of economic strategy, 
that policy was nevertheless broadly geared towards a fast improvement in the 
balance of payments and improving incentives for industrial investment.  Chapter 
five then reviews the historical legacy of sterling’s role as a reserve currency and the 
problems caused by the OPEC price increases, before demonstrating how these 
issues informed the decisive re-orientation of economic strategy from December 
1974, which was based on concerns about de-mobilising capital and maintaining 
foreign confidence.  Finally, it shows how these preferences were reflected in the 
April 1975 Budget.    
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Chapters six to eight offer a sustained analytical narrative of policy-making from the 
middle of 1975 until the IMF crisis of 1976, and demonstrate the way in which the 
Treasury and the Labour Party leadership consistently used market rhetoric and 
market rules in order to reconcile the views of the Labour left and the TUC with its 
preferences for deflationary policies through the politics of depoliticisation.  Chapter 
six deals with exchange rate management, the imposition of the £6 pay policy of July 
1975, the oil-facility and first credit tranche IMF loans of December that year, and 
the cuts in expenditure from the 1976 public expenditure white paper.  In chapter 
seven I review the changes in monetary policy that precipitated the sharp decline in 
the pound and the arrangement of the multilateral $5.3 billion stand-by in June 1976.  
It also examines the justification of the public expenditure cuts of 22 July, official 
and ministerial attitudes towards Tony Benn’s advocacy of generalised import 
controls in the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES), and how the case for a 
conditional drawing from the IMF was made.   
 
Chapter eight reviews the reaction to the IMF application, and shows how alternative 
proposals such as international agreement on a safety net for the sterling balances, 
were marginalised on the grounds that they offered no solution to Britain’s external 
financing problems in the long run.  Finally, the chapter gives an account of the 
Treasury’s negotiations with staff members of the International Monetary Fund, 
demonstrating the extent to which there was broad agreement with the Fund team at 
a substantive level from early in the negotiations.  It also reviews the Cabinet 
discussions, and demonstrates how the political case was made by arguing that 
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alternative courses would require even greater deflationary action than that necessary 
in order to reach agreement with the IMF. 
 
In chapter nine, I offer my conclusions.  I argue that despite the presence of a broad 
range of preferences for economic policy within the British state, those of the core 
executive were consistently in favour of deflation so that Britain would be able to 
reverse its relative economic decline within the framework of international free 
trade.  The chapter concludes by showing how this was achieved by justifying 
expenditure cuts because of a slide in the exchange rate despite established 
preferences for depreciation, arguing that market conditions had left the government 
no alternative to drawing on the Fund, and ultimately by deferring desired fiscal 
adjustments until they could be attributed to IMF conditionality.  The fall in the 
value of the pound and IMF conditionality should not therefore be understood as 
disciplinary features of the international financial system, and it is not the case that 
British policy outputs were determined by market forces during the 1976 IMF crisis.  
Rather, the fall in the value of the pound and IMF conditionality provided the Labour 
government with the room for manoeuvre to pursue its established preferences for 
public expenditure cuts and incomes policy by acting as a buttress between the 
government and the social and political consequences of those policies.  
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Chapter II 
 
The state, the economy and the politics of economic policy-making 
 
The politics of economic policy-making is a salient issue in light of contemporary 
debates about globalisation, capital mobility, and the embedded nature of agreed 
principles in international economic regimes, which have all produced a wide 
literature that argues, to varying extents, that power in the world economy has 
shifted away from the national state and towards the market.  This shift is seen to 
have imbued market actors with the ability to impinge on the policy autonomy of 
state managers by exercising structural power to create currency instability through 
capital flight, and denying access to multilateral credit facilities without the 
acceptance of explicit conditions designed to force policy changes.  The relationship 
between the state and the economy is also a fundamental feature of Marxist state 
theory, which has moved away from straightforward economic determinism, and 
produced various attempts to construct a theory of economy and society that can 
explain the way in which governments are able to act in favour of accumulation 
without reducing their understanding of the state to structural functionalism.   
 
This first half of this chapter discusses the relationship between states and global 
finance as understood broadly from a states and markets perspective, and shows how 
the logic of capital mobility and the accepted principles and norms underscoring 
international financial integration are often identified as having the potential to limit 
the freedom for individual states to decide upon and implement their own policies 
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independently.  It will then assess the development of Marxist trends in state theory 
and the implications for policy-making of their varying perspectives on the relative 
autonomy of the state, and critiques these accounts based on their shared application 
of an artificial analytical separation between states and markets and their acceptance 
of the view that structural power can be used in order to force policy changes on 
reluctant governments at moments of crisis.  The chapter then outlines an open 
Marxist perspective, which suggests that the state should be understood as an 
inherent feature of the class antagonism inherent in the social relations of capitalist 
production.  The state is not understood in reified terms, and it is its existence as a 
moment in the social relations of capitalist accumulation that leads it to favour 
policies generally geared towards accumulation, and not disciplinary action or the 
threat of disciplinary action by market actors at times of crisis.  Finally, it argues that 
as policies generally geared towards renewing conditions for accumulation have the 
potential to intensify class antagonisms, state managers often find it beneficial to 
depoliticise the consequences of its preferred policies by attributing them to market 
forces and market rules.  Far from representing disciplinary features of an 
international state system in which power has increasingly shifted from state to 
market therefore, market rules and rhetoric can provide powerful justifications for 
state managers to pursue policies geared towards renewing conditions for profitable 
accumulation by depoliticising the social consequences of those policies. 
 
 
* 
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States and markets 
 
‘States and markets’ approaches are generally concerned with the possession and 
expression of power by one group of actors over another, and focus on the varying 
forms that this power takes and how it is used.  This section addresses two ways in 
which it has been suggested that power over states can be exercised.  The first is 
through global finance and the logic of capital mobility, which is said to have the 
potential to destabilise national currencies when there is a lack of market confidence 
in the sustainability of economic policy.  The second lies in the multilateral 
international economic framework, and the way in which it establishes norms 
governing access to credit, and rules of good conduct in economic policy-making.  
These approaches share the view that there are significant sources of structural 
power residing in the market and its institutions, and that they are able to effectively 
discipline state managers and therefore play a key role in determining policy outputs. 
 
The mobility of capital is an undisputed fact of the modern world, with decreasing 
transaction costs and technological advances meaning that vast sums of money can 
flow very quickly, which has demonstrated the potential to destabilise national 
currencies.  This has given rise to the capital mobility hypothesis, of which it has 
been written:  
there is nothing wrong with the logic of the proposition, which derives 
directly from the dilemma of the Unholy Trinity.   Unless governments are 
willing to tolerate virtually unlimited currency instability, they must tailor 
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their policies to avoid provoking massive or sudden capital movements 
(Cohen, 1998, 132).  
The influence that the process has on governments stems from capital’s ability to 
express itself through exit, voice, and loyalty, because ‘the greater the ability of 
market actors to evade the preferences of public officials (Exit), the less the 
government will be able to count on or command submissive loyalty’ (ibid, 132).  As 
a result of this, it is argued that ‘public policy, more and more, is pressured to 
conform to what markets desire, whether or not this coincides with the preferences 
of elected officials’ (ibid, 133).  Global finance therefore can be said to have 
undermined the authority ‘once derived from legal-tender laws and other political 
interventions’, and embodied it in ‘the norms and expectations that rule the 
Darwinian struggle among currencies’ (ibid, 146).  ‘The power of governance’, 
Cohen concludes, ‘now resides in that social institution we call the market’ (ibid, 
146).   
 
Pauly (1997, 2) agrees that global finance ‘manifests a perfectly reasonable fear: that 
the evolution of markets means, in effect, that the power to make substantive 
decisions affecting one’s own material prospects and the prospects of our children is 
currently shifting out of our control.’  However, the notion of capital mobility 
reflecting a full and final determinant in policy making is rejected.  Instead, it is 
suggested that the fact that governments desire both ‘the fruits that financial 
openness appears to promise [and] real influence over the shape of the tree’, has led 
the international state system to a mid-point between states that have full autonomy 
in national policy-making and fully integrated cooperation (ibid, 5).  This is said to 
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have contributed to creating a situation in which: ‘economic commentators, 
prominent bankers, and conservative politicians, often abstracting from the fact that 
governments can let their exchange rates float, underscored the “discipline” on 
autonomous state action implied by capital mobility’ (ibid, 33).  As such, he argues 
that it nevertheless remains possible for states to retain their sovereignty within 
tighter constraints if they are willing to opt out and bear the costs of their isolation 
(ibid, 34).   On this point, he notes that ‘states, especially leading states, have 
demonstrated clear interests in capturing the benefits of deepening financial 
integration without fundamentally compromising their ultimate political authority 
over that process’ (ibid, 42). 
 
The ability for states to opt out of financial integration is, however, a subject of 
controversy because of the practical barriers to its achievement and the considerable 
costs it would bring.  Helleiner (1992, 33) for instance, notes that the experience of 
the 1970s demonstrated that ‘even a comprehensive system of financial controls is 
unable to prevent international financial movements taking place in a disguised 
fashion through leads and lags in current account payments’, suggesting that the 
degree of sophistication in global transactions has meant that financial capital will 
always be able to circumvent regulation by national states.  From a historical 
perspective, he goes on to demonstrate how the extensive regulation of the 1930s 
failed to prevent illegal capital transfers despite extensive penalties (ibid, 33), and he 
argues that the inevitability of capital mobility in the modern era is even more 
entrenched, because ‘channels for evasion are much more extensive today.’  They 
are said to include the proliferation of global telecommunications that allow for 
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speculative capital transactions to take place, and the growing sophistication of 
financial markets that has made the task of regulation increasingly difficult (ibid, 33-
4). 
 
Not only does Helleiner doubt that it is possible for national states to opt out of the 
system of global finance by imposing rigorous exchange controls, he suggests that it 
is increasingly unlikely any government would do so because of the costs involved 
in taking such action.  Even when faced with capital flight, he notes that Britain and 
France, in 1976 and 1982-83 respectively, decided against introducing such 
measures on the grounds that ‘there was the prospect of foreign retaliation and 
international isolation’, as well as ‘large domestic economic disruption’, which 
forced even advocates of comprehensive exchange controls to ‘acknowledge that the 
associated economic costs would prove greater than those linked to the austerity 
measures that the international markets were demanding’ (ibid, 34).  The 
inevitability of policy convergence therefore stems from the ability of financial 
transactions to create currency instability, and is reinforced by the ability of finance 
capital to avoid transaction restrictions, which in turn has served to deter 
governments from ‘opting out’ because of their reluctance to accept the costs 
involved.  As Andrews (1994, 201) notes, as ‘authorities become convinced […] that 
it is costly or even futile to resist the strong tendency of market and technological 
forces to produce further financial integration, they become less inclined to take such 
actions.’  
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However, it is not simply capital mobility that has been identified as a tangible 
constraint on the policy autonomy of state managers.  The rules and norms 
underscoring the system of international cooperation are also understood to have a 
role to play in disciplining states.   One of the most significant ways this can be 
achieved is through the control over access to credit, and as such is particularly 
relevant to countries in deficit.  Strange (1994, 30) argues that ‘finance – the control 
of credit – is the facet which has risen in importance in the last quarter century more 
rapidly than any other and has come to be of decisive importance in international 
economic relations.’  The power to create credit has several, fundamental 
implications for economic policy-making: 
[It] implies the power to allow or to deny other people the possibility of 
spending today and paying back tomorrow, the power to let them exercise 
purchasing power and thus influence markets for production, and also the 
power to manage or mismanage the currency in which credit is denominated, 
thus affecting rates of exchange with credit denominated in other currencies 
(ibid, 90).   
 
From the perspective of sovereign debt, this seems to imbue the IMF with 
considerable authority by virtue of its de facto status as an international lender of last 
resort and the conditionality associated with using its resources, but most 
importantly, because it ‘alone could issue the stamp of approval that would satisfy 
the private bankers that it was “safe” to resume lending, even on a lower scale’ (ibid, 
112).  It also has implications about the possibility for the United States to express 
its power through the auspices of multilateral institutions.  This is because of the way 
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that voting power is organised within the Fund according to the size of a country’s 
quota of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which means that ‘benefits that the United 
States receives from the IMF [are] far greater than those of any other member’ 
(Officer, 1990, 30, see also Dominguez, 1993, 366-7; Bordo, 1993, 36).1 
 
The extent of the power that this has conferred on the United States, however, is 
subject to some debate, and depends largely on the extent to which the existence of a 
financial hegemon is seen as either a necessary or as a sufficient condition for the 
stability of an international economic regime.  Kirshner (1995, 156) for instance, 
notes of the Bretton Woods system, that ‘the nature and design of the system […] 
were tailored to fit the economic and political goals of the United States in this era’.  
He argues this was achieved through the creation of the GATT, the strength of the 
dollar and the size of the American economy.  The former served to ensure that the 
United States had access to important markets for its exports, whilst the latter meant 
‘the United States would be well placed to exploit monetary dependence’ (ibid, 156).  
This account reflects the views of Robert Gilpin (1987, 23), who has argued that 
‘economic interdependence establishes hierarchical, dependency, and power 
relations among groups and national societies’, and that as a response, ‘states attempt 
to enhance their own independence and to increase the dependence of other states.’ 
                                                         
1 Much the same has been said of international bond-rating agencies because of ‘the 
authoritative status market participants and societies attribute to the agencies’ 
(Sinclair, 2005, 17), and the way in which this kind of normative authority is shaped 
‘along manifestly American lines’ (ibid, 174). 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The salience of American leadership in the system however, has been the subject of 
some debate.  The accounts above reflect the logic of hegemonic stability theory, 
which argues that ‘the overwhelming dominance of one country was necessary for 
the existence of an open and stable world economy’, and that this hegemon ‘served 
to co-ordinate and discipline other countries so that each could feel secure enough to 
open its markets and avoid beggar-thy-neighbor [sic] policies’ (Milner, 1998, 113).  
However, it is conversely argued that once the institutions governing the world 
economy have been created, ‘they take on a life of their own, and states come to see 
them as worth preserving [because they] provide information to states about each 
others’ behaviour, reduce the cost of negotiating agreements, and can expose, and 
sometimes even punish, violations of agreements by states’ (ibid, 116).   
  
As Keohane and Nye (1973, 158-9) argued, the transnationalisation of investment, 
trade, and capital movements, contributed to the emergence of important and novel 
problems with which governments have been forced to deal in a context where the 
declining efficacy of force had shifted threats to states away from traditional security 
issues towards the economic sphere.  They argue that this transformed the purposes 
of exercising power from the achievement of relative political gains to the 
achievement of absolute economic gains measured against nationally defined criteria 
through attempts to prevent burden shifting, such as the imposition of trade 
restrictions and competitive depreciation, by other nations (ibid, 159-60).   As such, 
they argue that in the global context, domestic monetary policy: 
cannot be understood solely as the result of state action and interaction: the 
behaviour of multi-national enterprises and multi-national banks, the 
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activities of international civil servants and the effects of national policies on 
internationalized forums of discussion must also be taken into account (ibid, 
163). 
This situation is seen to have given an important role for new actors in behaving as 
‘transmission belts’ that contribute to the system by conveying policy sensitivities 
across national boundaries (ibid, 163).  
 
Ruggie’s understanding of international regimes shares such a benign view of the 
restrictions on state managers’ policy autonomy implied by the existence of 
multilateral economic institutions.  He notes that regimes ‘have been defined as 
social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations’, which ‘limit the discretion of their constituent units to decide 
and act on issues that fall within the regime’s domain’ (Ruggie, 1980, 380).  He 
notes that although regimes of this kind are inherently dependent on the backing of a 
financial hegemon, and as such are formed as a reflection of its views and interests – 
in the case of the postwar period, the United States – he nevertheless asserts that the 
regime derived its legitimacy from a widely shared set of social objectives (ibid, 
397-8).  As such, the disciplinary role of regimes is clearly qualified.  Whilst they 
limit the range of policy options open to state managers, it is suggested that they do 
so in a way that is not deterministic: ‘international economic regimes do not 
determine economic transactions’, but rather, ‘play a mediating role, by providing a 
permissive environment for the emergence of certain kinds of transactions, 
specifically transactions that are perceived to be complementary to the normative 
frameworks of the regimes having a bearing on them’ (ibid, 404).     
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The implications of these approaches however, are nevertheless clear.  Whilst there 
is little agreement on whether constraints on a state’s autonomy to make economic 
policy independently are ultimately deterministic, a reflection of the interests of a 
financial hegemon or shared social values, it is nevertheless the case that real 
barriers to the exercise of autonomy in national policy-making by individual states 
are said to exist.  Reflecting this position, it has been argued that within the 
international state system, ‘the very nature of the actors cannot be understood except 
as part of some larger institutional framework’, and that ‘the possible options 
available at any given point in time are constrained by available institutional 
capabilities [that] are themselves a product of choices made during some earlier 
period’ (Krasner, 1988, 72).  Therefore, once states have made a decision to adopt 
the principles and rules of an institutional framework, that framework comes to 
impinge on the range of choices it is possible for them to make in the future.  
Institutional inertia that perpetuates these constraints on policy choices is therefore a 
product of individuals’ sensitivities to cultural norms that are entrenched by a 
process of socialisation, and creates a situation in which the costs of change increase 
greatly leading to ‘long periods of either relative stasis or path-dependent change’ 
(ibid, 73-4).  Or as Cooper (1968, 114) plainly phrases it: ‘the price of international 
rules of good behaviour as set forth in the GATT and the IMF Articles has been a 
reduction in the range of instruments available to policy makers.’ 
 
It is not, however, simply neo-realist scholars that highlight the potential for 
multilateral institutions to influence national states.  This potential for institutions 
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within the global order to influence the state is shared (albeit, developed from a neo-
Gramscian perspective),2 by Robert W. Cox (1981, 136), who argued that in an 
historical structure mediating between ideas, material capabilities and institutions, 
the framework for action contains clear enforcement potential.  However, he argued 
that this kind of power will not be ‘used in order to ensure the dominance of the 
strong to the extent that the weak accept the power relation as legitimate’, and that as 
a result structural power should be understood as hegemonic rather than dictatorial 
(ibid, 137).  He suggests that the historical structure is constituted of three spheres of 
activity – the social forces of production, forms of state, and world orders – which 
are related by the extent to which a change in one can produce a change in the other 
(the social forces of production could, for instance, promote nationalism, which in 
turn could play a role in fragmenting world order) (ibid, 138).  So whilst the state is                                                         
2 There is only potential because a fundamental difficulty caused by the adoption of 
such a neo-Gramscian approach lies in identifying the direction of causality.  Whilst 
the interaction of social forces, forms of state and world orders, implies that change 
in each sphere has the potential to act as the catalyst for change in the other – and 
thereby act as a constraint on other spheres – establishing how this operates in 
practice is problematic. As Burnham (2006a, 30) notes, each level is interrelated, but 
no universal causality assumed, or rather, ‘the question of lines of force is a 
historical one to be answered by a study of a particular case’ (ibid, 32).  As such, it is 
plausible to suggest that each sphere determines the other depending on particular 
historical circumstances, or as Bonefeld (2006, 177) phrases it, ‘depending on 
historical circumstances, the economy is either run by the state or the state is run by 
the economy’.  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not subservient to or bound by the world order per se, its role as an intermediary 
between global social forms and national social forces continues to leave it exposed 
to the hegemonic, if not dictatorial, enforcement potential of the world order, until a 
point is reached at which a fundamental change in one sphere of activity carries 
sufficient influence to bring about a change in the others.3 
 
Gill and Law (1989, 476-79) draw on this position, and have argued that the Bretton-
Woods regime of the postwar period was heavily dependent on the congruence of 
international ideas around the principles of embedded liberalism (ibid, 478), and that 
the power of capital has played a significant role in shaping policy outcomes.  They 
note that it was the contradictory nature of state expenditures implied by embedded 
liberalism and the rise of transnational capital that influenced state behaviour and 
contributed to the decline of the regime.  It is argued that the origins of this decline 
lay in the asymmetry of power between capital and labour, which is evident in the 
fact that an investment strike has a far greater impact on economic conditions than a 
labour strike, and served to contribute directly to the rise of British Thatcherism 
(ibid, 481). They conclude that although there was nothing inevitable about the 
adoption of monetarism and the fiscal orthodoxy this implies, it is clear that within 
the framework of material forces, institutions and ideas, capital has been able to 
exercise its structural power in order to promote ideas of sound finance, and by 
virtue of the fact, has gained hegemonic status in its own right (ibid, 485-6).  
                                                         
3 For a review of Cox’s position, see Bieler and Morton (2006a), for a critique, see 
Burnham (2006a).     
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Neo-liberal, neo-realist, and neo-Gramscian theories therefore each share an 
analytical view of the state that suggests under given conditions, forces outside of 
the state may act to determine policy, force convergence across states, or lock policy 
in to path dependent change.  The mobility of capital is understood to have limited 
the policy autonomy of states because not only does it have the power to create 
currency instability where there is a lack of confidence in economic policy, but also 
because in practice, it is able to either avoid restrictions or impose costs on 
individual states that prevent them from opting out.  Regimes and world orders have 
also been understood to possess enforcement potential, which stems from the 
widespread acceptance of a particular set of shared social and economic values that 
have been institutionalised and subsequently serve to limit the range of options 
available to policy-makers.  Whilst the origins of these shared values are disputed, 
neo-realists arguing from a reflection of the interests of the foreign economic policy 
of the United States, and neo-Gramscians arguing from the interaction of ideas, 
institutions and material capabilities, there is an accepted view that policies must 
converge around these ideas until there is a fundamental change in the world order.  
 
The relative autonomy of the state 
 
Marxian perspectives have approached the issue of state managers’ autonomy in 
economic policy-making from a different point of departure, which focuses not on 
the role of shared ideas and values in creating international regimes or world orders, 
but on how state behaviour has been historically conditioned by the capitalist mode 
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of production.  Within this framework, it has been common to make a distinction 
between structural or instrumental understandings of the role of the state.     
 
At its most basic level, structuralism is reflected in the simplistic economic 
determinism implied by an economic base / political superstructure approach that 
suggests the state has no real policy autonomy from the economy.  However, the 
determinism inherent in the position has led to its widespread rejection.  Although 
the functional claims on which economic determinism relies may be true in the sense 
that ‘no society could survive for long unless it made arrangements for economic 
reproduction, [they are] also trite’ (Jessop, 1990, 84).  This is because the same 
could be said of the state ‘unless it made adequate arrangements for its military 
defence, for internal law and order, for intergenerational reproduction or ideological 
cohesion’: in short, the position ‘ignores the extent to which the economic realm 
lacks the self-sufficiency needed for it to play such a determining role’ (ibid, 84).  A 
great deal of attention has therefore been focussed on the ‘relative autonomy’ of the 
state from the capitalist class and the capitalist mode of production, which has 
clearly drawn out the differences between instrumentalist and structural 
understandings of the state.    
 
The debate between instrumentalism and structuralism has often been characterised 
in terms of the views expressed by Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas in the 
pages of New Left Review in the 1960s and 1970s.  However, Barrow (2008, 84) 
notes that the association of Miliband’s work with instrumentalism in the 1970s 
represents ‘not only an oversimplification and caricature of Miliband’s political 
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theory, but an artificial polemical construct superimposed on his and others’ 
historical and empirical analysis of the state in capitalist society.’  He argues that on 
closer examination, Miliband’s position contains considerable nuance and 
sophistication.  This includes Miliband’s recognition that government power does 
not equate to state power (ibid, 90), his frequent references to the structural 
constraints faced by state managers (ibid, 99), and his recognition of the need for the 
state to have relative autonomy from the capitalist class (ibid, 103).  On this basis, 
Barrow argues that ‘one critic after another acknowledges the sophisticated, nuanced 
and multi-layered analysis in The State and Capitalist Society, but then still proceed 
to debunk his work on the basis of criticisms that apply only to an artificially 
constructed ideal type, rather than to his actual published works’ (ibid, 95).  Jessop 
(2008, 149-53) has also suggested that the debate should be considered a non-debate, 
and that the participants were ‘unable to grasp and depict their opponent’s stance 
within the controversy […] because they conceived the capitalist state in such 
radically different and fundamentally incommensurable terms that they were actually 
discussing two different types of theoretical object’ (ibid, 150).  However, despite 
these misconceptions about the exchange between Miliband and Poulantzas, it 
remains noteworthy for the debate that flowed from it.    
 
The exchange between Miliband and Poulantzas was based on an epistemological 
disagreement on the appropriate focus of study (Poulantzas, 1969, 67).  Poulantzas 
(1969, 69, original emphasis) noted that Miliband approached the problem of the 
capitalist state through ‘a direct reply to bourgeois ideologies by the immediate 
examination of concrete fact’, without any consideration of the Marxist theory of the 
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state.  As such, he argued that this ‘leads Miliband to attack bourgeois ideologies of 
the State whilst placing himself on their own terrain’ (ibid, 69).4   Instead, Poulantzas 
argued that it is not the social origin of members of the ruling class that is the salient 
issue, on the grounds that: 
The relation between the bourgeois class and the State is an objective 
relation. This means that if the function of the State in a determinate social 
formation and the interests of the dominant class in this formation coincide, 
it is by reason of the system itself: the direct participation of members of the 
ruling class in the State apparatus is not the cause but the effect, and 
moreover a chance and contingent one, of this objective coincidence (ibid, 
73, original emphasis).    
 
Understood in this way, Miliband’s position posed problems for explaining the 
politics of economic policy-making, because, as Block (1987, 53) notes, it is widely 
accepted by critics of instrumentalism that in order ‘to act in the general interest of 
capital, the state must be able to take actions against the particular interests of 
capitalists.’  This requires the state to ‘have some autonomy from direct ruling-class                                                         
4 Jessop (1990, 29-30) likewise noted, ‘Miliband is interested in confronting liberal 
theorists of democracy with the “facts” about the social background, personal ties 
and shared values of economic and political elites’ which does not strictly advance a 
theory of the capitalist state, but rather ‘reproduces the liberal tendency to discuss 
politics in isolation from its complex articulation from economic forces’, whereas 
Poulantzas identifies the state as a complex social relation in order to debunk the 
idea that ‘the modern state is no more than a pliant tool of monopoly capital.’ 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control’ (ibid, 53).  This view stems from Marx’s assertion that the ‘state can only 
truly serve the ruling class in so far as it is relatively autonomous from the diverse 
fractions of this class’ (Poulantzas, 1969, 74).  In this instance, the simple 
association of the relationship between the social background of political and 
economic elites with those of the dominant capitalist class fails to account for the 
relative autonomy that is required by political elites so that they may take the 
necessary actions against the interests of particular fractions of capital in order to 
sustain capitalist relations of production as a whole (ibid, 74).   
 
This position however, is replete with its own shortcomings, the most fundamental 
of which is Miliband’s (1970, 57) assertion that the relative autonomy position does 
nothing more than substitute the ideas of objective relations and objective structures 
for the idea of a ruling class.  As such, the implications of the relative autonomy 
thesis are that ‘the state is not “manipulated” by the ruling class into doing its 
bidding: it does so autonomously but totally because of the “objective relations” 
imposed upon it by the system’ (ibid, 57).  This, Miliband argues, closely resembles 
a ‘kind of structural determinism, or rather a structural super-determinism, which 
makes impossible a truly realistic consideration of the dialectical relationship 
between the state and the system’ (ibid, 57).    
 
The logical extension of the relative autonomy thesis to the point of ‘structural 
super-determinism’ is not the only grounds on which the position has been criticised.  
There is also a considerable question with regards to the limits of the state’s 
autonomy, if indeed it is understood to be relatively autonomous from the capitalist 
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class, and the way in which the necessary limits on state power can be enforced if the 
state is to continue to be viewed as relatively autonomous.  As Block (1987, 53) 
phrases it, ‘the difficult [sic] is in specifying the nature, limits, and determinants of 
the relative autonomy.’  On this problematic, it is worth quoting him at length: 
Relative autonomy theories assume that the ruling class will respond 
effectively to the state’s abuse of that autonomy.   But for the ruling class to 
be capable of taking such corrective actions, it must have some degree of 
political cohesion, an understanding of its general interests, and a high degree 
of political sophistication […] yet if the ruling class or a segment of it is 
class-conscious, then the degree of autonomy of the state is clearly quite 
limited (ibid, 53). 
From this perspective, the relative autonomy thesis ‘collapses back into a slightly 
more sophisticated version of instrumentalism’ (ibid, 53).   Whilst Block (ibid, 54) 
suggests that this problem can be overcome with the adoption of a framework that 
indentifies a division of labour between capitalists engaged in accumulation and 
political elites, Jessop offers a more radical, and ultimately, neater approach.  He 
suggests that ‘the concept of “relative autonomy” as a principle of explanation can 
be consigned to the theoretical dustbin’ (Jessop, 1990, 103).   
 
As an alternative, he proposes that the relationship between state and the economy 
be based in the concept of autopoiesis (Jessop, 1990; see also Jessop, 2001).  In 
contrast to the relative autonomy thesis, autopoietic theories propose a condition of 
radical autonomy that ‘emerges when the system in question defines its own 
boundaries relative to its environment, develops its own unifying operational code, 
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implements its own programmes […] obeys its own laws of motion’ (Jessop, 1990, 
320); ‘there are no external controls on their internal reorganization and the only 
internal constraint is the goal of self-reproduction’ (ibid, 321)5.   
 
The state and the economy are therefore defined as self-referential, self-reproducing 
and self-regulating systems, structurally coupled and which, whilst mutually 
indifferent, nevertheless ‘form part of each other’s environments and must co-exist 
and co-evolve in the same ecological system’ (ibid, 328).  Jessop suggests that the 
application of autopoietic theory to Marxist assumptions about the primacy of the 
economic system is therefore able to avoid both economic reductionism and the 
pitfalls of the relative autonomy thesis, if the primacy of the economic system is both 
qualified by the level of its autopoietic existence relative to other sub-systems and 
limited to understandings of capitalist societies (ibid, 334).  In the context of Marx’s 
understanding of the necessary role of crisis in creating conditions for renewed 
accumulation, the concept of structural coupling indicates that the state and economy 
interact in a fashion in which ‘the development of one structure affects the evolution 
of the other: but it neither controls it in a hierarchical relation of command nor                                                         
5 State centric theories, although distinctive from autopoietic theories, have also 
suggested that states and state elites form and pursue preferences in an independent 
way.  For instance, Skocpol and Weir (1985), note that appointed and elected 
officials have their own interests and work in order to devise policies that have the 
best chance of furthering those interests, or at least not harming them, in a way 
consistent with the coercive, fiscal, judicial and administrative capacities of the state 
structure.   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subordinates it through a functionalist logic which requires one system to act for and 
on behalf of the other system’ (ibid, 359).   
 
Open Marxism and the state as social form 
 
Despite disagreements on the nature and extent of the state’s autonomy from the 
economy, the accounts reviewed above all share in common a view of the state as a 
separate sphere of action, which presumes that it is possible for markets to impinge 
on its sovereignty or affect its development under given conditions.  They also each 
lack a coherent and sustainable theory of economic action that goes beyond the 
implicit assumption of rationality. This exposes non-Marxist theories to the criticism 
that they represent little more than a ‘black-box’ understanding of policy outputs 
akin to a simplistic pluralism.  Instrumentalist and structuralist Marxist accounts can 
likewise be criticised on the grounds that ‘the first position is simply radical-
sounding pluralism, [and] the second is an equally untenable Marxified Parsonian 
structural functionalism’ (Burnham, 1995, 95). 
 
In response to these inadequacies, Holloway (1995, 119) has argued that in order to 
understand change it is necessary to ‘go beyond the category of “the state”, or rather 
we need to go beyond the assumption of the separateness of the different states to 
find a way of discussing their unity.’  To do so, he argues, it is necessary to 
‘understand the state not as a thing in itself, but as a social form, a form of social 
relations’ (ibid, 116).  This is based on an understanding that just as in the natural 
sciences, there are no absolute separations in social relations, which are actually 
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‘fluid, unpredictable, unstable, often passionate [and] rigidify into certain forms, 
forms which appear to acquire their own autonomy’ (ibid, 116).  The state therefore, 
should be seen as ‘a relation between people which does not appear to be a relation 
between people, a social relation which exists in the form of something external to 
social relations’ (ibid, 116-7).  The state should be seen to appear in its fetishised 
form from the development of the antagonistic and crisis-prone relations of capitalist 
production: ‘the very existence of the state is a constant process of struggle’ (ibid, 
122).   
 
Werner Bonefeld also takes this position.  His examination of the state focuses on a 
discussion of the political and economic as constituting a unity that exists as a 
moment of contradiction, with the role performed by the state shaped by class 
struggle between capital and labour (Bonefeld, 1992, 98).  In this formulation, ‘the 
economic and the political, although seemingly existing independently from each 
other, stand to each other as moments of one process’ (ibid, 100), and it is the social 
relations of production – ‘that is the class antagonism between capital and labour’ 
(ibid, 100) – which represent both the constitution and processes of social 
phenomena such as the state.   As he eloquently phrases it:  
political relations do not primarily correspond to, or reproduce, economic 
relations (the so called functions of the state for capitalist accumulation).  
Rather, the political complements the economic only in a mediated form as a 
moment moving within the proper motion of class antagonism.  The state is 
not a state in a capitalist society, but rather a moment of the class antagonism 
of capital and labour (ibid, 113). 
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The state therefore, ‘is not autonomous, or simply related to “the economy”, rather it 
is an integral aspect of the set of social relations whose overall form is determined by 
the manner in which the extraction of surplus from the immediate producer is 
secured’ (Burnham, 1995, 93).  As such, states ‘are not to be thought of as “thing-
like” institutions losing power to the market’ (Burnham, 2006b, 76; see also 
Burnham, 2001a, 108)6.   
 
Understanding the state’s relationship to the economy in this way – perceiving of the 
state as a social form – makes it necessary to examine the implications of those 
social relations if we are to understand the role of the state in a capitalist economy. 
These social relations are generally perceived to be unstable and crisis prone because 
of the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production.  In Grundrisse, 
Marx noted of the capitalist mode of production that the ‘universality towards which 
it irresistibly strives encounters barriers in its own nature, which will, at a certain 
stage of its development, allow it to be recognized as being itself the greatest barrier 
to this tendency, and hence will drive towards its own suspension’ (Marx, 1973, 
410).  The basis of these inherent crisis prone tendencies are said to lie in the 
constant evolution of the forces of production and the conflicts that this evolution 
creates within the social relations of production (Harvey, 2006, 180); the limits to 
production founded on capital are therefore based in the recognition that ‘capital is                                                         
6 Bieler and Morton (2003, 467-472) offer a brief review of such open Marxist 
theories of the state in their paper ‘Globalisation, the state and class struggle: a 
“Critical Economy” engagement with Open Marxism’. See also Bieler and Morton 
(2006b).   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not, as the economists believe, the absolute form for the forces of production [but] 
appears as the condition of the development of the forces of production as long as 
they require an external spur, which appears at the same time as their bridle’ (Marx, 
1973, 415, original emphasis).   
 
Simon Clarke (2001, 95-6) notes that these inherent contradictions stem not from the 
anarchy of capitalism, but from the development of the forces of production aimed at 
the increase of exploitation and profit which is imposed on the capitalist by virtue of 
competition, and Harvey (2006, 192) has identified what he describes as a ‘first-cut’ 
theory of crisis.  This is based on the contradiction between ‘the capitalists’ 
necessary passion for surplus-value-producing technological change’ and the ‘social 
imperative “accumulation for accumulation’s sake”’, which produces ‘a surplus of 
capital relative to opportunities to employ that capital’, or a state of 
overaccumulation.  This perpetuates a tendency to produce ‘non-values’ through the 
employment of labour in the production of ‘commodities that cannot fulfil social 
wants and needs’ (ibid, 194), and results in the overproduction of commodities, 
surplus inventories, idle capital, increasing unemployment, and falling rates of 
return, as part of a process of devaluation that serves to exacerbate the antagonisms 
between capital and labour.  As Simon Clarke (2001, 96-8) argues, overproduction 
and overaccumulation are intrinsically linked to the impoverishment and de-skilling 
of workers which polarises the dominant social classes and exacerbates struggle with 
a political character and on a national scale as workers form unions in order to 
protect their own interests.  As Bonefeld (1992, 112) notes, ‘the compulsion on each 
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individual capital, if its devaluation is to be avoided […] forces upon each capital the 
necessity of expelling living labour from the process of production.’ 
 
The possibility of overaccumulation therefore, poses inherent problems for the state.  
This is because the contradiction between the interests of labour and capital inherent 
in the expansion of accumulation intensifies as the rate of exploitation increases, and 
because the conditions for profitable accumulation are not naturally occurring, but 
require the state to intervene in order to smooth the circuit of capital.  The state 
therefore appears to have clear and contradictory roles to play, both in ensuring the 
conditions for renewed accumulation, and in negating class antagonisms inherent in 
the social relations of production. This challenge is amplified by the global character 
of accumulation, which stands in contrast to the national political constitution of the 
state (Burnham, 1995, 94; Holloway, 1995, 125-6), which is ‘defined, historically 
and repeatedly, through their relation to the totality of capitalist relations’ 
(Holloway, 1995, 125). This requires the state to both attract and retain globally 
mobile capital and manage the class antagonisms this produces at a domestic level.   
 
On the national manifestation of the state and the global character of accumulation, 
Burnham (1995, 103) notes:  
the neo-realist image of independent and equal sovereign nation states is a 
fetishised form of appearance, since the global system does not comprise an 
aggregation of compartmentalised units, but is rather a single system in 
which state power is allocated between territorial entities. 
  45 
Therefore, it is necessary to move beyond images of the state conceived along 
fundamentally national lines on the grounds that individual states are simply 
localised manifestations of the social relations of capitalist production that are 
fundamentally global in character.  Individual nation states therefore, are linked 
through international systems of exchange that mean money is not bound by 
individual currencies, and in so far as states are dependent on attracting money as the 
source of their revenue, states are ‘confined within limits imposed by the 
accumulation of capital on a world scale’ (ibid, 103).  This introduces an 
international element into domestic state interests broadly conceived, on the grounds 
that the management of domestic class antagonisms is dependent on the maintenance 
of global capital relations more broadly: ‘whilst each national state strives to regulate 
the terms of class conflict within its jurisdiction, the overall interests of national 
states are not directly opposed, and relations of antagonism and collaboration are 
thereby reproduced at the interstate level’ (ibid, 103).  Although ‘national states 
pursue a plethora of policies […] the “success” of these “national” policies depends 
upon re-establishing conditions for the expanded accumulation of capital on a global 
scale’ (ibid, 105).   
 
On this point, Holloway is agreed.  On the grounds that the state is a manifestation of 
class struggle inherent in the social relations of production, and the fact that these 
relationships between people exist in an undefined space, he notes: 
The global nature of capitalist social relations is thus not the result of the 
recent “internationalisation” or “globalisation” of capital […] Rather, it is 
inherent in the nature of the capitalist relation of exploitation as a relation, 
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mediated through money, between free worker and free capitalist, a relation 
freed from spatial constraint (Holloway, 1995, 123).   
As a result of this freedom of capital within the spatially unlimited relations of 
production therefore, and as a result of the state’s dependence on the reproduction of 
these relations within its own boundaries, ‘it must seek to attract and, once attracted, 
to immobilise capital within its territory’, and it is the ‘existence of more or less 
favourable conditions for capital accumulation in different state territories’ that 
creates the impression of relative positions of hegemony or subordination (ibid, 127).  
 
Critics of the Open Marxist position have suggested that its focus on the social 
relations of capitalist production demonstrates a tendency to ‘project a “totalising” 
theory, rooted in central organising principles, capable of accounting for the myriad 
of contradictory forms of relations between capital, the state and labour’ (Bieler and 
Morton, 2003, 473); or as Bruff (2009, 337) phrases it, ‘Open Marxism’s ontology 
totalises human social practice by way of its focus on capitalist social relations.’  He 
notes that the emphasis on the essential properties of accumulation means that ‘the 
epistemological modesty proclaimed by Open Marxists […] is in fact an assertion of 
epistemological austerity’ (ibid, 337, original emphasis).   This has led for a call to 
‘move beyond the Puritanism of Open Marxism and embrace richer accounts of 
human social practice in capitalist societies’ (ibid, 341) through the examination of a 
broader range of social relations, a position shared by Roberts (2002, 88), who notes 
that ‘open Marxists have yet to develop a set of categories which usefully allow us to 
explore the distinct ideological characteristics of social forms of life which, at first 
glance, seem to have nothing whatsoever in common with capital and labour.’  
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‘What does it mean to say’, Roberts asks, ‘that writing poetry can be analysed 
through the capital-labour relation?’ (ibid, 88).   
 
These criticisms suggesting that open Marxism actually presents totalising ontology 
and a closed theory of human social practices however, misrepresent the position.   
As Werner Bonefeld notes (2009, 357), open Marxism makes no attempt to elevate 
laws of historically specific social organisations into general laws of history, but 
‘seeks to dissolve the autarky of things by revealing their social constitution in 
human practice.’  This means that the way in which ‘things’ appear under given 
historical conditions in their fetishised forms, ‘does not make [them] any less 
“human”, as if the world of things were a world apart’ (ibid, 357).   As such, open 
Marxism’s understanding of the state as a nationally manifested moment in the crisis 
prone social relations of global capitalist accumulation does not determine the way 
in which national capitalisms develop, or imply convergence around a particular 
system of managing accumulation,7 beyond the general constraint that state 
managers must act in order to create conditions conducive to the general 
reproduction of those relations and to manage the class antagonisms this gives rise 
to.  As Bonefeld (2009, 357) succinctly phrases it, ‘the anatomy of the man can 
explain the anatomy of the ape, but […] the anatomy of the ape does not explain the 
anatomy of the man.’ 
                                                         
7 There is a wide literature on national varieties of capitalism. See inter alia Whitley 
(1998), Dore, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1999), Allen (2004).  However, the classic 
volume is Hall and Soskice eds. (2001). For a review of the text see Howell (2003). 
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So far in this section I have made a number of claims.  Firstly, I have argued that the 
state should be conceived as a manifestation of the class antagonism inherent in the 
crisis prone social relations of capitalist production, and that this is a national 
manifestation in relation to the global character of accumulation.  Secondly, I have 
shown that this requires states to act in the general interest of accumulation in order 
to ensure the reproduction of these relations, and that this requires states to attract 
internationally mobile capital and attempt to de-mobilise it by creating favourable 
conditions for profitability relative to other nations.  Finally, I have argued that these 
general constraints are intrinsic, not disciplinary, and do not determine the specific 
ways in which individual states will seek to attract and retain capital or regulate 
accumulation and the class struggle inherent therein.  The question however remains, 
of how state managers are able to act in the general interests of accumulation without 
precipitating a political crisis when the costs of these policies must often be carried 
by labour, on which the political legitimacy of state managers depends.  
 
Governing strategies and the politics of depoliticisation 
 
Each of the objectives that the state derives from its nature as a feature of the social 
relations of production, such as a ready supply of cheap labour for exploitation, low 
rates of corporate taxation, and a robust counter inflation strategy (see Kettell, 2004, 
19), shares in common the fact that the costs associated with them are most likely to 
be borne by labour, on whom the political legitimacy of governing parties and state 
managers is dependent.  The tendency for actions the state must take to smooth the 
process of accumulation to exacerbate class antagonisms is therefore problematic 
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from the point of view of the government’s statecraft and other high political 
objectives, specifically the objective of achieving and maintaining office.8 
 
A successful statecraft9 strategy, it has been argued, includes five dimensions.  These 
are party management, a winning electoral strategy, political argument hegemony, 
governing competence, and another winning electoral strategy.  Party management 
refers to the need for party leaders to foster and maintain a good relationship with its 
backbenchers, party bureaucracy and pressure groups on whose support it depends 
(Bulpitt, 1986, 21).  A winning electoral strategy requires the manufacture of a 
package of policies that can be sold to the electorate, whilst political argument 
hegemony refers to the party’s ability to achieve a level of dominance in the elite 
debate about the nature of problems and the policies required to resolve them (ibid, 
21-2).  Governing competence refers to the ability of governments to foster belief 
that policy choices are correct, whilst another winning electoral strategy is, of 
course, self-explanatory (ibid, 22).  An important feature to take from this model of 
statecraft however, is that ‘there is no reason why the electoral strategy and political 
argument dimensions should “fit” its operations under the governing competence                                                         
8 Offe (1975, 126, original emphasis) long ago noted that ‘the existence of a 
capitalist state presupposes the systematic denial of its nature as a capitalist state’, 
but argued that ultimately, states are unable to perform and balance all of their 
necessary functions despite their continued attempts to find a strategy that permits 
this (ibid, 144).    
9 Bulpitt (1986, 21) defines statecraft as ‘the art of winning elections and achieving 
some degree of governing competence in office.’ 
  50 
category’ (ibid, 22), and it is from the reality of this position that state managers in 
contemporary capitalism can achieve their high political aims and act in the interests 
of accumulation without unduly exacerbating class antagonisms. 
 
In order to contain these class antagonisms, state managers may at times find it 
expedient in order to manage the economy in an overtly politicised way, with the 
state playing a direct and highly visible role in economic management.  The clearest 
example of this is the kind of state management of the economy associated with 
post-war Keynesian social democracy in Britain, when the government took 
responsibility for the provision of welfare and the level of unemployment (Kettell, 
2004, 25).  However, the politicisation of economic policy issues carries with it 
inherent risks.  As Kettell (ibid, 25) notes, ‘state intervention can lead to the 
politicisation of issues which have hitherto been regarded as being of a purely 
“economic” character […] and can thus lead to growing demands and pressure over 
these issues being directed at the state itself.’  However, as the state must act in order 
to renew conditions for profitable accumulation, this has the potential to exacerbate 
class conflict to the point that governing authorities are called into question.  As 
Kettell (ibid, 25) phrases it, ‘in such circumstances this can aggravate class unrest, 
and can even lead to a wholesale crisis of political authority itself.’  Therefore, given 
the inherent risks of politicised modes of governing the economy, state managers 
have often employed strategies geared towards reducing the political salience of 
economic policy-making, through the politics of depoliticisation. 
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 As Burnham (2001b, 127-8) explains, depoliticisation is a statecraft strategy through 
which governments aim to achieve a certain level of governing competence in the 
realm of economic management by distancing themselves from policy decisions, but 
which nevertheless remains a highly political governing strategy (ibid, 136).  As 
such, Flinders and Buller (2006, 295-6, original emphasis) have defined 
depoliticisation as ‘the range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which 
politicians can attempt to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to 
persuade the demos that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a 
certain issue, policy field or specific decision.’  However, the quintessential 
definition of depoliticisation is that of Burnham (1999, 47; 2001b, 128), who writes 
that it ‘is the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision 
making.’  He notes that by employing a strategy of depoliticisation, ‘in many 
respects state managers retain arms-length control of economic processes while 
benefitting from the distancing effects of depoliticisation’ (Burnham, 1999, 47, see 
also 2001b, 127).   
 
Discussion of depoliticisation therefore does not attempt to remove the politics from 
economic policy-making.  As Kettell (2008, 631) notes, ‘in a democratic polity, 
where the political legitimacy of government derives from the pursuit of the 
“national interest” […] policy-making must […] display at least a semblant of a 
connection to the views and wishes of the electorate’, but despite the innate political 
nature of strategies of depoliticisation, its benefits are clear.  By reducing the 
salience of particular issues in the eyes of the electorate, or making a convincing 
case that certain issues lie beyond the scope of discretionary decision making, the 
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government can ‘change expectations about the effectiveness and credibility of 
decision making’ (Burnham, 1999, 47), which makes it less likely that an economic 
crisis will escalate into a political crisis that has the potential to undermine the 
legitimacy of the governing party when the social and economic costs of policies 
required to resolve it fall on the general population (Kettell, 2008, 631).   As such, it 
is possible to see the logic of markets, and the appearance that power has moved 
from states to markets, as ‘providing the strongest possible public justification 
governments can muster for maintaining downward pressure on wages’. Market 
rhetoric and rules can therefore ‘provide governments with considerable power vis-
à-vis the working class’ (Burnham, 1999, 47). 
 
Methods of depoliticising economic policy-making have, on the one hand, been 
framed in terms of debates surrounding ‘rules’ versus ‘discretion’, however Flinders 
and Buller (2006) have attempted to move beyond this dichotomy, and suggested 
that strong and distant rules are not the only ways in which governments can 
depoliticise difficult aspects of policy.  They identify three such ways.  The first of 
these is institutional depoliticisation, which occurs when a ‘formalised principal 
agent relationship is established in which the former (elected politician) sets broad 
parameters while the latter (appointed administrator or governing board) enjoys day-
to-day managerial and specialist freedom within the broad framework set’ (ibid, 
298).  The second way in which state managers can depoliticise policy is rule-based 
depoliticisation, in which state managers adopt ‘a policy that builds explicit rules 
into the decision-making process that constrain the need for political discretion’ 
(ibid, 303-4).  The final strategy they identify is preference shaping depoliticisation.  
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This involves ‘recourse to ideological, discursive or rhetorical claims in order to 
justify a political position that a certain issue or function does, or should, lie beyond 
the scope of politics or the capacity for state control’ (ibid, 307).         
 
It comes as no surprise that British elites in economic policy-making have used 
strategies of depoliticisation in order to change expectations about the credibility of 
decision making and to insulate the governing parties from the potential 
consequences of unpopular policies, in either a historical or a contemporary context.  
It has been argued that the return to the Gold-Standard at the pre-war parity of $4.86 
in 1925, for instance, would encourage the control of wages, economic 
modernisation, and facilitate an adjustment from declining industries to newer forms 
of production whilst helping to ‘insulate the core executive from the adverse 
consequences of these economic effects’ (Kettell, 2004, 166-7).  Kunz (1987, 91) 
has likewise argued that in 1931 the Bank of England was concerned about British 
budgetary excesses and believed ‘that the Government needed to be pushed into 
action and the most effective prod would be a loss of gold’, and Burnham (2003) has 
shown how in 1952 the Treasury considered abandoning the fixed rate under 
Bretton-Woods in order to shift the strain of the balance of payments deficit from the 
reserves to the rate.    
 
There is also a burgeoning literature that suggests Britain’s membership of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism from 1990-92 helped to anchor the economy by 
imposing a robust anti-inflationary strategy whilst offsetting the political 
consequences of austerity (see Bonefeld and Burnham 1996, 1998; Burnham, 1999, 
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Kettell, 2008), and the New Labour government’s decision to grant the Bank of 
England monetary policy autonomy in 1997 is presented as a clear example of 
institutional depoliticisation (Burnham, 2001b).  In addition to the Bank of 
England’s independence, Watson and Hay (2003, 290) have also demonstrated the 
way in which New Labour has used contemporary discourses on economic policy 
making as an expedient way to invoke ‘globalisation as an exogenous economic 
constraint […] to render the otherwise contingent necessary.’10 
 
Conclusions  
 
In this chapter I have shown that there is a wide variety of literature suggesting that 
the imperatives of global finance possess disciplinary potential, are able to penalise 
states in the event that confidence in economic policies breaks, and that states’ 
subscription to the principles and norms of international regimes and multilateral 
institutions exposes them to various enforcement mechanisms, with differing degrees 
of emphasis placed on the consensual limits of policy autonomy that play a role in 
locking policy in to path dependent change.  Neo-Gramscians also note that the 
world order contains enforcement potential, whilst a wide variety of Marxist                                                         
10 See also Matthew Watson (2006), who draws on the depoliticisation thesis from a 
classical liberal perspective to demonstrate the way in which people have become 
increasingly socialised to accept the links between the imperatives of legitimation 
and accumulation as a means of resolving the ‘coordination problem’ that arises out 
of the contradiction between economic and social behaviour, as reflected in Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments. 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literature has debated the nature of the state’s autonomy from the economy and its 
implications for economic policy-making, ranging from the complete absence of 
policy autonomy implied by economic determinism, through various understandings 
of the relative autonomy thesis, to the radial autonomy theory of autopoiesis.   
 
I have also demonstrated that each of these approaches shares in common their 
reliance on the assumption that the state and the economy are fundamentally 
separate, which fails to acknowledge the role of social interaction and implies that 
governments are nothing more than rational vote winners or circuit managers, and 
that market actors are simply rational profit seekers.  But most fundamentally, the 
artificial separation of the state and market on which they rely suggests that markets 
have the ability to play a key role in determining policy outputs through the exercise 
of structural power.  I have suggested that this weakness can be resolved by 
perceiving of the state as a social form that is a manifestation of the class 
antagonisms inherent in the social relations of production.  By understanding the 
national basis of the state in relation to the global foundations of accumulation, it is 
then possible to see that the state has a key function in smoothing the inherent crisis 
prone tendencies of capitalist accumulation in order to ensure the reproduction of the 
social relations of production.  This makes state managers subject to the general 
constraints of accumulation, which involves justifying measures of austerity in order 
to be able to attract and retain globally mobile capital whilst managing the increased 
class antagonisms that this creates, but demonstrates that specific policies are not 
determined by the exercise of structural power possessed outside the state when 
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policy diverges from accepted principles and norms as implied by ‘states and 
markets’ approaches.   
 
Rather, the principal problem state managers face is how they can prevent the social 
consequences of these policies from translating into a political crisis.  I have also 
shown that in order to achieve this, there are significant benefits in employing the 
politics of depoliticisation, whereby government appeals to market rules and market 
rhetoric can help to persuade dissenters that certain issues lie or should lie beyond 
the scope of discretionary political action. As such, far from being features of a 
disciplinary system that has the ability to play a determining role in the politics of 
economic policy-making, market rhetoric and rules can provide strong justifications 
for state managers to act according to their imperative to improve conditions for 
profitable accumulation whilst minimising political dissent.  It is also clear that this 
has been common practice for political elites in the twentieth century, however, 
despite widespread awareness of this modus operandi of the British Treasury, the 
Bank of England, and various governing parties, no empirical consideration has yet 
been given to the possibility that such processes were at work from 1974-76. 
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Chapter III 
 
Decisive influence, de-mystifying the IMF crisis, and social learning  
 
In the previous chapter I argued that the state’s form as a moment in the social 
relations of production, inherently shaped by the class antagonisms within the crisis 
prone tendencies of capital accumulation, often provides state managers with the 
incentive to depoliticise difficult aspects of policy by an appeal to the rules or 
rhetoric of market forces, because highly politicised strategies run the risk that an 
economic crisis will quickly escalate into a political crisis.  In relation to the 1976 
IMF crisis, several authors have made the assertion that such a process was at work, 
but it has received no significant empirical examination (see Clarke, S., 1988, 314-5; 
Holloway, 1995, 128; Bonefeld and Burnham, 1998, 41).  Instead, a vast body of 
literature displays continuity of belief that there was no underlying strategic vision to 
British policy.  A significant amount of the literature also advances the position that 
British policy was ultimately determined by external forces, either through the 
exercise of structural power and the imposition of IMF conditionality, or the 
simultaneous occurrences of inflation and unemployment that served to undermine 
the Keynesian paradigm and force policy-makers to adopt new policies as part of a 
process of social learning.  In between these two positions sit principally narrative 
accounts of the IMF crisis. As such, it is possible to outline three broad approaches 
to studies of the 1976 IMF crisis, which this chapter reviews in turn: 
1. Accounts that have emphasised the extent to which the events in the run up to 
December 1976, and December 1976 itself, played a decisive role in 
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imposing retrenchment on a reluctant Labour government.  This argument 
has been developed substantially from ‘global finance’, ‘regimes’ and 
structural Marxist perspectives.   
2. Narrative accounts that have aimed to de-mystify the events surrounding the 
1976 IMF crisis by demonstrating how policy changes that have often been 
associated with IMF conditionality were in place before December 1976.  
These accounts have either denied that there was a strategic element to 
British policy – suggesting instead that it was made largely ‘on the hoof’ – or 
make no attempt to engage substantively with the question of the extent to 
which British economic policy outputs were determined by external forces 
during the crisis.  3. Accounts that associate policy changes during the 1976 IMF crisis with a 
process of social learning.  These accounts emphasise constraints on 
economic policy-making in so far as they suggest that the delegitimation of 
the Keynesian paradigm forced policy-makers to consider new theoretical 
approaches, and limited the range of choices they could make which had the 
potential to preserve overseas confidence. 
 
Decisive influence 
  
The decisive influence hypothesis attempts to identify specific processes and 
institutions through which pressure was directly exerted on the British government 
during the 1976 IMF crisis.  Firstly, it has been suggested that the system of global 
finance and the nature of international regimes that underscore it have 
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overemphasised the degree of cooperation and the mutual benefits they contain, to 
the point of disguising the way in which these structures actually operate on a 
coercive basis.  Secondly, it has been argued that there is a natural tendency for 
radical socialist solutions to economic crises to be moderated by the fact that the 
context within which the government must operate is a capitalist global economy.   
 
Bernstein’s thesis on the 1976 IMF crisis reflects the first position, with a specific 
focus on the influences operating on economic policy-making through the 
international system of global finance, and specifically through the control of access 
to international credit.  She has identified three distinct phases of borrowing, which 
serve to increasingly limit the autonomy available to domestic policy-makers as they 
pass from each phase of borrowing to the next.  This system is described as ‘an 
international hierarchy of lending […] which provides the framework for 
international influence’ (Bernstein, 1983, 657).  In the first phase of borrowing, 
finance is freely available from private institutions and there is little pressure for 
governments to change their policies because there are no existing mechanisms for 
the effective exercise of such influence.  In the second phase, private financial 
avenues have been exhausted and governments must seek recourse to other central 
banks, which may impose conditions such as future recourse to the International 
Monetary Fund if a satisfactory improvement in economic conditions is not achieved 
within a given timescale.  If this is the case, governments then become subject to the 
third-tier of the hierarchy, where ‘international influence is direct, and lending is 
conditional on policy changes bargained with the IMF as the representative of 
international creditors’ (ibid, 657-8).   
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The ability for the structure of global finance to restrict national policy autonomy 
through the IMF is also developed by Harmon from the perspective of regime 
theory, which, he argues, disguises the extent to which coercion plays an important 
role in the creation and maintenance of international economic regimes.  He notes:  
Functionalist voluntarism […] leads to an underemphasis both on the roles of 
coercion in regime formation and on the importance of discipline and the 
manipulation of incentives and punishments in sustaining regime 
arrangements.  The normative bias in favour of cooperation within the regime 
concept tends to confuse international “cooperation” with what might be 
more appropriately characterized as manipulative coercion and the discipline 
of enforcing cooperation (Harmon, 1997, 15).  
He argues that manifestations of the implicit costs suggested by regime theory in the 
event that policy does not coincide with established principles and norms can be 
clearly identified in the fact that ‘runs on the currency and a loss of confidence in the 
future value of assets denominated in that currency can occur in the face of real or 
perceived movements away from the liberal norms that embody the postwar 
regimes’ (ibid, 15).  This is especially problematic for governments in deficit, who 
will find financial assistance forthcoming only with conditions attached (ibid, 16).   
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Bernstein notes that the application of a strict sixth month time limit to the $5.3 
billion G101 stand-by in June 1976 was a key moment when the forces of global 
finance began to limit the policy autonomy of the British government, but she notes 
that for reasons of political acceptability, explicit conditionality relating to the details 
of policy were not applied before recourse to the Fund.  She concedes that ‘there is 
little question that the Fund is – and defines itself […] as “the creditors’ 
instrument”’, but also notes that it has an appearance of political neutrality stemming 
from the multilateralism that underscores it, which allows it to ‘fulfil a set of 
functions which other creditors are reluctant or unable to perform’ (Bernstein, 1983, 
50).  On this, Harmon (1997, 145-6) agrees: 
Loan conditionality is more tolerable when the policy changes can be 
presented by the economic authorities as their own decision.  In June 1976, 
explicit bilateral conditionality – i.e., overt American involvement and 
intervention into British domestic policy decisions – would have been 
unacceptable.    
 
The June stand-by is therefore seen as an important bridge in the transition between 
low conditionality borrowings and the explicit constraints placed on British 
economic policy by IMF conditionality, and Harmon has used the Labour Party’s 
pre-election commitments and manifestos in order to demonstrate the extent of the 
influence that these coercive forces ultimately had on British policy.  He notes that                                                         
1 Minus France and Italy, plus the Bank for International Settlements and 
Switzerland.  Hereafter this group is referred to as G10 for the purposes of 
convenient abbreviation. 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both Harold Wilson and Anthony Crosland had believed that the main problem the 
Labour government had faced during its incumbency from 1964-70 had been the 
inherited balance of payments position which became more acute because of low 
levels of growth and sterling’s role in the international payments system.  It was this 
view, he suggests, that precipitated the commitment in Labour’s Programme 1973, 
that ‘Labour will refuse to distort the domestic economy in order to maintain an 
unrealistic exchange rate’, and the assertion that ‘Britain must avoid international 
commitments which might hamper growth’ (Labour Party, 1973, 16), which he 
understands as a significant ‘disavowal of an exchange rate commitment’ (Harmon, 
1997, 55).   
 
He also notes that Labour’s domestic objectives were couched in language 
associated with the social democratic heritage, and that many of them were radical in 
comparison to the party’s recent revisionist past, especially the commitment to make 
steps towards the ‘redistribution of incomes and wealth [and] the greater 
accountability of economic power’ (ibid, 60).   He notes that by the end of 1976, the 
possibility for the Labour government to realistically achieve any of these objectives 
had escaped them, that this state of affairs was a direct result of ‘the chronic lack of 
market confidence that was made manifest with the persistent downward pressure on 
sterling’, and that it must be recognised that the IMF played the decisive role in the 
sense that ‘it was only with the explicit binding of the policy of the British economic 
authorities that the economic and political crises in Britain in 1976 were resolved’ 
(ibid, 229-30).  On this, Karen Bernstein is agreed; she argues that whether or not 
measures taken by the Labour government independently of the Fund would have 
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been sufficient to resolve the crisis is a moot point, because it cannot be answered 
(Bernstein, 1983, 649).  She argues that as history stands, measures in place before 
the crisis were not sufficient to resolve it, and that this resolution occurred only when 
policies ‘along the lines preferred by creditors and sufficient as defined by them’ 
were in place (ibid, 658).   Neither author perceives the fact that elements of the 
Treasury and the Bank of England had decided that policy changes were desirable in 
order to turn the British economy around prior to the crisis as significant (Bernstein, 
1983, 367; Harmon 1997, 145) – Harmon because of his belief that for autonomy to 
exist the government must have a range of options from which to choose, which he 
believes had gone by December 1976 (Harmon, 1997, 6), and Bernstein (1983, 656) 
on the grounds that ‘although the eventual cuts were desired by a portion of the 
Government, it would be difficult to argue that they were desired by the Government 
as a whole.’ 
 
Both of these extensive accounts reflect understandings of the relationship between 
state and market in terms of their separateness, and identify constraints on policy 
autonomy akin to those implied by the logic of global finance and regime theory.  
However, the argument that the British state’s autonomy in economic policy-making 
was bound during the IMF crisis has also been made from a structural Marxist 
perspective by David Coates (1980), who uses a distinctly partisan register in order 
to highlight the way in which structural forces manifest in the inherent contradictions 
of the capitalist world economy served to limit the policy autonomy of the Labour 
government.  Policy changes, he asserts, can be understood as the Labour 
government’s response to four paradoxes it faced in the global economy.  The first of 
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these was the fact that ‘the foreign loans raised to prevent immediate and draconian 
cuts in the social wage in the end (by the burden that their repayments place on 
Government spending in total) became one cause of the severity of the cuts in social 
expenditure that had to be imposed’ (Coates, 1980, 19).  Secondly, ‘the international 
indebtedness of the economy made the pound weak [and] worked against the 
restructuring of industry that indebtedness required’ (ibid, 20).  Thirdly, he argues 
that ‘inflationary pressures kept industrial costs high and product demand low, and 
so squeezed the rate of return on investment at the very time when the cost of 
borrowing was so high that only the most profitable ventures could generate the rate 
of return required to cover the borrowing costs involved’ (ibid, 22).  Finally, he notes 
that ‘the existence of a public sector deficit was vital to the maintenance of existing 
levels of output and employment, but its financing militated against the 
strengthening of those in the next period’ (ibid, 25).   
 
In confronting these paradoxes, he believes that the government was compelled to 
act in favour of capital at the expense of its more radical aspirations, and that this 
process represents part of a wider trend for Labour governments in power to 
‘succumb to more moderate aspirations and more conservative policies as they 
experience the constraints that can be exercised against a reforming government by 
centres of private power’ (ibid, 154).  He argues that economic recovery in Britain 
required a coordinated effort between all powerful British interests and would have 
been best achieved by creating a climate of social justice, and that the tragedy of the 
1974-79 Labour government was to discover ‘how incompatible the search for social 
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justice was to be with the requirements of significantly placed groupings both inside 
and outside Britain’ (ibid, 16). 
 
In addition to the accounts framed explicitly by theories of the state that emphasise 
its separateness from the market, and the ability of the market to discipline state 
managers, the decisive influence thesis is also reflected by the official history of the 
International Monetary Fund, which reviews all of the significant reforms of the 
international monetary system and Fund activities since its creation in 1944.  It notes 
that the context of the events of 1976 was one shaped fundamentally by the OPEC 
price increases of 1973, which had led the Fund staff to believe that ‘the problems of 
the U.K. economy were basic and in need of resolution over the long term’ (de 
Vries, 1985a, 416).  Reflecting this position, she notes that it was possible to agree 
Britain’s transactions with the Fund under the 1975 oil facility and first credit 
tranche on the basis of existing policies because they appeared to be having some 
success, especially incomes policies (ibid, 465).  However, in 1976, the Fund’s 
views were subject to a substantial re-appraisal, and by the time it had become clear 
that Britain would apply for a stand-by of its full quota of SDR 3,360 million, she 
notes that ‘it was by no means certain […] that the executive board would approve 
such a large amount’ (ibid, 467).  This leads her to the conclusion that the Fund’s 
position played a significant role in shaping British policy outcomes during the 
crisis, and she suggests that in coming to terms with the extent of the conditions 
required by the Fund, ‘the Government authorities involved, without question, 
considered themselves “pushed” by the Fund’s officials’ (ibid, 478).    
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Contemporaneous accounts also share the view that the extent of Britain’s borrowing 
prior to the IMF crisis and IMF conditionality in 1976 played a fundamental role in 
determining economic policy.  Keegan and Pennant-Rea (1979, 159) for instance, 
suggested that retrenchment had become inevitable as early as the first applications 
to the IMF for drawings under the oil facility and first credit tranche in 1975, 
because the need for these loans demonstrated the extent to which the intentions of 
the Labour government differed from those that were compatible with fostering and 
maintaining the confidence of financiers outside Britain.  As such, they note that 
despite the low-conditionality of the drawings, they may have represented ‘more of a 
noose than many observers realised at the time’ (ibid, 159).  They go on to note that 
as withdrawals of sterling began in earnest during March 1976, the intentions of 
interested parties within the United States2 were to ‘use the fall in sterling balances 
to ensnare the British Government’ (ibid, 163), and that ultimately, it was inevitable 
that during the negotiations of the terms of the loan that, ‘the IMF, like any bank 
manager, will exact a price for its money, and the supplicant is simply not in a 
position to sound convincing when he says, “my policies are all right; just give me 
the money’” (ibid, 165).    
 
Fay and Young (14 May 1978, 33) also note that American interests played a 
fundamental role in determining outputs, and were insistent that the G10 stand-by in 
June be repaid in six months at the outside in order to force Britain under IMF                                                         
2 They refer specifically to Undersecretary of the US Treasury, Edwin Yeo; 
Secretary of the US Treasury, William Simon, and; Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Arthur Burns. 
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discipline should it not be able to repay.  They furthermore argued that despite the 
claims of British officials and ministers that the loan had been arranged with relative 
ease, the Americans had essentially put up their share of the money ‘as bait’ (ibid, 
35).  They also note that US officials were obdurate in their opposition to a sterling 
balances agreement as a means of avoiding IMF conditionality, Edwin Yeo 
informing the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Harold Lever, that ‘Britain 
would not get the IMF loan at all if Callaghan continued to try and have a safety net 
for sterling’ (ibid, 21 May 1978, 33).  In the final analysis, they suggest that 
Callaghan was only convinced of the need to accept conditions to the extent 
suggested by the Fund during an unpleasant meeting with the Fund’s Managing 
Directory, Johannes Witteveen, on 1 December (ibid, 28 May 1978, 33).   
 
Accounts emphasising the decisive influence of the IMF in shaping policy outcomes 
are those that have come to be most widely accepted in general discourses about 
British economic and social history, and the history of the Labour party.  Tomlinson 
(1990, 280) for instance, suggests that the extent of Britain’s drawings from the 
Fund throughout 1975 made conditionality inevitable in 1976, noting that ‘the 
approach was bound to lead to a loan with conditions, as Britain’s unconditional 
tranche of borrowing had been taken up in 1975.’  Peter Clarke (2004, 353) notes in 
a similar register, that in completing the arrangement of the loan, ‘the terms available 
were naturally dictated by the lenders.’  However, the quintessential expression of 
this orthodox view is that of David Reynolds (2000, 238), who notes that the 
conditions of the IMF loan demonstrate that the Labour government was 
‘humiliatingly bailed out by the IMF on tough, deflationary terms.’ 
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De-mystifying the crisis 
 
Narrative accounts of the 1976 IMF crisis have played a substantial role in helping to 
de-mystify the influence of the IMF during the crisis by constructing a time-line of 
events that shows that a number of policy initiatives associated with Fund 
conditionality were actually in place before the arrival of the Fund team in December 
1976.  The most substantial account of this kind is that of then Permanent Secretary 
to the Treasury, Sir Douglas Wass (2008), who reviews events in order to assess the 
performance of the Treasury in advising the government on appropriate responses to 
the sterling crises of 1975 and 1976 by looking at macro-economic policy making in 
each calendar year from 1974.    
 
At the end of the first year of the Labour government, he notes that the principal 
problems with which they had been faced were the loss of national income that 
occurred as a result of the OPEC price increases, and the rise in inflation associated 
with the abandonment of formal incomes policy.  In addition to this, he notes that the 
large balance of payments deficit was problematic, and the ‘significant increase in 
public expenditure which occurred in the financial year 1974-75 largely due to the 
measures of the March Budget and the July mini-Budget’ had added to the 
difficulties of effectively managing the economy on the grounds that it ‘implicitly 
made the share of national income which flowed to the personal and private sector 
much less when those sectors were already being squeezed’ (ibid, 87).   
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He notes that whilst officials had identified the problems facing the government, the 
Treasury ‘was not very successful in devising satisfactory remedies for them.’ 
However, this statement is qualified by reference to the political situation, and he 
notes that the ‘sharp increase in public spending in 1974-75 was of course a political 
decision which the Treasury was in no position to prevent, or for that matter, to 
oppose’ (ibid, 87).  Even though officials had some success in persuading ministers 
of the need to limit expenditure increases in future years, he notes that the targets set 
were based on wholly unrealistic assumptions about the prospects for future growth, 
and that as a result, the Treasury’s attempts to control public expenditure can only be 
described as a moderate success (ibid, 87-8).  On the issue of diverting resources to 
the external sector, he notes that the Treasury fared no better on the grounds that 
whilst it had advocated depreciation of sterling, it had failed to convince ministers of 
the importance of the issue, and had not been able to propose a practical method for 
achieving it (ibid, 88). Finally, with regard to inflation, he absolves the Treasury of 
responsibility for policy failures on the grounds that whilst officials had doubts about 
the viability of voluntary incomes restraint as the key-stone in counter-inflationary 
strategy, it was in no position to argue for alternatives without having given the 
Social Contract a chance to work (ibid, 88).  Therefore, despite Wass’ attempts to 
present a neutral view of events, his account nevertheless leans towards a defence of 
the Treasury in the sense that where policy was seen to have been most ineffective, 
especially with regards to public expenditure and counter-inflation policy, he makes 
the judgement that it was beyond the remit of the Treasury to intervene substantially 
because these were political decisions.   
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In 1974 therefore, the image that Wass presents is of a Treasury acutely aware of the 
economic difficulties Britain faced, but unable to act decisively both because of its 
lack of ideas about how policy could be made effective, and because of its 
sensitivities to the political needs of the government.  Of 1975, he gives a more 
positive appraisal of the Treasury’s performance, albeit with some caution.  He notes 
that the pay policy agreed with the TUC had looked to be a reasonable success, and 
that although the applications for the oil facility and the first credit tranche loans 
from the IMF had not been approved by the end of the year, there was no reason to 
think they would not be.  This significantly eased the external financing outlook 
(ibid, 162), however, he notes that because Britain was still critically dependent on 
the confidence of its creditors, the issue of public expenditure remained problematic 
despite substantial cuts in planned expenditure for 1978-79 agreed for inclusion in 
the 1976 Public Expenditure White Paper, and the introduction of Cash Limits (ibid, 
163).  
 
At the beginning of 1976, he notes with regard to exchange rate management that 
‘the issue was still unresolved when events contrived to solve it for us’ (ibid, 163).      
This solution was a slide in the rate that was provoked by a reduction in the 
Minimum Lending Rate (MLR) on 4 March 1976, and whilst he acknowledges that 
the Treasury had been in favour of depreciation, notes that it occurred by accident in 
light of market conditions (ibid, 179-81).  He then argues that events on the foreign 
exchanges underscored the events of the rest of the year, as sterling continued to 
slide until the cuts of July 1976 (ibid, 210).  However, despite these measures, and 
the arrangement of the $5.3 billion G10 stand-by in June, which had not decisively 
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stopped the slide, the Treasury was convinced of the necessity to begin making 
preparations for an application to the Fund.   
 
In resolving the crisis, and of the IMF conditions themselves, he notes that 
improvements in Britain’s economic performance, specifically with regards to 
investment in and speculation against sterling in the foreign exchange markets, 
had begun to take place before any of the measures agreed with the Fund, 
notably the public expenditure cuts and the commitments to containment of 
the [Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR)] and of the growth of the 
monetary variables for 1977-78 and 1978-79 took effect (ibid, 308). 
He therefore concludes that the turnaround was ‘due either to expectations that the 
commitments would be honoured or the fact that the IMF had blessed the 
Government’s economic programme gave it some sort of legitimacy’ (ibid, 308). 
This suggests that the Fund’s involvement was beneficial largely as a presentational 
aid, a view reinforced by decisions taken in 1977 that ‘were a virtual cancellation of 
the cuts of December 1976 and […] were made without damage to the commitments 
on PSBR and the monetary variables’ (ibid, 311).  He also demonstrates that during 
the negotiations with the IMF, there was a considerable degree of overlap between 
the views of the Fund team and Treasury officials, that the Treasury did not make 
significant attempts to dissuade the Fund team from pursuing its objectives, and that 
he believes the Fund team was correct to push for them given British officials’ 
agreement (ibid, 312).  On the basis of his examination, he concludes:  
That there was no specific contingency plan for the events of 1976 is clear 
[…] beyond a simple statement that there would have to be unspecified 
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“crash” measures – public expenditure cuts, interest rate increases, etc. – 
there was no plan to deal with a situation where the major official sterling 
holders decided, almost en masse, to sell a significant part of their holdings 
(ibid, 345).   
 
The kind of incremental change in policy described by Wass reflects the account of 
Ludlam (1992a), who, whilst noting that the government was confronted by ‘actual 
and potential creditors of monetarist persuasion, among them stronger states whose 
view boiled down to the advice of the under-secretary of the US Treasury to his 
British counterpart to cut public spending in order to “get your people back on the 
reservation”’ (ibid, 714), makes a principally narrative – although important – 
contribution to the literature, by identifying ‘four myths’ of the 1976 IMF crisis. 
 
The first of the myths that he identifies is the association of public expenditure cuts 
with the IMF loan.  He notes that as early as 1974 Denis Healey had informed 
Cabinet that there was a pressing need to cut the PSBR and that the cuts imposed by 
their Conservative predecessors could not be restored.  Furthermore, he shows that 
cuts of £1.1 billion were announced in April 1975, and further planned cuts of £3.6 
billion were announced in February 1976 (ibid, 716-7).  The second of the myths he 
identifies concerns the imposition of a system of Cash Limits on public expenditure.  
He notes that far from being a condition of the IMF loan, the introduction of the 
system had been announced in February 1975, and notes that ‘as early as the July 
1976 crisis, ministers were aware that cash limits were producing an incalculable 
underspend’ (ibid, 720).  Thirdly, Ludlam shows that money supply targeting had 
  73 
also been introduced prior to the arrival of the IMF in London in December 1976 as 
an important element of government policy.  In July 1976 the government had set a 
target for the growth of broad money (M3) of 12 per cent, and Ludlam notes that the 
statistic had ‘acquired overwhelming significance to monetarist theory and policy 
prescription in the mid-1970s’, but that for the British government, was not seen to 
be critical (ibid, 721).  Finally, he argues that the government had ended its 
commitment to maintaining levels of relatively full employment through demand 
management at the time of its first Budget in April 1974, which was ‘mildly 
deflationary at a time when unemployment was already at 2.5 per cent’ (ibid, 724).   
 
Whilst Ludlam does not explicitly engage with questions about the extent to which 
British policy outputs were determined by or formed as the response to crises in the 
foreign exchange markets throughout the period 1974-76, he draws three broad 
conclusions.  Firstly, he argues that the ‘Thatcherite economic policy programme 
was at least prefigured, if not actually implemented between 1974 and 1979’ (ibid, 
713).  Secondly, he notes that the increased importance assigned to monetary policy 
by ministers and officials ‘had less to do with theoretical conversion and more to do 
with the formation of public opinion’ (ibid, 723), and lastly, he notes that ‘the IMF 
deal merely codified a change of political discourse already well underway and 
proceeding under the stewardship of British social democracy’ (ibid, 727).  This 
view is endorsed by Clift and Tomlinson (2008, 566), who note that agreement with 
the IMF ‘did not push British policy onto paths which would otherwise have been 
untrodden.’   
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Whilst these positions show that British policy was already changing during a 
turbulent period for British economic management, as the empirical narrative of this 
thesis will confirm, they lack an appreciation of the consistency and coherence in 
economic strategy that was evident from 1974-76.  As a result they further contribute 
to the view that the Wilson / Callaghan administration was one in which economic 
policy-making was characterised by indecision, and in many ways mirror positions 
that have argued that economic policy in Britain during this period was changing 
incrementally, through a process of social learning.   
 
Social learning and the IMF crisis 
 
These narrative accounts have therefore contributed to the literature by making it 
demonstrably clear that there was no single moment at which significant structural 
pressure was applied to the British government, either in the run up to the 1976 
crisis, or during the crisis itself, and have implied a gradual, and at times, ad hoc, 
approach to policy change.  Narrative frameworks of this kind are strongly reflected 
in accounts of the crisis that have identified social learning as the key determinant in 
economic policy-making under the 1974-79 Labour government.  These accounts 
imply that the delegitimation of the Keynesian paradigm limited the choices 
available to political elites and forced them to consider other intellectual approaches 
to economic policy-making, and ultimately, to integrate these into their policy-
making. 
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Identifying the influence of new ideas on economic policy-making is not a new 
approach to explaining change in Britain.  The conversion of Treasury officials to 
Keynesian principles of macroeconomic management after 1945, for instance, has 
been described as the result of piecemeal acceptance of Keynesian ideas throughout 
the 1940s that eventually resulted in incomes policies and principles of demand 
management becoming widely accepted within the Treasury, and shaping policy 
outputs from then on (see Booth, 1983, especially 107 and 122-3; Oliver and 
Pemberton, 2004, 421-3).  This however, is not an uncontested position.  In 
response, it has been argued that the subjugation of economic objectives to the 
manipulation of fiscal policy in order to sustain relatively full levels of employment 
could never and did never exist in the UK (see Tomlinson, 1981, 73; 1984, 259), 
despite the ‘long and tortuous process by which Keynesian ideas permeated [the 
Treasury]’ (Tomlinson, 1984, 258).3   In light of this debate however, and the 
historical coincidence of the rise in popularity of monetarist economic doctrine and 
the adoption of policy changes that seemed to endorse it during the 1976 IMF crisis, 
it is only natural to consider the extent to which those ideas were significant in 
shaping change. 
 
                                                        
3 Oliver and Pemberton (2004, 425-5) argue that Tomlinson takes this kind of 
revisionism too far, and argue that there were clearly significant shifts in the goals 
and instruments of policy between the 1930s and 1950s, of which the Keynesian 
framework was the most significant, and that whilst battles over diverging policy 
suggestions such as Robot in the 1950s had to be fought, they were fought and won. 
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Heclo (1974, 305) argued that understanding policy changes as responses to ‘a 
change in the possession and relationships of power among conflicting groups’ does 
not capture the dynamic of the policy-making process.  Instead, he argues that 
policies are a product of the state’s ‘collective puzzlement on society’s behalf.’  This 
belief is strongly reflected in Peter A. Hall’s discussion of policy change in Britain 
during the 1970s.  He suggests that it is the cumulative acquisition of knowledge by 
policy makers that dictates policy change, which can be divided into three distinct 
phases, described as follows: 
We can call the process whereby instrument settings are changed in the light 
of experience or new knowledge while the overall goals and instruments of 
policy remain the same, a process of first order change […] when the 
instruments of policy as well as their settings are altered in response to past 
experience even though the overall goals of policy remain the same, might be 
said to reflect a process of second order change [and] simultaneous changes 
in all three components of policy: the instrument settings, the instruments 
themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy [are] instances of third 
order change (Hall, 1993, 278-9).4   
 
                                                        
4 Oliver and Pemberton (2004, 420) have attempted to refine this framework, and 
suggest that failure to stabilise a paradigm through first and second order change 
does not result in paradigm shift.  They argue instead that an exogenous crisis is also 
necessary in order to force policy-makers to face the inadequacies of the existing 
paradigm (ibid, 434). 
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Policy change, he argues, can be equated with the kind of revolutions in scientific 
theory described by Thomas Kuhn.  Kuhn (1996, 66) noted that initial advances in 
theory are ‘achieved only by discarding some previously standard beliefs or 
procedures and, simultaneously, by replacing those components of the previous 
paradigm with others’, and that crisis provides ‘the indication […] that occasion for 
retooling has arrived’ (ibid, 76).  Subsequently, these events provoke scientists to 
change the nature of their research, which is accompanied by the ‘proliferation of 
competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit 
discontent, the recourse to philosophy and the debate over fundamentals’ (ibid, 91), 
which allows for the emergence and application of new paradigms.   
 
This structure is applied to Britain’s experiences in the 1970s by suggesting that 
British macroeconomic policy had, until the 1976 sterling crisis, operated within a 
Keynesian framework which specified and prioritised both the aims of policy and the 
means by which these ends were to be reached, at which point there was a shift in 
this framework towards monetarist modes of macro-economic management (Hall, 
1993, 279).  He suggests that the ‘radical shift from Keynesian to monetarist modes 
of macroeconomic regulation’ (ibid, 279) began with basic changes in MLR and 
fiscal policy consistent with ‘normal’ policy-making, escalated to include changes in 
the instruments of policy-making like the introduction of Competition and Credit 
Control under the Heath government in 1971, and the imposition of Cash Limits in 
1975, with the movement towards the monetarist mode of macro-economic 
management beginning at the time of the IMF loan in 1976, before becoming more 
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formally institutionalised with the election of the Conservative government in 1979 
(ibid, 283-4).  
 
Kevin Hickson has also used an analytical framework of this kind in order to assess 
the impact of the IMF settlement on British politics.  He begins from the point of 
departure that, if defined as broad continuity in policy, it is possible to identify a 
period of postwar consensus in economic policy-making (Hickson, 2004, 147-50; 
2005, 42).  He proceeds to demonstrate that the ideas of economic liberalism, as 
distinct from monetarism, became increasingly popular as a result of the impact of 
the OPEC price increases and the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, before 
being incorporated into policy after influential think tanks like the Institute for 
Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) helped to politicise 
academic debates by disseminating ideas to a wide audience that included political 
elites (Hickson, 2005, 176).  Burk and Cairncross (1992, 129) also note that 1976 
was a turning point in the philosophical basis of economic policy-making, and 
suggest that the IMF crisis represented the victory of the market over a government 
in deficit resulting from the delegitimation of demand-management orthodoxies 
(ibid, 131-8).   
 
There is agreement amongst accounts of this kind that in order for policy to change, 
there had to be a situation in which ‘economic commentators and public figures alike 
[began] to search for alternatives to the Keynesian paradigm’ (Hall, 1993, 286), 
creating a larger pool of resources in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ on which policy-
makers could draw.  These accounts also demonstrate that in the 1970s, a wide 
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number of solutions to British economic problems were proposed from both 
academic and political sources. 
 
Bacon and Eltis had made an important contribution in mounting an attack on the 
scale of resources taken by the public-sector, noting that economic problems would 
be easier to solve if a greater proportion of national output was marketable and 
Britain had a stronger industrial base (Bacon and Eltis, 1996, 3).  Their argument 
was that consumption by industry was increasingly reduced as more resources were 
siphoned off in order to pay for employment in the public services at the expense of 
exports and investment, which were squeezed during deflationary periods of the 
‘stop-go’ economic cycle (ibid, 19).   Problems were compounded in times of 
unemployment, when the government provided jobs in the public sector, which 
required the increased taxation of profit makers, and served to reduce investment and 
actually increase unemployment over time (ibid, 24).    
 
Burk and Cairncross (1992, 149) note that the idea that ‘the growth of public 
expenditure represented a denial of resources to the market and their pre-emption by 
the state’ was also reinforced by the views of the New Cambridge School of 
economists, which believed that the public sector deficit was a mirror image of the 
trade balance and argued that the overseas sector could only move into profit ‘by 
greater budgetary discipline designed to cut the public sector deficit’ (ibid, 150).  
This School was also in favour of introducing import controls because of ‘a new 
found pessimism about the uses of devaluation’ (ibid, 151).  This view was shared 
by advocates of the AES, who wished to see the commitment to full-employment 
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maintained through government stimulation of aggregate demand, the 
democratisation of industry, and centralised planning (Hickson, 2005, 178).  
However, it is the views of monetarists that have received the greatest attention.   
 
Milton Friedman had been one of the fiercest critics of the Keynesian mode of 
macro-economic management, especially the neo-Keynesian adoption of the Phillips 
Curve relationship between inflation and unemployment after 1958.  He had argued 
that there is ‘no stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there is a 
“natural rate of unemployment”, which is consistent with real forces and real 
perceptions’ (Friedman, 1976, 15).  The Phillips Curve model he believed, was 
predicated upon confusion between nominal and real wages and was false on this 
basis: ‘no economic theorist’, he noted, ‘has ever asserted that the demand and 
supply of labour were functions of the nominal wage rate’ (Friedman, 1975, 15, 
original emphasis).  The implication of this analysis was that there are in fact two 
Phillips Curves – one representing the short-run, and one representing the long-run.  
The long-run curve incorporates the fact that wage bargainers negotiate on the basis 
of imperfect information about the real wage rate, which drives inflation, but does 
not reduce unemployment over the long-run.  In essence, there is ‘a short-run “trade-
off” between inflation and unemployment, but no long-run “trade-off”’ (ibid, 21, 
original emphasis).    
 
The salience of this argument in the British case was based in the fact that the 
‘natural-rate’ hypothesis as it was then understood, ‘relegates the importance of 
unemployment in macroeconomic strategy’ (Hickson, 2005, 182).  This is because 
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the suggestion that attempts to reduce unemployment below its natural rate will 
simply lead to higher inflation implicitly legitimises austerity measures whilst 
stopping short of actively encouraging the creation of slack in the economy (ibid, 
182).  The mathematical logic that was the basis of the ‘natural rate hypothesis’ 
therefore conveyed the policy measures it implied with a certain degree of political 
neutrality, however superficial this was.  As Burk and Cairncross (1992, 139-40) 
note, monetarist doctrine was able to ‘offer a convenient and convincing explanation 
of the inflation that followed the Barber boom’, but the overly simplistic idea that 
controlling inflation was simply a matter of controlling the rate of growth of the 
money supply concealed the highly political nature of the process in practice, which 
was dependent upon a rise in the level of unemployment as the decisive check on 
rising prices.  Presented in this way, they note, the monetarist doctrine was a far less 
appealing way of controlling the rate of price increases ‘than the apparently 
innocuous – indeed desirable – slowing down of monetary expansion’ (ibid, 140).   
 
These accounts therefore share a belief that ideas and economic doctrines have a 
significant role to play in shaping policy outcomes.  They also note that the 1970s 
was a period of change marked by the declining legitimacy of the Keynesian 
paradigm and the rise of various other policy prescriptions that had robust analytical 
foundations, which were politicised by the advocacy of important think tanks and 
political elites with a global reach.  As Hall notes, ‘the media magnified the 
prominence given to monetarist doctrine and catapulted it onto the public agenda’, 
showing how ‘policy changed, not as a result of autonomous action by the state, but 
in response to evolving social debate that soon became bound up with electoral 
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competition’ (Hall, 1993, 288).  This suggests that the 1970s saw the rise of a new 
set of shared values that ensured policy change in Britain because of the extent to 
which these values had gained widespread legitimacy in other countries and financial 
markets. 
 
However, the social learning thesis does not present the IMF crisis as the end-point 
in this process.  As noted above, Hall (1993, 283-4) identifies 1976 as a transitory 
year in economic policy-making, and suggests that the new paradigm was not 
entrenched until the election of Mrs. Thatcher.   According to one review of the 
literature of the IMF crisis, it is Hickson’s account that should be understood as 
assigning the most significance to these events in terms of limiting the policy 
autonomy of the British state.  Clift and Tomlinson (2008, 547) describe this 
understanding of events as a polemic, ‘claiming that the IMF package was a 
humiliation in which Britain had lost the capacity to determine its own policies’, 
however this interpretation overstates Hickson’s position.  Whilst he does conclude 
that the IMF loan forced Cabinet to accept a number of reforms in the field of 
monetary policy, he argued that the extent of this influence was limited, and stopped 
short of the widespread and unequivocal acceptance of the need to adopt fully-
fledged monetarist machinery for macro-economic policy-making in Britain.  This is 
based on his observation that the Labour government ‘did not accept the “natural 
rate” hypothesis or the quantity theory [of money]’, even though the Chancellor had 
‘accepted elements of the crowding-out theory and used the economic liberal supply-
side argument’ in order to win the political debate (Hickson, 2005, 226).  His 
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position therefore is a moderate one, suggesting that the IMF loan represented the 
adoption of some, but not all, elements of a new governing philosophy. 
 
Burk and Cairncross are more explicit in their conclusions about how far British 
policy was ‘locked-in’ to new ideas adopted during the 1976 IMF crisis, suggesting 
that whilst the period clearly shows the occurrence of a revolution in discourse, it did 
not translate itself into a revolution in policy-making.  They note that the wider 
movement that had reacted against state intervention and high taxation whilst 
advocating the importance of free market solutions of which the monetarists were a 
part, was largely confined to academics and commentators, even though the IMF had 
been making attempts to convert members of the British Treasury to such 
understandings of the economy since 1968 (Burk and Cairncross, 1992, 143-4).  
They argue instead that events ‘may have started new trains of thought; but it did 
little to change Treasury thinking at the top’ (ibid, 144), and that although ‘there 
were representatives of various schools of thought urging very different responses 
[…] it is doubtful whether there were any out-and-out monetarists among them’ 
(ibid, 161).  They also note that the degree of long-term influence at the political 
level was limited.  Whilst the Labour government accepted policy changes, it had 
done so only in so far as the new discourses had altered market perceptions about 
what constituted rectitude in economic policy making.  They conclude: 
There was little change of heart in the Labour Party.  The Prime Minister 
might denounce public spending as a way of coping with depression [but] the 
Chancellor had every intention of restoring the cuts when it seemed safe to 
do so and the PSBR was back above £9 billion by 1979 […] the rank and file 
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demonstrated all too clearly in the winter of discontent that they had 
undergone no conversion (ibid, 228).   
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown that there is a broad literature on the 1976 IMF crisis, 
however it has also shown that, with the exception of historical accounts that have 
contributed to debunking myths about the crisis by demonstrating the way in which 
reforms in Britain began before the onset of crisis, the majority of this literature 
reflects theoretical positions that assume that external forces emanating from the 
logic of markets can play a key role in determining the economic policy output of 
states. The decisive influence thesis, in a straightforward application of the logics of 
global finance, regime theory, and structural Marxism, have argued that in the run up 
to, and during the 1976 IMF crisis, pressure was applied to British policy makers 
directly through the structures of the world economy.  The social learning thesis, 
whilst accepting that policy changed over a sustained period, suggests that the policy 
autonomy of policy-makers was limited by the delegitimation of the Keynesian 
paradigm and resulted in a situation where applying its principles in policy was not 
sufficient to sustain the confidence of external actors.  As such, it has been argued 
that the Labour government was forced to consider alternative courses, such as 
monetarism, favoured by the media, academics, and external markets.   
 
The reification of state and market in each of these accounts however, is inherently 
problematic, and has contributed to an oversimplification of events in Britain in 
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1976.  Firstly, by failing to acknowledge the way state preferences are shaped by the 
contradictory imperatives of accumulation and legitimation that arise from its 
existence as a moment in the antagonistic social relations of production, they fail to 
recognise the problem of policy-making as a response to these contradictions.  This 
is exacerbated by the exclusion of the Treasury and the Bank of England from the 
analyses, which means that the range of preferences within the British state and the 
degree of conflict that resulted from them, is concealed.  Whilst empirical studies of 
events have had an important contribution in debunking popular myths about the 
timeframe over which policy changes in Britain occurred in 1976, and have shown 
the depoliticisation hypothesis to be plausible, they stop short of making the case 
because they fail to appreciate the degree of coherence in economic policy-making.  
As such, like those accounts that assign a considerable degree of importance to 
structural sources of power in determining policy outputs, they fail to acknowledge 
the benefits governments can gain from the use of market rules and market rhetoric 
in order to justify austerity policies through the politics of depoliticisation, and the 
extent to which such a governing strategy was deployed during the Wilson / 
Callaghan administration.   
  86 
Chapter IV 
 
Managing the inheritance: economic policy in the short parliament, February – 
October 1974 
 
The previous chapter reviewed existing accounts of the 1976 IMF crisis and argued 
that as a result of their theoretical perspectives they took insufficient account of the 
range of preferences within the British state, which has served to exacerbate the 
extent to which it appears as if expressions of structural power from market actors 
and market institutions played a key role in determining economic policy outputs 
from 1974-76.  In this chapter I will demonstrate that the Labour government was 
faced with an inherent tension between its broad economic objectives and the views 
of the labour movement.  On the one hand, it had to respond to the wishes of the 
electorate that desired social reforms to improve the standard of living and was 
vehemently opposed to government intervention in the wage determination process.  
These wishes were reflected in the rhetoric of the Social Contract and the Labour 
Party’s 1974 General Election manifestos.  On the other hand, it had to appease the 
views of the overseas sterling balance holders on whose confidence the stability of 
the pound depended, and who were sceptical about the effectiveness of voluntary 
collective bargaining and suspicious of substantial public expenditure.  Confidence 
was further hampered by the large balance of payments deficit, and the fact that 
domestic businesses had found their profits substantially squeezed by price control, 
which offered them little incentive to rationalise and achieve greater international 
competitiveness. 
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The inherent tension between the domestic and external demands of economic policy 
was, however, recognised by officials and ministers alike at an early stage, and 
reflecting this, the government clearly demonstrated that its commitment to the 
principles of the Social Contract was very limited.  On balance, it was accepted in 
the Treasury, the Bank of England, and to a more limited extent, the Cabinet, that 
economic policy must be geared towards diverting resources into exports to assist 
the correction of the balance of payments, even if this meant foregoing commitments 
to social expenditure.  However, the conflict in objectives meant that economic 
policy between February and October 1974 was the product of a series of 
compromises stemming from the need for the Labour government to simultaneously 
maintain its electoral support, its credibility amongst those on whom it was 
dependent for borrowing, and to restore domestic industries to profitability.  The 
chapter will demonstrate that the result of these compromises was invariably the 
deference or cancellation of public expenditures promised in Labour’s general 
election manifesto in order to transfer resources into the balance of payments.  This 
began at the time of the March 1974 Budget, and was moderated only by small 
concessions to the social wage in a package of measures announced in July in 
anticipation of an autumn general election. 
 
The social and political inheritance 
 
As Gamble (1994, xvi) notes, the ‘favourite political scapegoat for the British 
disease used to be the trade unions’, and significant difficulties for both the 1964-70 
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Labour government and the 1970-74 Conservative governments arose from their 
attempts to reform Britain’s system of industrial relations.  Trade union resistance to 
such attempts made a significant contribution to shaping the Labour Party when it 
was out of office, and in many ways set the boundaries for the political discourse 
about incomes policies and collective bargaining by virtue of its effectiveness and 
because trade union hostility to government intervention in industrial relations was 
historically entrenched.  The previous Labour administration’s attempt to reform 
industrial relations, In Place of Strife, had argued that the climate of industrial 
relations in Britain meant that ‘management and employees are able to unfairly 
exploit the consumer’, and had ‘produced a growing number of lightning strikes and 
contributed little to increasing efficiency’ (Cmnd. 3888, 1969, 5).  However, the 
proposal to legislate so that strike actions would have to be democratically agreed by 
union ballot, and to establish a body to enforce settlements arising from industrial 
disputes, was defeated in the House of Commons.  According to one author, the 
debate over In Place of Strife contributed to relations between the TUC and the 
Labour party reaching ‘their “historical nadir” in 1969’ (Ludlam, 1992b, 155).      
 
The 1971 Industrial Relations Act was similarly damaging in political terms for 
Edward Heath’s Conservative government.  The Act was intended as a wide-ranging 
reform of the structure of British industrial relations, and was designed to effectively 
criminalise any form of industrial action deemed to be ‘unfair’.  According to Brown 
(1983, 180) it provided that: 
it was an unfair industrial practice for any person to induce or threaten to 
induce someone else to break a contract of any kind – that is, virtually any 
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practice, for any person to lead a strike – unless that person was acting within 
the scope of his authority on behalf of a trade union. 
It meant that the enforcement of injunctions under the Act would require the 
imprisonment of transgressors, which was especially problematic because the 
activities it criminalised had long been ‘generally regarded as vital to trade 
unionism’ (ibid, 180).  In essence, Brown writes, any enforcement of the Act, 
‘conferred a martyr’s crown on [transgressors] and a stigma on the Act and the 
Court’ (ibid, 180-1).  The result of the legislation was a situation in which the 
majority of unions refused to register under the Act, despite the financial penalties 
they incurred as a result, negating any supposed gains and antagonising a significant 
proportion of the politically active population. 
 
The trades unions’ resistance to incomes policies and their belief in free collective 
bargaining matched their opposition to the structural reform of the system of 
industrial relations more generally.  Edward Heath had operated two such policies 
from 1970-74.  The first was the public sector pay policy of de-escalation known as 
‘n-1’, but the most significant in political terms was the Counter Inflation 
(Temporary Provisions) Bill, which was to operate in tandem with statutory price 
controls from 1972.  The Bill operated on incomes in three phases: firstly, there was 
to be a six month statutory wage freeze, followed by stage two, which would create a 
Pay Board and a Price Commission, which were empowered to impose ‘rollbacks’ or 
fines on firms in violation of the set limits to profits, prices, and wages (see Fishbein, 
1984, 106).  This was to begin in 1973, and like the first phase of the policy, had 
provoked only minor discontent.   
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Attempts to implement the third phase of the policy however, were a political 
disaster.  The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) had requested an exceptional 
‘unsociable hours’ payment, which the government unwisely treated as a 
constitutional issue rather than a notable exception.  Peter Clarke (2004, 337-8) notes 
that the government ‘guilelessly wrote this provision into the general guidelines for 
phase three, instead of keeping it […] as a special treat for the miners alone.’  This 
had the effect of antagonising and mobilising one of Britain’s most militant unions.  
The oversight prompted the NUM to institute an overtime ban in November as it 
pursued its claims for extra payments to mineworkers, and unable to break the 
impasse and anticipating a strike by the miners, the government ‘pre-emptively 
instituted a three-day week for British industry’ in December 1973 (ibid, 338).   
 
The February election, held on the issue of ‘who governs Britain’, therefore occurred 
with the country ‘hamstrung in the darkness of [a] three-day week’ (ibid, 339).  
Whilst Pliatzky (1984, 117) notes that in the general election of February 1974, ‘very 
few Labour voters […] were conscious of what they were voting for, as distinct from 
an end to the three day week’, the Labour Party (1974a, 192) campaigned on the 
promise to bring about ‘a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power 
and wealth in favour of the working people and their families’, as they would again 
in October (see Labour Party, 1974b, 213).  However, the broader programme of 
policies with which the Labour party was associated keenly reflected the industrial 
relations landscape that had blighted its predecessors.  
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This broader programme was known as the Social Contract, and had emerged from 
the meetings of the TUC / Labour Party Liaison Committee.  The committee had 
first met in January 1972 on the initiative of the General Secretary of the Transport 
and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), Jack Jones, who had ‘a clear determination 
on his part to rebuild a close relationship between the TUC and the Labour Party 
after the divisive conflict of 1969’ (Taylor, 2000, 209).  This determination was no 
doubt principally shaped by the possibility of exploiting the political weakness of the 
Heath government in light of the unpopularity of the Industrial Relations Act, and 
the extent to which the committee’s suggestions represent concessions to the labour 
movement reflects this.   
 
The principal policy document emerging out of the committee’s meetings was 
Economic Policy and the Cost of Living, which called for statutory measures to 
control food prices as part of ‘a wide-ranging and permanent system of price 
controls’, the expansion of subsidies for house building and transportation, the 
redistribution of incomes and wealth, and a prompt return to voluntary collective 
bargaining (TUC / Labour Party Liaison Committee, 1973, 313, original emphasis).  
Many accounts emphasise the degree of cooperation between the Labour Party and 
the TUC implied by the document, Koelble (1987, 257) noting that it ‘established a 
deal in which the unions would support the Government’s attempts to fight inflation 
by curbing their wage demands [in return for] favourable industrial policy, 
unemployment relief and structural modernization.’  Harmon (1997, 56) likewise 
suggests that: 
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the foundation of the Social Contract as it emerged in 1973 and 1974 was a 
quid pro quo commitment between a future Labour Government and its trade 
union allies, in which the Government, through its progressive economic, 
social and industrial policies, would create an appropriate “climate” to which 
the trade unions would respond with income restraint. 
 
However, the image of two groups with shared interests reaching amicable 
agreement in order to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes, whilst intuitively 
appealing, fails to capture the dynamic of the relationship between the Labour Party 
and the TUC.  As Tarling and Wilkinson (1977, 395) noted, it was significant that 
Economic Policy and the Cost of Living contained no specific commitment to 
incomes policy, reflecting the unions’ wariness of such policies.  As such, Taylor 
(2000, 210) has noted that the Liaison Committee simply provided a forum for the 
TUC to press for improvements in areas it deemed of importance, without making 
any of its own undertakings.  In this sense, there was an asymmetry of purpose in the 
ideas that underpinned the Social Contract, and the 1973 document on which it was 
based was, in actual fact, ‘little more than a shopping list of TUC demands’ (ibid, 
210).    
 
The process of forming the Social Contract may therefore rightly be described as the 
‘most systematic attempt ever in Britain to make an agreement between the 
governing party and the trade unions’ (Tomlinson, 1990, 301), however the extent of 
the compromises made by the TUC need to be carefully qualified.  It remained 
insistent that it would not make promises on wage restraint that it would be unable to 
  93 
deliver, in light of which it postponed calls for generalised wage restraint until the 
summer of 1974 (see Taylor, 2000, 211). As such, the claim that the Social Contract 
was ‘an arrangement whereby the TUC agreed to collaborate with a voluntary 
incomes policy in return for the repeal of the 1971 Act and some modest economic 
benefits’ (Sheldrake, 1991, 77), is both an overstatement of the extent of TUC 
commitments and an understatement of the demands it had made on a future Labour 
government in return for its support.  In many respects, it was because of the 
inadequacies of the partnership between the TUC and the Labour Party, and not 
because of its strength, that the Social Contract was acceptable to the TUC as the 
centrepiece of Labour’s 1974 general election manifestos.  Furthermore, although 
the Labour Party was committed in principle to the Social Contract, the main reason 
for this was an electoral consideration, and the extent of its commitment, especially 
amongst the party leadership, was in practice far weaker.  
 
The social and political context of industrial militancy in Britain in the 1960s and 
1970s therefore helps to explain the significant leftward shift of the Labour Party 
between 1970 and 1974,1 even if this shift was only really reflected in the Party’s 
rhetoric rather than the beliefs of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) leadership.    
Taking a broader view, the PLP had astutely noted that this leftward shift would                                                         
1 Wickham-Jones (1996, 26-32) notes that the leftward shift in opposition is also 
partly explained by the status of the National Executive Committee (NEC) as the 
administrative authority of the party, which allows it to dominate the immediate and 
medium term policy-making of the party, whilst the Parliamentary Labour Party 
(PLP) is able to reassert its control over policy when in office.  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need to accommodate a broader economic strategy that addressed the ‘problem of 
improving economic performance by raising the rate of economic growth, while 
maintaining full employment and achieving balance-of-payments equilibrium’ 
(Tarling and Wilkinson, 1977, 396).  This was problematic because it required 
incentivising industry through higher profits and lower corporate taxation (ibid, 
396), and stood in contradiction to the principles of the Social Contract.  It was also 
made considerably more difficult in light of the Labour government’s economic 
inheritance.   
 
The economic inheritance 
 
The economic situation that the Labour Party inherited in February 1974 was 
difficult and worsening, and Denis Healey (2006, 392) recalls that the Conservatives 
had left him ‘an economy on the brink of collapse.’  In 1974, the balance of 
payments was in deficit by £3.3 billion (Central Statistical Office [CSO] 1977, 46), 
and as figure IV.1 shows, had stood in deficit for six years out of ten between 1965 
and 1974, and been in especially steep decline between 1973 and 1974, in part due to 
the increased import costs resulting from the OPEC price increases.  The indication 
that inflation showed little sign of abating was perhaps the greatest difficulty for 
policy makers given the vulnerability of sterling to destabilising capital flows.  As 
table IV.2 shows, in the first quarter of 1974 the retail prices index (RPI) had 
increased by 12.8 per cent on the first quarter of the previous year.   
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Figure IV.1, Balance of Payments 1965-75, Seasonally Adjusted, £ million 
 
Visible 
Trade   Invisibles    
        
Year Exports Imports Total Credits Debits Balance Current Balance 
  (f.o.b.) (f.o.b.)           
1965 4848 5071 -223 2871 2674 197 -26 
1966 5203 5269 -66 2955 2788 167 101 
1967 5139 5693 -554 3245 2989 256 -298 
1968 6282 6949 -667 3809 3414 395 -272 
1969 7075 7231 -156 4315 3699 616 460 
1970 7907 7932 -25 5006 4248 758 733 
1971 8810 8530 280 5550 4746 804 1084 
1972 9141 9843 -702 6109 5253 856 154 
1973 11772 14106 -2334 8396 6774 1622 -712 
1974 15899 21119 -5220 10169 8272 1897 -3323 
1975 18768 21972 -3204 11047 9499 1548 -1656 
Source: CSO (1977) Economic Trends, Number 279, London: HMSO, 46 
 
Figure IV.2, Retail Price Index 1973-74, 1970 average = 100 
   RPI   
Percentage 
Increase*  
        
Year Quarter   
All 
Items     All Items   
1973 1   123     7.99   
 2   126.9     9.40   
 3   128.8     9.15   
  4   133.2     10.26   
1974 1   138.8     12.85   
 2   147     15.84   
 3   150.7     17.00   
 4   157.5     18.24   
Source: CSO (1976) Economic Trends, Annual Supplement, Number 2, London: 
HMSO, 96-7 
 
* Percentage increase on same quarter of previous year (my calculation) 
 
Despite the fact that these indicators meant the government’s credibility amongst the 
financial markets would be closely linked to their improvement, there were some 
positive indicators in the economy.  Whilst public expenditure had increased by 18.1 
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per cent between 1972 and 1973, investment had increased by 23.5 per cent in 
comparison to increases in current expenditure of just 13.8 percent (CSO, 1977, 54).  
The scale of this investment, whilst falling short of that required in order to 
decisively solve the problem of the competitive position of British industry, 
nevertheless indicated that Britain’s economy was moving in the right direction, and 
that for the time being at least, it remained a suitable lending prospect.  The real 
difficulty for British policy was that this confidence was fickle, and short-run 
improvements did not necessarily generate enough confidence to ensure that 
Britain’s external deficit could be financed in the long-run.  As a result of this, the 
diversion of resources towards exports and attempts to rationalise industry remained 
central to a sustainable governing strategy, a view reflected in the frequent dialogues 
between British and IMF officials in the early 1970s.   
 
Clift and Tomlinson (2008, 549) have noted that ‘UK-IMF interactions were a 
“repeated-game” in the two decades [1956-1976]’, with the result that ‘UK 
politicians and officials became very familiar with IMF preferences and opinions in 
relation to particular policies.’  In discussions between the Treasury and the Fund in 
1973, when Britain considered applying to the Fund in the wake of worrying 
economic forecasts, these views were once again put forward.   The rationale for the 
British approach stemmed from a Treasury paper circulated for discussion by the 
Budget Committee (BC) at the end of the year, which noted that despite a fall in 
unemployment of around 20,000 per month since June, increases in the number of 
vacancies had waned, and exports were rising more slowly than imports (The 
National Archives [TNA] T 171/1092, BC (O) (74) 1, 30 November 1973).  In 
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addition to the additional slack emerging in the economy, ‘import prices were up 
more than 20 per cent and export prices by 10 per cent’, and the ‘general impression 
given […] by the growth of M3 is disarray’ (ibid).   
 
The Treasury also forecast that the PSBR would rise sharply and corporate profit 
margins would fall because of the ‘sharp increases in the assumed rate of pay and 
price rises and the further deterioration in the current external account’ (TNA T 
171/1092, BC (O) (74) 2, 2 December 1973).  The energy crisis also posed a 
significant problem because of the difficulties this created for maintaining levels of 
private consumption, and the head of the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), Sir 
Kenneth Berrill, noted that with the balance of payments deficit likely to double 
between 1973 and 1974 (TNA T 171/1092, BC (O) (74) 5, 7 December 1973), the 
government should try to encourage people to accept a reduction in consumption 
levels, reduce public expenditure and tighten its monetary stance in order to help 
with the balance of payments (ibid).  
 
The Conservative government broached the possibility of drawing from the Fund 
when Anthony Barber met the managing director of the IMF, Johannes Witteveen, in 
mid-January, on the grounds that ‘UK reserves, although stronger than in the past, 
remain[ed] insufficient to inspire and maintain confidence’ (TNA T 354/282, Littler 
to Fogarty, 7 January 1974).  Barber believed that it would be necessary to ‘have 
access to really big sums’ in order to achieve this (TNA T 354/282, Barber to Heath, 
7 January 1974).  In the Chancellor’s meeting with Witteveen, the managing director 
expressed the view that measures the government had taken to cut expenditure in 
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December had been welcomed, but that it was feared that they may have been 
insufficient to impose the required limits on domestic demand and make room for 
increasing the volume of British exports (TNA T 354/181, Note of a Meeting, 15 
January 1974).  More importantly from the point of view of financing the balance of 
payments and with regard to conditionality, Witteveen noted that ‘in principle […] 
the IMF would be ready to help financing the UK’s deficit if it could be shown that 
action was being taken to restore Britain’s underlying balance of payments position’ 
(ibid, emphasis added).  The head of the Overseas Finance Division, Sir Derek 
Mitchell, captured the policy dilemma concisely: whilst ‘there was no lack of 
goodwill towards the UK within the Fund […] unless and until our economic and 
political uncertainties were eased, there would be no guarantee that our application 
for a standby would get approval other than on terms which we might find 
unacceptable’ (TNA T 233/2950, Mitchell to Allen, 22 January 1974).   
 
Whilst the prospect of a drawing from the Fund had passed by the end of January 
1974 (see TNA T 233/2950, Walsh to Cassell, 30 January 1974), the episode is 
informative in two respects.  Firstly, it demonstrates the extent to which the economy 
that the Labour government inherited was on the verge of requiring funds from the 
IMF, and that UK officials were well aware of what the implications of such a 
course would be with regards to conditionality.  But secondly, and more 
significantly, the economic inheritance and the Treasury’s awareness of what 
constituted rectitude in economic policy-making in the eyes of overseas opinion, 
help to explain the substantially more moderate approach to policy-making that 
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emerged between February and October 1974 than had been suggested by the 
Labour Party’s general election manifestos and the rhetoric of the Social Contract.  
 
It has been shown that the British political and economic contexts were problematic 
by the spring of 1974.  The opposition on principle to incomes policy meant that 
voluntarism had to form the centrepiece of Labour’s counter-inflation strategy if it 
was to maintain its office, and demands for subsidies represented a burden to the 
public purse whilst distorting the investment incentives that Britain badly needed if 
the competitiveness of its industry was to improve.  The IMF had also indicated that 
genuine attempts to restore the economy to a fundamental equilibrium were required 
if Britain wished to use the Fund’s resources.  The Labour government therefore 
faced the problem of how it was to simultaneously satisfy the electorate, which 
expected the government to act in a way that reflected the commitments it had made 
in its election manifesto despite the fact that the PLP leadership was not as 
committed to it as the more left-leaning policy-making apparatus of the Party, and 
transfer resources into the balance of payments at a rate sufficient to avoid a critical 
break in confidence.   
 
The March Budget 
 
As Barnett (1982, 24) recalls, ‘the decisions about the growth of expenditure were 
made in the first three weeks of coming into office and announced by the Chancellor 
in his Budget statement.’  Healey (2006, 393) recalls that the Budget was ‘received 
with rapture by the Labour movement as representing the first step in that 
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“irreversible transfer of wealth and power to the working people and their families”’ 
that the Labour Party had promised.  However, other members of the Cabinet have 
not spoken as favourably of the package.  Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn 
(1989, 127), for instance, noted that it was ‘a Budget that will undoubtedly 
disappoint the Party and the movement, and one which as I was listening to it, I was 
convinced was written by the Treasury and not by Ministers.’   Harold Lever also 
shared this view, the Secretary of State for Social Services, Barbara Castle (1980, 
51), recording in her diary that Lever believed ‘the essence of our policy was the 
Social Contract, which, above all, was based on reducing unemployment and going 
for growth.  He thought the Budget would inevitably increase unemployment and we 
should be in trouble with the trade unions.’  However, despite disagreement in 
retrospect about how the government’s first Budget should be judged, it was clear 
that its modesty in comparison to the election manifesto promises was determined by 
the importance of a broader set of macro-economic objectives.  
 
At a meeting with the Chancellor on Budget strategy in early March, the Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury, Sir Douglas Allen, outlined the problems that had to be 
considered in preparing the forthcoming Budget.  He noted: ‘on the public 
expenditure side, the Government’s proposals on pensions and food subsidies could 
add a great deal to demand.’  On the revenue side, he suggested that ‘it would first be 
necessary to offset the extra spending proposals’, and that overall, ‘if the Chancellor 
still wished to go hard for an improvement in the balance of payments, the Budget 
should be mildly deflationary’ (TNA T 171/1053, Note of a Meeting, 7 March 
1974).  The Chancellor’s own proposal demonstrated an acute awareness of the 
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balance that had to be struck.   He told officials that he was willing to continue with 
the levels of expenditure he had inherited from the previous administration and that 
he favoured additional cuts from the defence budget, as well as prestige projects 
such as Concorde, so that it would be possible for him to propose the desired 
increases in pensions, and food and rent subsidies (ibid).   
 
Despite making these offsetting savings, the Chancellor also emphasised to his 
colleagues the need for the government to show that the increases in expenditure 
were prudent.  He noted: ‘in order to avoid a disastrous loss of confidence, I must 
show in my Budget how the extra expenditure, and the effects on demand of all these 
additional commitments, are going to be met by increased taxation’ (TNA CAB 
129/175, C (74) 2, 12 March 1974).  The Budget was therefore clearly planned with 
the implications for foreign confidence in sterling at the forefront of the agenda, and 
an awareness that a ‘giveaway Budget’, justified by the government’s commitments 
under the Social Contract and its parliamentary vulnerability, would be damaging.  
As such, the Budget judgement was focussed on the current economic situation, the 
balance of payments position, foreign confidence, and the demand effects of fiscal 
changes.   
 
The CPRS’ view of broader macro-economic strategy however, was not 
encouraging.  It noted that the four major objectives of the government were the 
redistribution of wealth, the stimulation of industrial production, the correction of the 
balance of payments and the control of inflation, but that in the context the 
government found itself, they were objectives ‘which may or may not be compatible’ 
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(TNA CAB 130/726, Misc 9 (74) 2, 12 March 1974).  The CPRS was also clear on 
where it believed the compromise should fall.  It suggested that the government 
should prioritise quick action to prevent any further worsening of the balance of 
payments situation, secure an improvement in company liquidity, and pursue social 
expenditure to prevent the worst off in society from suffering disproportionately the 
effects of the current crisis (ibid).   On the public expenditure front more generally 
however, the CPRS noted that the government’s tax yield was likely to be 
insufficient to meet the manifesto commitments to increasing pensions and child 
cash allowances, and that as a result, it would be necessary to question ‘how quickly 
can or should other Manifesto proposals involving higher expenditure be 
implemented.’  It noted starkly that, ‘there is very little money in the till and 
inadequate scope for filling it up’ (ibid).  Just two weeks into its office therefore, 
Wilson’s government was being advised by its civil servants that the conflicting 
demands of economic policy would require it to retreat from its pledges in order to 
prioritise the correction of the external accounts and the maintenance of foreign 
confidence. 
 
On 15 March, it was noted that whilst under other circumstances, an unemployment 
figure of 600,000 would point to the need for a slightly reflationary Budget, this 
would not be appropriate given the broader picture of the state of affairs.  Berrill 
noted that in the event of a reflationary Budget, ‘the rest of the world would be 
bound to ask how we were proposing to tackle the balance of payments problem 
[and] the implications for confidence would be serious’ (TNA T 171/1053, Note of a 
Meeting, 15 March 1974).  It was argued that a Budget that took a modest amount 
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out of demand would not be objectionable on these grounds, and allowed the 
government leeway to undertake reflationary action later in the year if conditions 
had improved (ibid).  By the middle of the month, a weight of official opinion 
favoured a Budget that would take about £200 million out of demand annually (ibid), 
and despite the Treasury’s belief overseas finance could always be mobilised in the 
event of need, could be justified in terms of the Steering Committee on Economic 
Strategy’s (SCE) judgement of the following week, that ‘the short-term policy of 
borrowing to meet the deficit could not easily be extended into the medium-term’ 
(TNA CAB 134/3838, SCE (74) 2nd Meeting, 22 March 1974).  
 
On the basis of these judgements, the Budget on 26 March included a 3 per cent 
increase in the basic and higher rates of income tax; increases in personal and child 
tax allowances; a £500 million commitment to additional food subsidies; the fixing 
of corporation tax at 52 per cent, £50 million of defence cuts, and the extension of 
VAT at a rate of 10 per cent to confectionary and petroleum (see Hansard, 26 March 
1974, cols. 277-328).  The TUC responded to the Budget with moderate approval, 
and at a meeting with government ministers on 27 March it was noted that ‘there was 
approval of what the Government had already done, and an understanding that the 
Government was going in the right direction’ (Modern Records Centre [MRC] 
MSS.292D/560.1/10, Econ Ctee 10/1, 27 March 1974).   This view was also shared 
by leading financiers in New York City, who expressed their pleasure at the 
measures to the British ambassador, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, who reported that he had 
found amongst them that ‘there was a general disposition to give HMG credit for a 
well judged Budget in difficult circumstances’ (TNA T 354/174, Ramsbotham to 
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Callaghan, 3 April 1974).  This was no doubt because the Budget implied that 
Britain would be giving greater priority the balance of payments deficit.  
 
Interestingly, Sir Douglas Wass’ appraisal of the March Budget focuses less on the 
indications it gave about the general direction of policy relative to the government’s 
commitments in the Social Contract or its need to finance and correct the balance of 
payments deficit, than it does on the indication it had for the way in which policy 
would be made under the new administration.  He notes (2008, 45) that the Budget 
‘was prepared in accordance with the usual conventions, that is to say that it was 
carried out within the Treasury and collective discussion was confined to the usual 
Cabinet meeting on the eve of Budget Day’, but that it had become ‘evident that in 
future decisions on economic policy would generally be taken more collectively than 
had conventionally been the case’ (ibid, 45).  However, he acknowledges that there 
is little documentary evidence to support this assertion, beyond the extensive use of 
the Ministerial Committee on Economic strategy later in the period (ibid, 45), and 
his statements on the subject appear to reflect his concern with demonstrating the 
technical and administrative responsibilities of various government agencies, rather 
than an attempt to engage in substantive issues about the direction of policy. 
 
The balance of payments 
 
Subsequent to the Budget announcement, the balance of payments problem posed 
two questions for Treasury officials and government ministers.  The first was how 
the deficit was to be financed, and the second concerned the appropriate pace of 
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adjustment.   Whilst there was no uniformity of opinion on the issue, a review of 
economic policy decisions demonstrates that policies were frequently geared to 
balance of payments priorities at the expense of social objectives during Wilson’s 
short parliament.  These priorities emerged from the generally accepted answer to 
the first question, which was that the deficit would be bridged by overseas borrowing 
in the short-run, and a transfer of resources in the medium to long-run.  This, in turn, 
was dependent on the maintenance of credibility and confidence amongst foreign 
lenders, however, in choosing to prioritise the balance of payments, the credibility 
constraint was, for all intents and purposes, self-imposed.  The extent to which these 
priorities had implications for the wider population was dependent on the more 
widely debated answer to the second question, because this carried with it more 
direct consequences for the rate of increase in public expenditure, and whilst 
political decisions were eventually moderate, official opinion strongly favoured a 
more aggressive approach.   
 
The reason that it was widely accepted that short-term borrowing was the preferred 
method of balance of payments adjustment despite the ever-present possibility of a 
collapse in confidence that could de-rail this strategy is straightforward.  As one 
official noted, confidence could be treated as a long-run consideration because 
‘although there is no lender of last resort in a formal sense, ways would inevitably be 
found to mobilise sufficient resources for last resort lending in the event of need’ 
(TNA T 354/347, Walker to Hedley-Miller, 17 May 1974).  The strategy was also 
agreed upon at a time when European banks were lending freely, so the prospect of 
Britain’s borrowing opportunities being suddenly curtailed was not considered a 
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matter for immediate concern either by the Treasury or the Bank of England (ibid).  
This confidence was no doubt bolstered by Witteveen’s assurance earlier in the year 
that IMF financing would be available if Britain could demonstrate it was addressing 
the balance of payments problem, and in this respect the borrowing strategy would 
be commensurate with Britain’s broader economic objectives even in the event that 
the issue of confidence required policy changes.   
 
Wass (2008, 52) notes that the commitment to using short-term finance in order to 
finance the balance of payments throughout 1974 through ‘tapping up’ credit from 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, along with the increase in the sterling balances held by the 
OPEC countries, was effective in so far as these funds were ‘more than sufficient to 
provide the UK with the finance it needed that year’, and that as such, ‘the Treasury 
and the Bank could congratulate themselves on having so successfully dealt with a 
potentially difficult problem’ (ibid, 52).  However, he also acknowledges that this 
strategy ‘did give a very large hostage to fortune as the Treasury and the Bank were 
to discover in the course of 1975 and 1976’ (ibid, 52) as the short-term credit it had 
secured ‘became the single most volatile element in the whole scene when the 
exchange value of sterling came to be questioned’ (ibid, 52).  This however, is a 
curious assessment, because it implies that neither the Treasury nor the Bank had 
immediately recognised the extent to which the extensive use of short-term funds for 
balance of payments financing would add to sterling’s vulnerability in the future.   
Given the expertise in these institutions, this seems implausible, and once again 
Wass’ analysis appears as an attempt to defend the actions of the Treasury lest they 
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be interpreted as fundamental errors or strategic attempts to justify the introduction 
of policies that ran counter to the government’s electoral mandate.   
 
Despite the confidence in the availability of necessary finance to meet Britain’s 
needs in the short and medium-term however, the prospect of borrowing from the 
Fund was again on the agenda by April 1974.  The annual Article VIII consultation2 
was due to begin in May, and Healey was advised by Treasury officials that this 
would be the opportune moment to begin negotiations for a standby if he felt this 
was necessary (TNA T 354/223, Fogarty to Mitchell, 8 April 1974).  The official 
view was that such a course was not, on balance, necessary, but it was nevertheless 
noted that an approach to the Fund in 1975 ‘might well be found a desirable course’ 
(ibid).  This borrowing strategy lends itself to the inference that there was substantial 
weight of opinion in favour of pursuing policy concordant with that suggested by the 
Fund prior to the emergence of any obvious need, in spite of the implications this 
had for the rate of increase in public expenditure and private consumption.  This 
view is supported by the early rejection of generalised import restrictions as an 
appropriate mechanism to be used for the purposes of balance of payments 
correction, with the Treasury noting in March that the United States should be 
advised that ‘the UK very much wants to avoid direct restrictions on imports’ (TNA 
T 354/174, Fogarty to France, 26 March 1974), and Cabinet conclusions of 26 July                                                         
2 Wass (2008, 63) notes that the assessment reached by the Fund during the 
consultation was ‘surprisingly mild’, showing a concern about policy, or the lack of 
it, for counter-inflation, and DCE, which he describes as ‘a routine hobby-horse of 
the Fund’.  
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recording that the Chancellor was committed to a solution ‘within the framework of 
a mixed economy, with a suitable blend of greater industrial efficiency and social 
idealism’ (TNA CAB 128/55, CC (74) 29th Conclusions, 26 July 1974).    
 
The short and medium-term balance of payments strategy clearly had at its base, 
therefore, the explicit acceptance that it would be necessary to sustain international 
confidence, and to reduce the public sector’s claim on resources in order to improve 
the export position.  Deciding on the pace of adjustment however, was a less clear-
cut affair, and international and domestic opinions had parallel bearing on policy.  In 
principle, prevailing international opinion favoured ‘burden-sharing’ in order to 
avoid a return to the kind of beggar-thy-neighbour policies that had proved 
problematic in the interwar period.  The emphasis on the pace of balance of 
payments adjustment fell on the side of caution because of the potential 
consequences of one nation unilaterally trying to improve its position at the expense 
of others.  However, in practice, as Healey recalls, despite his own best efforts to 
avoid burden shifting, it nevertheless came to pass as ‘Britain and Italy were alone in 
following the advice of the international institutions and in fulfilling their promises 
made earlier to the IMF’ (Healey, 2006, 393).   
 
Despite calls for international good will on this issue, and Healey’s willingness to 
exercise it, official opinion in the UK did not accept that a modest pace of 
adjustment was appropriate for Britain, and the Treasury prepared two scenarios in 
June 1974.  The question under consideration was whether the UK should aim to 
‘give the highest practicable priority to the growth of exports and to the closing of 
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the external deficit; or whether we should take a more leisurely path, insofar as our 
creditors will allow us, and rely more heavily on the flow of North Sea Oil to restore 
the balance of payments to equilibrium’  (TNA T 364/16, Wass to France, 15 June 
1974).   Case I, the more leisurely of the proposals, aimed to achieve balance on the 
non-oil portion of the deficit by 1979, and predicted that by this time Britain would 
have accumulated some £17 billion of external debt based on a transfer of £100 
million per annum into the balance of payments.  Case II, the more aggressive 
stance, argued for a more rapid adjustment, which would achieve balance in the non-
oil deficit by 1978.  If this path were taken, it was estimated that Britain would have 
accumulated only £11 billion of external debt based on a transfer of £400 million per 
annum into the balance of payments (ibid).   
 
The case for the more leisurely approach rested largely on the fact that the more 
aggressive stance would have domestic political consequences because of the degree 
of austerity that an annual £400 million transfer of resources into the balance of 
payments would impose.  The attempt to eradicate the balance of payments deficit 
too quickly would also add to world deflationary pressures and could therefore be 
self-defeating, especially as the prospects for North Sea Oil production were widely 
known to be very good, and could therefore provide collateral to make borrowing a 
comfortable prospect in the short-run (ibid).  On the other hand, Case II was 
supported because officials believed ‘we simply cannot assume that foreign credit to 
the tune of circa £17 billion will be available to us over the next 5 years [because] 
there is a grave risk that the UK’s creditworthiness will come under suspicion’ 
(ibid).  Furthermore, if Britain did adopt this strategy and found itself burdened with 
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£17 billion of debt in 1980, the interest payments alone would take up nearly half of 
the revenues of North Sea Oil (ibid).   
 
The Treasury therefore believed that whilst the aggressive approach risked 
precipitating austerity and provoking domestic dissatisfaction, there was a danger 
that making any slower progress would damage Britain’s ability to borrow and make 
holders of sterling balances uneasy about the currency’s future prospects.  A sharp 
decline in the rate that such a scenario would bring about would require even more 
drastic domestic deflation to shore up confidence, creating in the process ‘domestic 
unrest, galloping inflation and heavy unemployment’ (ibid).  As such, the Treasury 
position noted that prudence demanded the government to ‘lean on the side of 
severity’ (ibid), despite the recognition that the political consequences of austerity 
may be problematic if the government was unable to explain and justify such a 
course of action to the electorate in terms it would accept. 
 
The Bank of England’s view on this issue was also located at the severe end of the 
spectrum, even more so than the Treasury’s recommendation.   Governor of the 
Bank, Gordon Richardson, advocated ‘aiming for at least as rapid a rate of progress 
with the balance of payments [as suggested by Case II]’ (TNA T 364/16, Richardson 
to Wass, 18 June 1974, original emphasis).  His view was that the Treasury’s 
forecasts in terms of trade, the price of oil, and interest rates, may all prove to be 
optimistic and that in a worst case scenario, the balance of payments would actually 
end up in a worse position in 1977 than it was in 1974.  He suggested that Britain 
would face accumulated debt, not of £17 billion as the Treasury predicted, but of £25 
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billion.  This would take up three quarters of the revenues of North Sea Oil in 
interest repayments, not half as the Treasury believed (ibid).  Whilst the Bank 
accepted the view that the £400 million annual rate of transfer into the balance of 
payments may be the limit of what was politically acceptable, it argued that under no 
circumstances should the government aim for less (ibid). 
 
When the pace of adjustment was discussed with the Chancellor towards the end of 
June, Healey informed his officials that of the two options, he preferred the more 
conservative approach because it would be less likely to involve domestic costs in 
the short-term (TNA T 364/16, Note of a Meeting, 21 June 1974).  Nevertheless, 
despite this initial conservatism on Healey’s part, at Cabinet on 26 July he informed 
his colleagues that whilst the economy was predicted to grow by about £2,000 
million per year, ‘£400 million would need to be devoted to increasing the rate at 
which the balance of payments deficit was being reduced’ (TNA CAB 128/55, CC 
(74) 29th Conclusions, 26 July 1974).  This, he warned, would leave room for only a 
2.75 per cent increase in public expenditure, which, if accepted, would mean that 
‘any increase in one programme must come from reductions in other programmes or 
the contingency reserve’ (ibid).   
 
Counter-inflation and the July ‘mini-Budget’ 
 
Whilst the government had been able to deliver a moderate Budget and agree that it 
was necessary to divert resources into the balance of payments relatively quickly on 
confidence grounds without provoking unmanageable discontent from the unions, 
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the aversion to incomes policy meant that counter-inflation strategy posed more of a 
problem from the point of view of its credibility, and was limited to price control, 
which had the disadvantage of providing disincentives to investment for industries.  
This was because of the operation of the ‘Productivity Deduction’ in the Price Code, 
which allowed firms to pass on only 50 per cent of increased wage costs to the 
consumer.  This was inherently problematic in so far as the long-run balance of 
payments position was linked to the performance of British industry, which required 
a significant amount of investment if it was to become internationally competitive, 
and which government policy was actively discouraging through the Price Code. 
 
The Price Code was kept under review by the Official Committee on Price Control 
(PCO), which had concluded by early August that whilst the Code had held down the 
RPI as a whole by approximately 2 per cent, and the prices of goods and services 
covered by the Code directly by 4 per cent, ‘the effect had been achieved primarily 
by depressing industry’s profits by approximately 8 per cent, although maybe more’ 
(TNA CAB 134/3814, PCO (74) 5th Meeting, 12 August 1974).  The extensive costs 
in relation to modest benefits therefore showed the impact of the Price Code to be 
disproportionate, and leant themselves to stark and straightforward conclusions, with 
the Committee noting that ‘it was common ground that in the present circumstances 
the Code was too severe [and] the bad effects on investment and industrial 
confidence were not wholly compensated for by the good effect on prices’ (ibid).  
Within the Department of Industry, one official, Peter Carey, advocated the outright 
abolition of the Price Code in a note to the new Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 
Sir Douglas Wass.  He wrote that the Price Code had ‘done relatively little to restrain 
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inflation; it has caused, and is continuing to cause, a good deal of harm to industry; 
and it is increasingly irrelevant in light of the short-term economic outlook’ (TNA 
CAB 134/3814, Carey to Wass, 29 August 1974).  He went on to note that ‘the 
continuation of the Code for any further period is likely to do more harm than good, 
whatever modifications may be introduced’ (ibid, original emphasis).  Whilst this 
position was rejected by the Treasury on political grounds (see TNA CAB 134/3814, 
Wass to Carey, 5 September 1974), it was a shared view that the Price Code was a 
contradictory instrument in need of reform.   
 
The Bank of England’s view was that the operation of the Price Code was placing 
undue pressure on firms’ liquidity positions, and it was noted that ‘the crux of the 
problem is the low level of profits which companies are able to retain [and] that 
some immediate relief from price and profit control is essential’ (TNA T 233/2778, 
Bank of England Paper, 5 September 1974).  The CPRS took a similar position, 
arguing that price control, in combination with other pressures on company liquidity 
like the Advanced Corporation Tax Surcharge and social security payments, had 
caused profits to fall by 30 per cent between the fourth quarter of 1973 and the first 
quarter of 1974 (TNA T 233/2778, CPRS Staff Paper, 19 September 1974).  As 
such, it estimated that British industry would be required to borrow in the region of 
£2.7 billion to cover capital requirements even to sustain existing levels of 
production, and would be reluctant to do so given the uncertainty of future prospects 
(ibid).  It believed that continuing on the present course of prices policies would 
mean that companies would be forced to self-correct by ‘reducing their cash 
requirements by taking measures such as laying off labour, cutting back on 
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investment plans, reducing R & D and maintenance, providing less support for 
export activities and reducing stocks’ (ibid).  On this basis, the CPRS recommended 
that price control should be immediately relaxed, accompanied by reductions in 
Corporation Tax and the abandonment of the Advanced Corporation Tax Surcharge, 
and the encouragement of Banks to lend to British industry on terms that it could 
afford (ibid). 
 
The Price Code therefore, whilst politically popular and in accord with the Social 
Contract, was widely felt to be economically damaging, reflecting the contradiction 
between the wishes of the electorate and the needs of the economy, especially in a 
context where wage claims continued unabated – one account placing the rate of 
increase at 30 per cent (Tomlinson, 1990, 301), and another arguing that, as a 
strategy against inflation, the Social Contract was ‘clearly worthless’ (Morgan, 2001, 
377).  These views accurately reflect opinions from within the civil service, as by the 
end of June the Official Committee on Pay Negotiations had been informed that the 
Pay Board had received reports of infringement rates on wage guidelines of 20 per 
cent (TNA CAB 134/3809, PA (74) 9th Meeting, 20 June 1974), which was 
especially problematic in light of the fact that this had occurred despite the TUC’s 
statement on collective bargaining in the year ahead, which had emphasised the fact 
that there was little room in the economy for increasing personal consumption, and 
that a period of twelve-months should be allowed to pass before pay deals should be 
re-negotiated (see TNA CAB 129/177, C (74) 59, 18 June 1974).   
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This made the credibility of counter-inflation policy problematic, because it 
demonstrated the fact that ministers could not be sure that the TUC would be able to 
ensure the exercise of restraint in wage claims even if it had wanted to.  However, 
the problem of incomes was not just down to the unilateral action of the unions.  The 
rate of increase in incomes was also added to by the Labour government’s decision 
to honour ‘threshold agreements’.  Sawyer (1991, 176) notes that stage III of Heath’s 
incomes policy allowed wages to rise by £2.25 per week, or 7 per cent, up to a 
maximum of £350 per annum, with an additional ‘threshold payment’ for every 1 per 
cent rise in the RPI above 7 per cent on the October 1973 index, and as Barbara 
Castle (1980, 114) noted, this clearly meant that ‘every rise in retail prices above the 
threshold brought an automatic wage increase.’  
 
This was significant because the automaticity of the system removed the time lag 
between increases in prices and increases in wages, directly fuelling inflationary 
pressures and doing nothing to remove inflationary expectations from the economy 
(Ormerod, 1991, 58).  In combination therefore, the tendency for wage settlements to 
exceed TUC guidelines despite calls for voluntary wage restraint, and the increases 
in wages granted when thresholds were triggered – no fewer than eleven times 
before the agreement expired (ibid, 58) – shows that government policy was actually 
contributing to the inflationary problem on the incomes side.  This, no doubt, played 
a significant role in the Labour Party coming to be so closely associated with 
inflation (ibid, 59-60), and in combination with the Price Code, the government was 
clearly operating a set of policies that were not only ineffective, but they also were 
counter-intuitive when considered in the context of the broader economic goals, 
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notably the restoration of the balance of payments to equilibrium and the 
maintenance of overseas confidence.  As such, they provoked considerable weight of 
opinion in favour of retreating from the Social Contract commitments on price 
control in order to increase incentives.  However, the government’s electoral 
weakness meant that concessions would have to be made to ensure a renewed 
governing mandate. 
 
Barnett (1982, 31) recalls, ‘the 22 July statement was made in the expectation of an 
autumn General Election’, and Dell (1991, 76) notes that preparation for the 
measures began because ‘as the summer of 1974 wore on Denis Healey became 
increasingly optimistic about the British economy.’  These expectations had been 
bolstered by his visit to Washington D. C. in June, where ‘he had found that 
confidence in the British economy was far greater abroad than it was at home’ (ibid, 
76), and on this basis, he informed Cabinet on 8 July that some kind of Budget 
package would be introduced later in the month (ibid, 78). 
 
Preparation for the measures had, however, begun earlier.  Various packages had 
been discussed at the Official Budget Committee meeting on 5 July, and after 
discussion about the conflict between the requirements of Britain’s external and 
domestic objectives, Sir Douglas Wass presented three packages.  He said that the 
measures could either be in the form of a large package aimed primarily at reducing 
prices; could take no net action, or; could take the form of a small package to give 
some incentives to industry, take some action on prices, and carry a smaller risk of 
causing a break in confidence’ (TNA T 171/1095, BC (O) (74) 4th Meeting, 5 July 
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1974).  It was the shared view of the committee that none of the strategies were risk 
free.  The main disadvantage of a larger package would be the impact on overseas 
opinion, although it was felt that this could be ‘mitigated if the Government were 
able to demonstrate that it had obtained a genuine quid pro quo from the TUC’ 
(ibid).  A smaller package, on the other hand, carried the risk of becoming ‘a rag-bag 
of items with no discernable underlying strategy’ which, if not received well at 
home, could have an even bigger negative impact on overseas confidence than the 
larger package (ibid).  
 
Despite the broad acceptance of the risks involved in introducing a package at this 
stage, there was no consensus as to what form it should take, and ‘there was 
substantial support for the view that, on balance, it would be better to wait until the 
autumn before taking steps to reflate demand’ (TNA T 171/1092, BC (O) (74) 18, 8 
July 1974).  Nevertheless, the Treasury put forward two possible packages for 
consideration.  Package ‘A’ proposed to cut the rate of VAT by half, increasing 
demand by £936 million and cutting the RPI by 2.5 per cent directly.  It also 
included support for rate payers through the Rate Support Grant (RSG) at a cost of 
£100 million, and doubling the Regional Employment Premium (REP), also at a cost 
of £100 million, but creating 20,000 new jobs in the regions in the process (TNA T 
171/1151, Airey to Wass, 9 July 1974).  The major objections to this package were 
the need for substantial legislation to cut the rate of VAT by 5 per cent, and the risks 
involved, which were two-fold.  Firstly, it would fail if ‘overseas opinion interpreted 
it as simply another politically motivated premature reflation by the UK’; and 
secondly, it would fail ‘if it became apparent that the pay-off, in terms of reduced 
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wages pressure by the unions, was not going to materialise’ (ibid).   Package ‘B’ in 
contrast, aimed to provide a demand stimulus be relieving the financial position of 
firms by reducing employers’ National Insurance contributions.  It also proposed to 
quadruple the REP at a cost of £360 million a year, creating 60,000 new jobs (ibid).  
The argument against this package was the risk that the element relating to National 
Insurance contributions would create pressure for employees’ contributions to be 
similarly reduced, which would add further inflationary fuel.  Like the first package, 
it would also require substantial legislation for it to be enacted (ibid). 
 
The Treasury and the Bank of England both expressed concern about the growing 
size of the package as the date of its announcement approached (Dell, 1991, 79), and 
the Downing Street Policy Advisor, Bernard Donoughue, also recorded doubts about 
what the government was trying to achieve.  In his diaries he notes: 
I argued that we needed an attack on price inflation rather than public 
expenditure to counter unemployment. [Wilson] said he hoped for a mixture 
of both […] I’m not sure you can have everything in the package and keep 
sterling safe, but he was very clear where we stood (Donoughue, 2005, 163).   
The Bank of England likewise noted that ‘the need for great caution springs from the 
danger of weakening confidence in sterling [and] the argument is therefore for 
postponement of large-scale action for the moment’ (TNA T 171/1152, Bank of 
England Paper, 17 July 1974), and the following day Wass noted his agreement with 
the Bank’s assessment (TNA T 171/1152, Wass to France, 18 July 1974).   
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Despite these warnings however, Healey announced a package that reduced VAT by 
2 per cent, included relief for rate payers, doubled the REP, and gave £50 million of 
uncommitted funds for increased food subsidies (Hansard, 22 July 1974, cols. 1048-
60).  Dell (1991, 80) notes that the effects of this package would be to ‘add under 
£200 million to demand by the end of 1974 and “a relatively small amount”, some 
£340 million to the PSBR’, and on reflection, Joel Barnett (1982, 32) notes of the 
July package that, ‘all in all, there can be little doubt that we planned for too high a 
level of public expenditure in the expectation of levels of growth that, in the event, 
never materialised.’  The July mini-Budget measures therefore seem to display 
convincing evidence that the government’s economic strategy remained focussed on 
delivery of its commitments made under the Social Contract.  However, this 
judgement must be qualified by the context; the government was facing an autumn 
general election to confirm its mandate, and providing concessions to the electorate 
in this form was embarked upon despite advice to the contrary from officials in the 
civil service. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The contradictions between the government’s commitments under the Social 
Contract and the needs of the wider economy therefore clearly presented difficulties 
that resulted in a number of compromises, which displayed the weakness of the PLP 
leadership’s commitment to the principles of the Social Contract in practice.  The 
March Budget was broadly neutral, and reflected a clear recognition of officials and 
ministers alike that the balance of payments represented a prior claim on resources to 
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current expenditure, which was confirmed in discussions during the middle of the 
year about the external financing strategy, when it was widely agreed that it was 
necessary to act decisively in order to restore the balance of payments to equilibrium 
because the levels of borrowing otherwise required would be unsustainable.  The 
government was also operating a counter-inflation policy contradictory to these 
aims, both because it was failing to have an impact on the incomes side, and because 
the Price Code removed incentives to investment, and as a result it was widely felt 
that the Price Code was in need of substantial reform or abolition.  Only in the 
preparation of the July ‘mini-Budget’ does the evidence suggest any political 
conviction to deliver on the Social Contract, and this occurred in the context of an 
upcoming election and despite strong civil service opposition.   
 
Worryingly from the government’s perspective, the measures it had taken elicited 
only weak responses from the TUC, such as reminders that the pay settlements of 
other unions should not be used as a lever in negotiations (see MRC 
MSS.292D/560.1/10, Econ Ctee, 10, 10 April 1974).   However, the TUC continued 
to emphasise the ‘need to reverse cuts and indeed increase public expenditure […] 
with the aim of solving both acute social problems and using resources at present 
lying idle’ (MRC MSS.292D/560.1/10, Econ Ctee 15/2, 16 July 1974), without 
providing any indication it was able to deliver on wage restraint.  In combination 
with concerns about the confidence implications a committed government response 
to the TUC’s demands would have, this meant that neither the government nor 
officials were able to form or pursue a decisive economic strategy.  With a renewed 
mandate secured in October however, it was possible to change this approach, with 
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preference falling firmly in favour of the balance of payments and foreign 
confidence ahead of the Social Contract.  
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Chapter V 
 
The status of sterling and the decisive re-orientation of economic strategy, 
October 1974 – June 1975 
 
In the previous chapter it was shown that there was an inherent conflict between the 
Labour government’s commitments to redistribution under the Social Contract, 
which had been affirmed in its general election manifestos, and Britain’s external 
economic position.  It also showed that whilst the March Budget had made some 
concessions to the social wage, it was moderate and provoked only lukewarm 
approval from the trade unions.  In many respects, it underscored the views that 
emerged strongly later in the year that the balance of payments represented a prior 
claim on resources to social expenditure on the grounds that Britain would not be 
able to continue borrowing indefinitely to finance its external deficit.   There were 
also problems with regards to the distortion of incentives caused by the operation of 
the Price Code, and the inadequacy of TUC guidelines in order to produce wage 
restraint, which was causing officials concern.  However, as a result of the Labour 
government’s weak electoral position, it was nevertheless required that concessions 
had to be made to social expenditure despite official opposition. 
 
This chapter shows how this compromise approach changed decisively after the 
October 1974 general election, with officials strongly advocating fiscal restraint and 
direct intervention in the wage determination process.  It begins by reviewing the 
historical legacy of sterling’s role as a reserve currency and the impact of the OPEC 
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price increases in order to show how the pound’s vulnerability to speculation had 
played a key role in influencing Treasury opinions about what constituted 
sustainability in domestic economic policy.  It then reviews the Treasury’s 
arguments for a decisive re-orientation of economic strategy that would prioritise the 
competitiveness of British industry and the correction of the balance of payments 
ahead of social objectives, before showing how this re-orientation was reflected in 
the April Budget package.   
 
The sterling balances   
 
The sterling balances had long been a problem for British policy makers because 
they made Britain’s foreign reserve position vulnerable when confidence in the 
pound waned and money flowed out of sterling.  In a worst-case scenario, the 
diversification of sterling holdings could quickly cause a run on the pound that 
official reserves would not be sufficient to reverse.  This would call into question the 
value of the pound as a store of value and as a medium of exchange, and the 
Treasury’s historical section noted that ‘the “problem” of the sterling balances is one 
that constantly confronts the Treasury’ (TNA T 267/29, Historical Memorandum No. 
16, January 1972).   
 
The origin of the balances had deep historical roots, dating from the operation of the 
trade and payments system in the nineteenth century, when the majority of trading 
nations used sterling as the currency of settlement for their international transactions.  
However, the 1940s saw further accumulations as ‘the dedication of the UK 
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economy to the single purpose of winning the War distorted beyond recognition the 
normal channels of trade’ (ibid).  These wartime distortions had a profound impact 
on the pattern of Britain’s imports and exports as it remained necessary to import 
essential goods and services for the war effort whilst domestic production was 
geared almost exclusively to the same end, meaning: 
Those who exported to us were unable to use the sterling so acquired on the 
purchase of imports from us [so] unless that sterling could be used for the 
redemption of debt or purchases of goods and services from other countries 
of the sterling area, it could not be used at all (ibid). 
Figure V.1, Sterling Balances 1945-62 
Source: TNA T 267/29, Treasury Historical Memorandum No. 16, January 
1972 
 
The postwar period saw some of these balances run-down in an orderly fashion, 
however this occurred simultaneously with increases in balances elsewhere.  As 
Figure V.1 shows, whilst the level of the balances held by the non-sterling area 
decreased between 1945 and 1962, there was a gradual increase of sterling area 
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balances, which contributed to producing a relative consistency in the total level of 
balances despite periodic peaks and troughs.   In practice, this meant that for as long 
as Britain was unable to find an orderly way to run-down the balances, the pound 
would remain sensitive to fluctuations in the foreign exchange markets.  As a result 
the Treasury had historically displayed a great deal of sensitivity to the effects that 
declining confidence in British macro-economic strategy could have on the value of 
sterling and therefore the level of foreign reserves.  The importance of this became 
especially apparent in light of the establishment of the IMF to ‘assist in the 
establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions 
between members and the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper 
the growth of world trade’ (de Vries, 1985a, 14), because this meant that pressure 
would mount on the UK to introduce full convertibility.   
 
As Burnham (1992, 245) notes, the sterling balances, ‘when taken in conjunction 
with general convertibility posed a serious threat to Britain’s foreign currency 
holdings’, which had to be faced almost immediately after the abrupt end of the lend-
lease programme and the United States’ insistence that Britain make commitments to 
dismantling the system of imperial preferences.  As Lairson and Skidmore (2003, 
81) note, after successfully negotiating a $3.75 billion loan from the United States, 
Britain ‘grudgingly gave verbal assurances and, as a first step in 1947, moved to 
make the pound fully convertible’, however, in the context of a slide in Britain’s 
gold and dollar reserves that had begun in 1946, convertibility forced Britain ‘to use 
most of the $3.75 billion loan to support the pound’ (ibid, 81), and abruptly brought 
the period of convertibility to an end.   
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Whilst the 1947 episode is historically remote to the events of the 1970s, it is 
illustrative of the practical difficulties that the Treasury had faced in attempting to 
maintain confidence in the pound arising because of the scale of the sterling 
balances.  The result was to force the Treasury to examine schemes designed to 
stabilise the balances, which had included the possibility of negotiating voluntary 
blocking of the balances, agreed rates of run-down, and international safety nets 
(TNA T 267/29, Historical Memorandum, No. 16, January 1972).  However, despite 
these attempts to remove the vulnerability of Britain’s foreign reserves caused by the 
balances, by 1965 they were still extensive and the search for a mechanism to 
stabilise them remained important, especially as the election of the Labour 
government in 1964 was enough by itself to intensify market concerns about the 
value of the pound (Tomlinson, 1990, 241).  The solution proposed by the Treasury 
was the result of extensive contingency planning examining the possibility of 
offering a guaranteed value to holders of sterling, negotiated at Basle in 1968. 
 
The possibility of offering a guarantee to holders of sterling in order to prevent 
diversification in the event that Britain was forced to devalue began in earnest in the 
mid-1960s, and addressed three principal questions.  In 1965, these were whether 
Britain should offer guarantees: 
1. To holders of sterling in order to prevent diversification which may force 
a devaluation; 
2. To holders of sterling to discourage diversification provoked by the belief 
that sterling was no longer a good reserve asset after devaluation, and; 
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3. To compensate holders of sterling for the loss in the dollar value of their 
reserves after devaluation (TNA T 267/33, Historical Memorandum, 
Number 19, June 1972).  
The conclusion however, was that guarantees would not be credible if they were 
introduced before a sterling devaluation on the grounds that they may represent a 
commitment that Britain would be unable to honour, and that in a post-devaluation 
context, they may provoke suspicion that a further devaluation of sterling was 
inevitable (ibid).  As such, the prospect of a sterling guarantee was shelved on the 
grounds of impracticality, and it remained the view in 1966-67 that the offer of a 
guarantee before devaluation would not be credible, and could be ‘acutely 
embarrassing in the future, particularly if there were ever to be a round of 
competitive devaluations or if sterling were forced to float’ (ibid).  Whilst the 
Chancellor ‘was inclined […] to offer guarantees after devaluation provided that the 
offer was coupled with a stipulation that the general problem of the sterling balances 
must be dealt with’ (ibid), it was ultimately decided that finding a way of offering a 
guarantee that was both credible and limited Britain’s exposure to movements in the 
balances remained an insurmountable problem.   
 
The devaluation of November 1967 however, substantially altered this view by 
precipitating unrest amongst the overseas sterling area countries, which had begun to 
diversify their reserve positions in order to avoid future losses in the event of a 
further downward adjustment in the rate (Strange, 1971, 75).  In negotiating a 
sterling guarantee therefore, the Treasury had a straightforward negotiating brief.  In 
exchange for the offer of a guarantee, Britain ‘wanted undertakings not to diversify 
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to any significant further extent (TNA T 267/33, Historical Memorandum No. 19, 
June 1972).  These undertakings were to be related to five specific objectives of 
British policy, which were: 
1. To obtain undertakings from countries that it would hold a minimum 
percentage proportion of its total external reserves in sterling that was not 
lower than the percentage as of June 1968; 
2. To obtain undertakings that the promised dollar guarantee would exclude 
sterling holdings above 20 per cent of total official external reserves; 
3. To persuade countries a charge should be levied for the guarantee; 
4. For the undertakings to be valid for seven years, and subject to review at 
any time by mutual consent, and; 
5. To obtain assurances that fifteen countries would make deposits of 
foreign currencies with the BIS totalling around $2,200 million (ibid).  
The achievement of these objectives was a difficult task, however the agreements 
reached at Basle were sufficient for Britain to secure the funds it needed in order to 
help reverse the trend towards diversification in the medium-term whilst leaving the 
long-term problem of the sterling balances unresolved (ibid). 
 
Tomlinson (1990, 243) has written that the Basle agreements contributed to the 
stabilisation of the sterling balances, and that in combination with the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, Britain was able for the first time to 
‘regard the value of sterling as entirely secondary to domestic economic objectives.’  
In actual fact, the sterling guarantees did not act as a vehicle for the orderly run-
down of the balances or the phasing out of sterling’s role as a reserve currency, and 
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actually contributed to Britain’s vulnerability to confidence factors by contributing 
to a rise in the balances between September 1968 and September 1971 (see Zis, 
1991, 109).  The Treasury history of the Basle discussions also reflects this view, 
noting that despite the guarantees, ‘balances increased by some £800 million in the 
ensuing two years’, which was problematic because ‘some day someone will want to 
draw them down again’ (TNA T 267/33, Historical Memorandum Number 19, June 
1972, 95).   However, this view was not reflected in the Bank of England’s official 
press release on the six month extension of the guarantees beyond their expiration 
date of 24 September 1973, in which it was noted that the guarantees ‘have provided 
a valuable element of stability in the international monetary scene and Her Majesty’s 
Government considers it to be in the interest of all that this stabilising element be 
continued for a further period’ (Bank of England [BE] 3A 38/4, Sterling Agreements 
– Press Statement, 6 September 1973).  Whilst in private it was noted that the 
agreements were not inherently desirable (see BE 3A 38/4, St. Clair to Walker, 13 
March 1974), they were again extended in March 1974 (see BE 3A 38/4, Official 
Sterling Balances – Press Notice, 15 March 1974), and it was not until the November 
1974 Budget that they were discontinued despite the clear recognition that the size of 
the balances increased the sensitivity of British policy to confidence factors, and the 
fact that guarantees had served only to exacerbate the problem.   
 
Sterling’s status as a reserve currency had therefore posed problems for the Treasury 
for nearly thirty years, and attempts to resolve it through the creation of multi-lateral 
facilities such as that at Basle in 1968, had been treated with scepticism for some 
time, and were eventually proven to be ineffective.  In light of this, the confidence 
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issue was one that clearly resonated with officials as they attempted to keep the 
balances stable, however it was also something that became increasingly difficult in 
light of the large-scale disequilibrium in international payments that resulted from 
the OPEC price increases of the early 1970s.   
 
The impact of OPEC price increases 
 
The OPEC price increases of the early 1970s were the result of a number of factors. 
As de Vries (1985a, 307) notes, ‘devaluations of the dollar in terms of gold in 
December 1971 and February 1973, followed by further depreciation of the dollar in 
terms of other major currencies after the introduction of floating rates in March 
1973, reduced the receipts of oil exporting countries […] by as much as fifteen per 
cent.’  This was coupled with hostilities in the Middle East in 1973, which prompted 
OPEC to impose an embargo on oil exports to the Netherlands and the United States 
to ‘help induce the Government […] to temper their “pro-Israel policies”’ (ibid, 
306).  The subsequent announcement that from 1 January 1974 the price for Saudi 
Arabian light crude would be doubled to $11.56 per barrel meant that the total 
increase in price between 6 October 1973 and 1 January 1974 was more than four 
times, and given the inelasticity of demand for petroleum products, ‘a massive and 
startling disequilibrium in international payments was expected for 1974’ (ibid, 308). 
 
Skeet (1988, 58) notes that the OPEC price increases affected ‘just about everybody 
in the world in one way or another’, however for British policy makers, the 
difficulties were particularly acute.  In light of sterling’s dependence on the 
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maintenance of foreign confidence in its economic policies for stability, the failure 
of the Basle guarantee to reduce the pound’s sensitivity to speculation by running 
down the balances, the disequilibrium in the British balance of payments caused by 
the OPEC increases, and the accumulation of large balances by oil exporters, meant 
that the issue of the credibility of domestic economic strategy became even more 
important, and ensured that Britain played a leading role in attempts to find a 
multilateral solution to correcting the imbalance.   
 
In recognition of the risk that individual countries may revert to protectionist 
strategies in order to correct their current account deficits at the expense of others, 
the Committee of Twenty had issued a communiqué at its fifth meeting in Rome on 
18 January 1973, emphasising the need for a cooperative response to the 
disequilibrium caused by the OPEC price increases.  Members of the Committee: 
Agreed that in managing their international payments, countries must not 
adopt policies which would merely aggravate the problems of other 
countries.  Accordingly, they stressed the importance of avoiding competitive 
depreciation and the escalation of restrictions on trade and payments.  They 
further resolved to pursue policies that would sustain appropriate levels of 
economic activity and employment, whilst minimizing inflation (Committee 
of Twenty, 1973, 199).  
The document went on to note that ‘the Committee agreed that there should be the 
closest international cooperation and consultation in pursuit of these objectives’ 
(ibid, 199), and as such, the concept of burden sharing became internationally 
accepted as part of a code of good practice. 
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The mere acceptance that the industrialised nations would, for a substantial period, 
legitimately find themselves with current account deficits did not, however, resolve 
the problem of how best to channel the surplus funds from oil producers to other 
nations, and this was an especially important question given the prevailing view that 
the ‘prospective surpluses of oil exporters were beyond their capacity to absorb’ 
(Harmon, 1997, 65).  Strange (1997, 43) has argued that the decisions taken in 
response to the problems created by the OPEC price increases were of critical 
importance for international monetary relations.  She notes that the United States 
rejected an early and substantial increase in the resources of the Fund because this 
‘seemed far too pro-Arab, too much like knuckling under to impudent newcomers’, 
and suggests that the subsequent adoption of a hawkish posture towards OPEC 
effectively ‘left governments wondering how to persuade the banks not to cut off too 
abruptly the supplies of credit’ (ibid, 43).  Cohen (1998, 127) notes that this 
represented the Americans foregoing an opportunity to ‘exercise its influence over 
other actors through its control of access to dollar resources, either directly or 
through the decision making processes of the IMF.’ As such, this represented an 
opportunity for Britain to be proactive in designing a system for recycling through 
official structures that would allow them access to funds relatively free from 
conditionality should they need to borrow to cover their deficits, and therefore 
insulate itself, in the short-run at least, from the sensitivities arising out of the size of 
the sterling balances and the pound’s reserve role.   
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Britain’s major role in securing such facilities was in successfully lobbying for the 
extension of the IMF’s oil-facility into 1975.  The first oil facility had been 
introduced in order to meet the inevitable financing requirements of net-importers of 
oil, especially the industrialising nations, on the initiative of the Fund’s managing 
director, Johannes Witteveen.  As de Vries (1985a, 314) notes, Witteveen had 
recognised that whilst emphasising the spirit of cooperation was desirable, it would 
not be enough to solve problems of the extent of those that faced the international 
economy.  He also recognised that existing private financial arrangements would be 
insufficient to handle the task, at least in part because they ‘would not ensure that the 
surplus funds of oil exporting nationals would find their way to the oil importing 
countries that needed them most’ (ibid, 315).  The oil facility was therefore proposed 
as a temporary bridging operation that would assist the adjustment of national 
economies.   
 
The United States however, felt that a more appropriate solution would be to exert 
pressure on the oil exporting nations to make price reductions, and German officials 
were also reluctant to endorse the proposal for an oil facility (ibid, 315-7).  In 
response however, Witteveen argued that without a recycling facility of some kind, 
‘the only alternative [for industrialising nations] was for them to curtail their imports 
and submit to corresponding hardships in the form of reduced economic growth, 
greater unemployment and even lower living standards’ (ibid, 318), and on the back 
of these arguments, the Fund managed to negotiate agreement for a fund nominally 
open to all member nations with the exception of oil exporters and the United States, 
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and had secured funds amounting to SDR 1.8 billion from seven countries for the 
facility by August 1974 (ibid, 321).   
 
British ministers and officials were strongly in favour of the extension of the oil 
facility.  As Harold Lever noted in June 1974, there was little prospect of oil prices 
falling because of weakness in the OPEC cartel as the United States believed, and as 
such it was his view that the UK should attempt to bring the OPEC nations 
collectively to an understanding that they shared a mutual interest in stability with oil 
importers (TNA T 354/571, Lever to Wilson, 10 June 1974).  Derek Mitchell was 
also concerned about the prospects for stability in the absence of a recycling 
mechanism, and whilst he acknowledged that the risk of a collapse in the Euro-
currency markets was small, it was nevertheless the case that a point would be 
reached when ‘the intermediation capacity of the Euro-banks was substantially 
reduced [and] there is accordingly a clear need to consider how to manage the switch 
over from short-term banking finance to longer-term forms of financing’  (TNA T 
354/571, Mitchell to France, 19 June 1974).  He therefore concluded: ‘either new 
machinery will be needed, or existing machinery will need to be adapted to the new 
situation’ (ibid). 
 
There was growing acceptance of this view in international circles by September 
1974, as the situation in which oil exporters were lending to commercial banks on a 
short-term basis whilst the banks lent to oil importers on a medium to long-term 
basis, began to endanger the liquidity position of commercial banking enterprises.  In 
light of the failure of the German Herstatt Bank in June 1974, the position was seen 
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as highly unsatisfactory, and Witteveen once again ‘stressed the need for increasing 
official recycling of funds from oil exporters to oil importers and made a strong case 
for a substantial increase in recycling through the Fund’ (de Vries, 1985a, 334).  In 
the UK, Lever was broadly sympathetic to the idea of increasing the extent of 
official recycling facilities, but was nevertheless concerned that the funds made 
available would be dwarfed by the size of the problem.  For his part, he emphasised 
the importance of making attempts to achieve either a drastic reduction in the oil 
price, or more feasibly, taking some of the surplus out of the system, which he 
suggested could be achieved by isolating the bulk of the producers’ surpluses in an 
international fund which would be released only when the OPEC nations were able 
to use the surplus for the purchase of goods and services from abroad.  In exchange, 
he argued that the oil exporters could be compensated with a low rate of interest 
(TNA T 354/571, Lever to Wilson, 1 November 1974).   
 
The Treasury more broadly however, was not convinced that the oil money problem 
would be of a lasting duration, predicting that the disequilibrium would have petered 
out by 1980.  This was based on the view that oil prices were bound to come down 
because the exporters’ ‘share of the market is bound to shrink as alternatives are 
developed, and they will not, once investments in new sources have been made, be 
able to win it back’ (TNA T 354/565, Oil Money Synopsis, 2 December 1974, 
original emphasis).  In the interim however, it would be necessary to supplement 
recycling facilities for the simple reason that ‘nobody gains if the international 
system cannot cope with the flow and collapses under the strain’ (ibid, original 
emphasis).  Healey endorsed this view at a meeting in the Foreign Office on 6 
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December.  He informed his colleagues that he believed ‘the important thing was to 
set up alternative recycling mechanisms – as many as possible and as soon as 
possible’ (TNA T 354/411, Note of a Meeting, 6 December 1974).  Britain also 
made it clear that it was willing to exert diplomatic pressure on the United States if it 
did not endorse the renewal of the oil facility for 1975, by threatening to block its 
own recycling proposal for a ‘common loan and guarantee facility’ (ibid).  Britain’s 
ambassador to the United States, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, reported in early January 
that the architect of the American scheme, Henry Kissinger, had been rebuffed after 
informing him that unless the EEC finance ministers agreed in principle to 
supporting the American scheme, that the United States would not support the 
extended oil facility in the IMF.  He told Kissinger as a point of fact that the United 
States had no authority to formally veto the IMF facility, and that any other means to 
do so would be seen as a deliberate barrier to cooperative actions in their formative 
stages (TNA T 354/411, Note for the Record, 9 January 1975).  
 
Whether this intervention was decisive in and of itself is unclear, however the 
Executive Directors of the Fund agreed at the Interim Committee meeting on 15 and 
16 January that the oil facility should be renewed and enlarged for 1975 (see de 
Vries, 1985a, 344).  Whilst the United States once again voiced opposition on the 
grounds that it believed that financing structures were simply contributing to the 
accumulation of unsustainable levels of debt that some nations would never be able 
to repay (ibid, 340-1), the UK had nevertheless been key supporters of the recycling 
facilities, and by so doing had provided a buttress for the government that reduced 
the immediate concerns about maintaining the overseas confidence that was required 
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in order to prevent the diversification of the sterling balances by ensuring that a 
limited amount of low-conditionality finance would be available in the event of 
need. 
 
The OPEC price increases therefore placed unprecedented strain on the international 
monetary system.  However, it also provided an opportunity for Britain to take 
interim action to reduce the susceptibility of the sterling balances to declining 
confidence by negotiating the extension of the oil facility, which would mean Britain 
would be able to borrow in order to continue financing its deficit, and if necessary to 
supplement the reserves and support the rate, without engaging in politically difficult 
negotiations on conditionality.  However, the Treasury was also acutely aware that 
this was only a temporary fix to the problems caused by vulnerability of the sterling 
balances, and in order to ensure the stability of the rate and continued external 
financing prospects, it would be necessary to make a decisive restatement of 
economic strategy.   
 
The decisive re-orientation of economic strategy 
 
Edmund Dell (1996, 410) recalled that in the preparation of Healey’s spring Budget 
in 1974, ‘the Treasury obeyed its political master and presented options, none of 
them too demanding.’  By the end of the year however, ‘the official Treasury had at 
last concluded that existing policies were not sustainable’ (ibid, 412).  The 
restatement of the Treasury’s position occurred in the context of the November 
Budget, which had revealed that the PSBR had been nearly twice the Treasury 
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estimate, and was ‘seen to have done little to deal with the UK’s basic problems 
(Wass, 2008, 80), despite attempts to restore investment incentives through a 
reduction in the productivity deduction.  The Budget however, was a success with 
the TUC, which described the measures as ‘a courageous endeavour to protect 
employment, stimulate investment and promote social fairness’ (MRC 
MSS.292D/560.1/11, Statement on the Autumn Budget, 12 November 1974).  
However, the TUC was also advocating an ‘injection of some £1,500 million [into 
demand] over the next twelve months’ in order to sustain acceptable levels of 
employment (MRC MSS.292D/560.1/11, Econ Ctee 2/3, no date), and it was clear in 
the Treasury’s view that such measures were out of the question.  Sir Douglas Wass 
expressed this view in a Treasury Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) paper in 
December.  He noted that ‘a substantial shift [in economic policy] is called for’ 
because ‘we depend critically on overseas confidence to hold sterling balances and 
to maintain our capacity to borrow, either in sterling or dollars to finance our 
continuing deficit’ (TNA T 277/3053, PCC (74) 4, 20 December 1974).  He went on 
to note that ‘confidence is growing more fragile and could collapse at any time’ 
(ibid), before concluding that ‘there is no longer any official support for existing 
policies’ (ibid).  
 
The Treasury proposed a number of domestic measures in order to ease the problem 
of overseas confidence that was so critical because of the overhang of the sterling 
balances and the scale of Britain’s balance of payments deficit, and which had been 
exacerbated by the OPEC price increases.  Wass noted that the primary objectives of 
economic strategy should be to simultaneously address the problem of inflation 
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whilst tackling ‘the structural imbalance of the use of resources by which I mean a 
situation in which we are consuming as a nation 6 per cent more than we are 
producing, resulting in an excessively large balance of payments deficit quite apart 
from the oil price rises’ (ibid).  He believed that the best strategy for achieving these 
goals would be through a deflation of domestic demand and direct government 
intervention in the wage bargaining process (ibid). 
 
The deflation of domestic demand would be achieved by a combination of changes 
in fiscal policy, including both increases in taxation and reductions in expenditure, 
‘which would work on demand partly directly and partly by reducing real personal 
disposable incomes’, concurrently reducing the flow of imports, accelerating 
exports, and improving the balance of payments (TNA T 277/3053, PCC (74) 4, 20 
December 1974).  He also noted that whilst placing a figure on the kind of budgetary 
action that was called for was difficult, he believed that some contraction of the 
economy with an associated rise in unemployment would be beneficial both by 
removing bottlenecks where exporters had been held up by labour supply shortages, 
and reducing the rate of increase of wage settlements (ibid).  He wrote starkly: ‘this 
would inevitably give rise to severe social pressures and have serious consequences 
for the industrial sector but I cannot see any way of reducing inflation and improving 
the use of resources which does not involve increased unemployment’ (ibid).  
 
On the public expenditure side, he noted that action would need to be severe.  The 
Permanent Secretary proposed that for the appropriate outcomes to be reached,  ‘the 
cuts will have to concentrate on actual spending on goods and services and it is 
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unlikely the social services could be spared’ (ibid).  These measures alone, however, 
were not thought to be sufficient to both restore fundamental balance of payments 
equilibrium and decisively tackle inflation, so Wass also held the view that ‘we have 
no alternative but to attempt once more to break into the wage/price spiral by laying 
down a norm for the rate of pay increases’, whether by statutory means or effective 
government leadership (ibid).  In combination, these policy suggestions rejected the 
very essence of the Social Contract as the framework for economic management in 
terms of its approach to full employment as a legitimate economic aim, attitudes to 
social expenditure, and the government’s role in industrial relations.  
 
These policy recommendations were also made with an acute awareness of the 
potential political ramifications they held.  The paper notes: 
I do not by any means underestimate the political costs of such a policy, 
which I would regret as much as the Chancellor himself and the most careful 
thought would have to be given to the industrial and social programmes 
required.  But I now believe that the economic costs of clinging to the 
existing policy outweigh the political costs of abandoning it (ibid).   
From Wass’ point of view, it was likely to be the case that ‘the Chancellor will feel 
that it is politically out of the question for him to embrace the recommendations I 
have put forward – at any rate without the external crisis that would justify it’, 
however he also believed that failure to adopt measures of the kind proposed would 
precipitate an external crisis that Britain’s reserves would be insufficient to rebuff, 
and that this would force the government to adopt similar measures in any event 
(ibid).  After discussions with the Chancellor, Wass found his suspicions confirmed, 
  141 
and reported back to PCC that Healey ‘shares our anxieties [about inflation], but is 
extremely sceptical about the efficacy of a policy change which involves a departure 
from the Social Contract’, and was ‘wholly unsympathetic to an approach which 
seeks to correct the current account deficit solely by deflating domestic demand’ 
(TNA T 277/3054, PCC (75) 33 (revise) 26 February 1975).  
 
The reorientation of economic strategy was significantly influenced by the problems 
of financing the external deficit caused by evaporating confidence and the weakness 
of sterling, which were becoming more acute and used as justifications for policy 
changes in their own right.  At the end of January, the prospects of financing the 
deficit in 1975 were uncertain, with ‘questions now being raised about the UK’s 
credit-worthiness […] bound to affect sterling inflows and the capacity to borrow in 
foreign currency’ (TNA T 354/414, Financing the External Deficit in 1975, 22 
January 1975).  It was also noted that Britain remained especially vulnerable, and 
that predictions about external financing could become ‘entirely unrealistic within a 
matter of hours’ should confidence break dramatically (ibid).   
 
The paper argued that the need to attract sterling inflows without provoking 
suspicion about the sustainability of economic policy founded on fears about the 
future value of sterling meant that traditional assumptions about widening the 
uncovered interest rate differential as a means of attracting investors to sterling did 
not hold.  It was argued: 
A point could well be reached where the benefit would be more than offset 
by the damage done to confidence by what would be taken as a clear signal 
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that the UK situation had become so bad that exceptionally high interest rates 
were necessary to contain it (ibid).   
The Treasury argued therefore, that monetary policy alone was insufficient to 
address the problem, and could serve to be counterproductive considering that 
‘sharply reduced inflows from the major sterling holders in the OPEC group in the 
fourth quarter of 1974’ were interpreted as a sign that confidence was already on the 
wane (ibid).  The Treasury argued that this seepage of confidence was a product of 
increasingly sceptical market opinion about the concept of the oil deficit as an 
appropriate reason for borrowing, concern about the rate of increase of British debt 
servicing liabilities exceeding the implicit collateral of North Sea Oil revenues, and 
the persistence of UK inflation at a rate much higher than elsewhere in the world 
(ibid).  It was predicted: 
If confidence remains in its present sickly state, there is a clear possibility 
that net sterling inflows would be negligible: whereas if confidence 
improves, it would seem justifiable to expect a total net inflow of the order 
of, say, £1,500 million.  But no faith can be pinned in any “middle” forecast 
for the net sterling inflow: in some respects, such an outcome is the least 
probable (ibid).   
 
There was also concern about the extent of the sterling balances that were held in 
liquid form by two holders, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, and that attempts to attract 
inflows by using the uncovered interest rate differential would simply increase the 
vulnerability of the balances even if it did not create panic.  As a result, it was argued 
that it was more desirable to seek medium-term finance through foreign currency 
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borrowing by the public sector (TNA T 354/414, Financing the External Deficit in 
1975, 22 January 1975), but on the grounds that waning confidence had ‘impaired 
the capacity of the public sector to borrow in foreign currency’, it was felt that this 
avenue was likely to yield no more than £1 billion (ibid).  Given the bleak prospects 
for attracting net-sterling in-flows and market borrowing, the Treasury also reviewed 
the possibility of bilateral and multilateral borrowing, each of which posed two 
questions, intrinsically linked to the confidence issue.  The first was whether it 
would be possible to negotiate a loan of this kind without unfavourable conditions 
attached, and the second was how far any failed attempts would further dent 
confidence.   
 
On the first question, it was felt that the prospects of borrowing on agreeable terms 
from Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia would be favourable, and although this could 
not be said with absolute certainty, the Treasury concluded that for the purposes of 
financing the balance of payments, ‘the main focus will have to be on new bilateral 
deals, with the most immediate initiatives designed to take the temperature as to the 
possibility, amounts and timing of deals with one or a combination of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Iran.’  On optimistic assumptions, it was felt that such financing avenues 
could yield approximately £2,250 million over twelve months (ibid).  The 
government also had the prospect of borrowing from the IMF if required.  With the 
successful extension of the oil facility into 1975, it was nominally possible to draw 
funds of up to $2,000 million from the oil facility, in addition to the $3,700 million 
that Britain had access to under its entitlement to draw two hundred per cent of quota 
on the General Account (ibid).   
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An early drawing against Britain’s entitlement under the oil facility however, was 
problematic on the grounds that the UK’s use of resources would leave less available 
for others, and was likely to ‘be resented by the LDCs (and no doubt by others) and 
would seriously unbalance the whole operation’ (TNA T 354/414, Financing the 
External Deficit in 1975, 22 January 1975).  In contrast, a drawing on the General 
Account of the Fund was seen to have a potentially advantageous impact on 
confidence.  It was suggested that ‘the immediate effect of a drawing on the Fund 
would be favourable for confidence, especially if associated with what might appeal 
as a tough economic programme, blessed by the Fund’ (ibid).  On this basis, Wass 
(2008, 104) recalls that it was decided to treat the Fund as a fall back option, because 
the government ‘might want to use the Fund in an emergency and as part of a 
programme to restore confidence.’  These views expressed at the beginning of 
January had changed little by the beginning of March.  Whilst the prospect of 
borrowing from the oil facility seemed more plausible if the approach could be 
delayed until the end of the year, it nevertheless remained the Treasury view that: 
Either seepage of confidence will be checked and reversed, in which case the 
auguries of the external financing side would improve significantly, or the 
seepage will continue, in which case the prognosis is bad (TNA T 354/414, 
External Financing: State of Play, 7 March 1975). 
 
 
* 
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The exchange rate and the balance of payments   
 
Given the uncertain prospects for external financing in January, the Treasury 
considered a number of schemes that would reduce Britain’s deficit and eliminate 
the need to attract sterling inflows over the medium-term, which began with 
consideration of ‘the classic way to improve export prices [which] is of course to 
depreciate one’s currency’ (TNA T 354/414, External Financing: State of Play, 7 
March 1975).  However, the collapse of the Bretton Woods par-value system of 
fixed exchange rates made this considerably more difficult in light of the fact that it 
was unclear how a downward adjustment of the rate could be achieved in an orderly 
fashion.  As Wass had noted, the absence of a formal mechanism for adjustment was 
compounded by the fact that interest rate adjustments could not be guaranteed to 
produce predictable outcomes, and that because the government could not publicly 
pursue a policy of depreciation because of the impact this would have for 
confidence, the authorities would not even be able to take any credit for benefits that 
were gained; whilst the strategy was economically risky, it would also be politically 
neutral (ibid).   
 
It was however, suggested that ‘an announcement that the authorities would no 
longer intervene to buy sterling at a rate above, say, $1.90, would quickly trigger a 
depreciation to about that level’ (TNA T 358/207, Walker to Barratt, 11 March 
1975), thus negating the difficulty of achieving the adjustment in the context of a 
floating rate system.  Nevertheless, the strategy was laden with disadvantages, the 
most notable of which was the appearance that British policy had been directly 
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responsible for the erosion of £5 billion of official reserves and £2.5 billion of 
private sterling holdings.  In addition to the considerable distrust that would be 
created, there was also the risk that the extent of the depreciation could not be 
effectively managed, carrying the possibility of a widespread diversification of 
sterling holdings that could serve to make the situation worse (ibid).  It was argued 
plainly, ‘the cumulative effect of all of these pressures could plainly be catastrophic’ 
(ibid).1 
 
Despite the practical difficulties of achieving the change in the rate, the Treasury 
continued to consider the possibility of achieving a 20 per cent depreciation of the 
pound.  However, the size of the proposal posed as many problems as the absence of 
mechanisms to achieve it.  It was noted in a PCC paper that Britain’s ‘major trading 
partners and the IMF would regard a 20 per cent depreciation, going well beyond 
what was required to restore competitiveness, as a form of international misconduct’, 
which carried the added danger of becoming ‘the first link in a chain reaction of 
competitive depreciations’ (TNA T 277/3055, PCC (75) 41, 13 March 1975).   
However, a straightforward step-change in the rate or a depreciation by market                                                         
1 There was also concern about the implications direct government involvement in 
securing sterling depreciation would have on the counter-inflation strategy, because 
it would clearly place pressure on the RPI as a result of increased import costs, and it 
was a distinct possibility that this would contribute to increased wage claims, a quick 
erosion of competitive gains, and as a result simply leave the economy in the same 
fundamental situation but with a higher rate of inflation (TNA T 358/207, Walker to 
Barratt, 11 March 1975). 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forces however, were not the only possible ways in which Britain could try to use the 
exchange rate in order to help improve the competitive position of British industry.   
 
Lord Kaldor was the architect of one such proposal, which advocated the application 
of an ‘industrial value’ for the pound sterling as part of a ‘dual exchange rate’ 
system, which would operate by devaluing the ‘industrial pound’ by a given 
percentage in relation to the pound sterling.  The receipts of British exporters would 
be exchanged at the normal sterling rate, however importers of goods would only be 
able to obtain foreign exchange for their overseas transactions at the devalued 
‘industrial pound’ rate (TNA T 277/3053, PCC (75) 20, 12 February 1975).  The 
logic of the argument was fairly straightforward, in that the system appeared to allow 
Britain to reap ‘all the benefits of a devaluation of the pound by x per cent on our 
trade balance without the disadvantage of a falling pound on internal costs’ (ibid).   
 
Whilst intellectually appealing, there is no evidence to suggest that the Treasury 
considered this a feasible alternative to depreciation, and it was feared that the 
international community would respond in a similar way to its introduction as it 
would to depreciation of 20 per cent.  This was because the system in all but name 
was an import surcharge and export subsidy applied differentially to identical goods 
on the basis of their national origin, and as such, was likely to be perceived as a 
barrier to free trade (TNA T 277/3054, PCC (75) 33 (revise) 26 February 1975).  
Although the IMF and the EEC had tolerated a similar scheme operated by France in 
1971 following monetary reforms, which might indicate ‘that our international 
partners would be more disposed to condone it than they would an undisguised 
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subsidy and surcharge system’ (ibid), by 18 March, the Chancellor had decided the 
scheme was not suitable for Britain and would only be accepted grudgingly overseas 
(Wass, 2008, 97).   
 
Like the dual exchange rate system, taking direct action to restore the balance of 
payments through the introduction of import controls had an intuitive appeal on the 
grounds that they appeared to offer a solution to reducing imports whilst avoiding 
domestic price inflation associated with depreciation.  However, there was also a 
considerable stigma attached to formal import restrictions, which carried additional 
objections on the grounds that their imposition would have a counter-intuitive effect 
by actually contributing to a substantial erosion of the efficiency of British industry 
by removing all incentives to invest and become internationally competitive.  
Treasury calculations showed that in order to make savings of £1,500 million 
through the introduction of import controls applied only to imports of manufactured 
consumer goods and non-essential producer goods, it would be necessary to impose 
quotas of up to 70 per cent, which would result in the substitution of imports with 
inferior goods which may in themselves rise in price as supply bottlenecks emerged 
(TNA T 277/3054, PCC (75) 33 (revise) 26 February 1975).  On the other hand, if 
import restrictions were applied to a broader range of goods, there was the 
possibility that the supply of raw materials to the production process would be 
disrupted (ibid).  Furthermore, the argument for import controls, taken in the context 
of the long-term aims of British policy, was weak given that they would inevitably 
divert resources from exports to the home market, which was counter to the 
government’s stated aims of achieving export led growth (ibid).   Given the strength 
  149 
of official feeling about the complete unsuitability of a programme of import 
controls as a solution to the balance of payments problem, and the perception that 
there was growing enthusiasm for them at a political level, the Treasury plainly 
stated that it would ‘prefer existing policy, with all its attendant risks, to a scheme of 
quantitative restrictions on imports’ (ibid). 
 
The difficulties caused by the sensitivity of the sterling balances to confidence 
factors and the demands of external financing had therefore caused the Treasury to 
engage in a substantial restatement of economic strategy, which was designed to 
make the case that in a world made up of reasonable persons, the only suitable action 
was to cut expenditure, increase taxation and intervene in the wage determination 
process.  Whilst other options were considered, they were rejected on the grounds of 
impracticality, leaving little option for the government other than fiscal reductions, 
which underscored decisions included in the April Budget.   
 
The April Budget 
 
The TUC’s economic review in January 1975 had noted that ‘one of the overriding 
priorities of government policy will be to maintain employment’, and that ‘real 
resources will also have to be devoted to public expenditure on agreed social 
priorities’ (MRC MSS.292D/560.1/11, Econ Ctee 4/5, 8 January 1975, original 
emphasis).  These views were clearly reflected it its Budget recommendations to the 
Chancellor.  The TUC informed Healey on 9 April that ‘a neutral Budget would 
mean increasing unemployment, and against that background the TUC was calling 
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for an expansionary Budget’ (MRC MSS.292D/560.1/12, Econ Ctee 7/1, 9 April 
1975).  It also argued that expenditure priorities should target social issues, and that 
the balance of payments difficulties should be addressed through a temporary 
scheme of import restrictions coupled with continued overseas borrowing (ibid).  
However, the Chancellor used the confidence issue in order to explain why this 
would not be possible and informed them that although ‘up to now loans had been 
arranged commercially without any political conditions imposed’, the current level 
of the UK’s inflation ‘might mean that this situation would not pertain in the future’ 
(ibid). 
 
Healey’s discussions with the TUC were undoubtedly underscored by the 
reorientation of the views of the Treasury and its Budget recommendations, despite 
alternative suggestions.  Tony Benn had informed the Ministerial Committee on 
Economic Strategy (MES) at the beginning of February that Britain was effectively 
faced with a choice between two economic strategies.  In the first, the government’s 
primary aims were the relatively quick improvement of the balance of payments and 
a sharp reduction of inflation. Achieving these goals would require the people to 
accept large cuts in the standard of living in exchange for better long-term 
employment prospects caused by a fiscal reduction of about £3 billion and direct 
intervention in wage determination (TNA CAB 134/3929, MES (75) 4, 11 February 
1975).  On the other hand, he argued that it would be possible to go for a slower 
improvement in the balance of payments whilst saving jobs and maintaining 
industrial capacity through selective intervention discussed extensively with the 
TUC.  This would require greater explanation of the extent of the crisis to the people, 
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the maintenance of the price code, selective assistance to industry, and import 
controls (ibid).  Benn’s preference however, was clear: 
Strategy A and its variants entails, as a deliberate act of policy, a relatively 
sharp cut in living standards and employment, achieved by traditional 
indirect, macro-economic measures of a broadly indiscriminate nature.  
Strategy B, by contrast, is intended to operate more slowly and more 
selectively by direct action at particular points of weakness (ibid).  
 
However, it was the view of the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury that the targets 
for public expenditure reductions should be in the region of £2 billion for 1975-76 
and £4 billion for 1976-77 (TNA T 277/3053, PCC (75) 33 (revise), 26 February 
1975).  This was presented as Budget strategy Beta, along with packages including 
no new measures (Alpha), a package including the import surcharge / export subsidy 
scheme (Gamma), and a package including quantitative restrictions (Delta) (see 
TNA T 171/1182, Posner to France, 7 March 1975).  The prediction for the current 
account on the basis of strategy Beta was an improvement of £1,300 million 
compared with Alpha, which may have risen to £2,250 million in the second year, at 
the cost of an increase in unemployment of 25,000 after one year, potentially rising 
to 125,000 after two years (ibid). 
 
Within the Cabinet, the Treasury’s programme ‘Beta’ was preferred to Tony Benn’s 
alternative, with Healey informing officials that his colleagues had ‘a general 
awareness […] that it would be necessary to squeeze expenditure’, and that there 
would be ‘little difficulty getting this agreed in principle’ (TNA T 353/145, Note of a 
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Meeting, 28 February 1975).  Healey finally declared his definite intentions to 
impose cuts on public expenditure programmes for 1976-77 to Cabinet on 13 March, 
which he justified on the grounds that they were inevitable because of Britain’s 
tenuous external position (see TNA CAB 128/56, CC (75) 12th Conclusions, 13 
March 1975).  However, the cuts were not to go as far as the Treasury had desired on 
the grounds that they would have had ‘arbitrary and disruptive effects’ of the kind 
that he wished to avoid, and as a result were limited to a reduction of £1,000 million 
at 1974 survey prices (ibid).  Whilst Wass (2008, 98-9) recalls that this decision was 
reached on the basis of views that were rather more political than economic, it was 
nevertheless enough to secure Cabinet agreement to the action, which led to what 
Barnett (1982, 64) described as ‘the first big public expenditure cuts Cabinet’ on 25 
March.   
 
Benn however, remained unconvinced of the case for cutting public expenditure, and 
on the eve of the Cabinet discussions wrote to Wilson once again illustrating his 
view that Britain had a choice of economic strategies, and that Healey’s was 
essentially a conventional deflationary package that would lead to high 
unemployment (TNA PREM 16/341, Benn to Wilson, 24 March 1975).  He 
emotively argued that the course was ‘bound to be seen by the Labour movement 
and the whole country as a policy of despair, representing an admission of the failure 
of our economic policy’, and once again suggested that ‘we must now seriously 
consider an explicit commitment to a protectionist strategy for industrial 
reconstruction and a return to full employment’ (ibid).  However, at the Cabinet 
meeting the following day, Healey restated the argument that if Britain were to 
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continue living beyond its means to the extent of 5 per cent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per annum, the government would inevitably face a sterling crisis 
that would force it to ‘adopt the policies appropriate to a siege economy, or they 
would have to borrow from the international institutions, and possibly the United 
States, on terms which would to a considerable extent dictate policy to be followed’ 
(TNA CAB 128/56, CC (75) 16th Conclusions, 25 March 1975).  In order to add 
extra weight to his argument, Healey once again noted that import restrictions were 
out of the question, not least because they would impose severe cuts in living 
standards on the British people and critically damage Britain’s prospects for 
Borrowing overseas (ibid).   When Cabinet resumed in the evening, it was agreed 
that Barnett should conduct bilateral discussions with spending ministers in order to 
decide the makeup of the package (TNA CAB 128/56, CC (75) 17th Conclusions, 25 
March), and by the second week of April the Cabinet had reached agreement on cuts 
of just under £900 million for 1976-77 (TNA CAB 128/56, CC (75) 19th 
Conclusions, 10 April 1975).   
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter it has been shown that the size of the sterling balances had made 
British economic policy particularly susceptible to changes in overseas confidence in 
its macro-economic management, and that sterling guarantees in the 1960s were 
initially thought to lack credibility, and once put in place in 1968, had served to 
increase the balances rather than contribute to their orderly run-down.  It has also 
shown that Britain was a principal advocate of the extension of the oil facility into 
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1975, which provided a condition free buffer for the government in the event 
confidence broke decisively, and that the Treasury believed that a decisive re-
orientation of economic strategy was required in order to preserve the confidence 
that was required so Britain would be able to continue to finance its deficit and avoid 
a catastrophic diversification of overseas sterling. 
 
It has also been shown that whilst the Treasury considered a number of ways of 
correcting the balance of payments directly, it strongly favoured reductions in public 
expenditure and government intervention in the wage bargaining process in order to 
preserve confidence.  These preferences were strongly reflected in the expenditure 
cuts included as part of the April Budget, when, despite the objections of the TUC 
and Tony Benn, who wanted to see increased public expenditure to maintain 
employment coupled with import restrictions and borrowing to cover the deficit, the 
Chancellor argued that overseas opinion and financial markets had made it inevitable 
that expenditure had to be cut, and that any alternative course would force Britain 
either to withdraw from the world economy, with associated consequences for the 
British standard of living, or borrow from abroad, with conditions that would dictate 
austerity measures.   
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Chapter VI 
 
The sterling exchange rate, the £6 pay policy, and the oil facility loan, April – 
December 1975 
 
In the previous chapter it was shown that Britain’s foreign reserves were vulnerable 
to wavering confidence in the sustainability of economic policy because of the size 
of the sterling balances, and that as a result of this the Treasury had advocated a 
decisive reorientation of economic strategy that considered a broad range of options, 
but settled on the need for the government to reduce public expenditure and 
intervene in the wage-bargaining process.  It also showed that despite resistance 
from the TUC and the left of the Labour Party, it was able to begin making cuts in 
public expenditure in the April Budget by arguing that any other course would either 
be disastrous for confidence, the standard of living of the British people, or the 
government’s ability to make its own economic policy. 
 
This chapter will show how agreement on the need for policy measures that ran 
contrary to the principles of the Social Contract continued throughout 1975, and 
shows how they began to be implemented through the process of preference shaping 
depoliticisation.  It begins by showing that a number of economic indicators were 
still a concern for the Treasury on confidence grounds, and then demonstrates how a 
slide in the sterling rate was used in order to argue that there was no alternative to 
introducing a £6 per week flat rate pay limit, despite the fact that the Treasury 
wanted the pound to fall for reasons of competitiveness and had refused to allow the 
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Bank of England to intervene substantially in the foreign exchange markets in order 
to achieve this.  Finally, it will show that in the absence of a substantial improvement 
in Britain’s external financing prospects, prudence encouraged the government to 
apply for loans from the IMF’s oil facility and first-credit tranche, and that by 
emphasising the importance of avoiding further external financing crises resulting 
from lapses in confidence on the grounds that their outcomes would be worse than 
immediate retrenchment, it was possible to secure agreement to further cuts in 
expenditure for the February 1976 white paper in December.    
 
The economic indicators 
 
The levels of public expenditure and the extent of the PSBR in the 1970s had three 
broad economic implications for public policy-making stemming from their impact 
upon confidence.  Firstly, the scale of public expenditure financed by monetary 
expansion had a negative impact on confidence because of its contribution to 
inflation.  Of itself, this was especially problematic for Britain in light of the scale of 
the sterling balances, because large public expenditures financed in this way were 
seen to be actively eroding the value of sterling assets.  Secondly, public expenditure 
was seen to pre-empt the use of resources by the private sector, which made the 
achievement of balance of payments equilibrium seem more remote.  Lastly, the size 
of the PSBR had implications for the cost of Britain’s debt servicing, which was 
increasingly seen to be unsustainable given the inability of British industries to 
rationalise. 
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Despite these implications, at a political level, the significance of the PSBR for the 
real economy was doubted, and in general discussion1 at Cabinet on 10 April, it was 
noted that the concept had become ‘a fetish, forming a barrier to the realisation of 
sensible policies’ (TNA CAB 128/56, CC (75) 19th Conclusions, 10 April 1975).  
However, the Treasury was quite clear that the PSBR had implications for both the 
real economy, and for confidence.  In a note by officials circulated to Cabinet, it was 
recorded: 
many of the lending transactions that contribute to it […] can have an 
important influence on the liquidity of the private sector, and so can affect 
spending and external capital flows.  Secondly, the financing of a large 
borrowing requirement can pose problems for monetary management, which 
again have implications for the real economy and external outflows (TNA 
CAB 129/183, C (75) 61, 19 May 1975). 
Finally, the paper noted, the PSBR ‘has come to be considered by outside observers 
as an indication of the Government’s budgetary stance, and so can be critical to 
confidence’ (ibid).   
 
The path of public expenditure in the UK however, did not appear to be prudent, and 
aggregate expenditure virtually doubled from £27.4 billion in 1972 to £54.5 billion2 
in 1975 (CSO, 1977, 52).  Perhaps more significantly from the point of view of 
market opinion, expenditure on investment had stalled relative to expenditure on                                                         
1 The minutes do not make it clear which Cabinet member made the specific point in 
this instance.  
2 Figures rounded upwards to the nearest £0.1 billion. 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consumption from 1973 onwards, with investment increasing by under £4 billion 
between 1973 and 1975, whilst spending on consumption rose by nearly £9.5 billion 
(ibid, 54).  These figures did nothing to quash market suspicions that Labour 
governments were profligate spenders and lacked control over the public purse.  
Monetary expansion was also a concern, as figures for M3 rose from £2 billion in 
1971-72 to £6.8 billion in 1973-74, before falling back to £3.5 billion in 1974-75 
(ibid, 52), and as figure VI.1 below shows, the PSBR had virtually doubled fiscal 
year on fiscal year between 1971-72 and 1974-75. By this stage, the PSBR had 
reached nearly £8 billion, and it was noted in a Treasury paper that ‘the UK’s 
external debt is currently accumulating at a rate roughly equivalent to the value of a 
full year’s North Sea Oil production in 1980 at 1974 prices’ (TNA T 354/414, 
External Financing in 1975, 22 January 1975).  
Figure VI.1, PSBR 1971-72 – 1974-75, £ million (not inflation adjusted) 
 
Source: CSO (1977) Economic Trends, Number 279, London: HMSO, 52 
 
Inflation had also continued unabated since the election of the Labour government in 
February 1974, and continued to contribute to the erosion of the real value of sterling 
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assets held abroad. As such, it continued to act as an incentive to diversify out of 
sterling.  Wages had risen by nearly 5.5 per cent between February and June 1975, 
(CSO, 1977, 2), whilst as figure VI.2 below shows, the RPI had increased by 24.2 
per cent on the same quarter of the previous year before the end of the first half of 
1975. 
Figure VI.2, Retail Price Index 1974-75, 1970 average = 100 
   RPI   
Percentage 
Increase*   
        
Year Quarter   
All 
Items     All Items   
1974 1   138.8     12.85   
 2   147     15.84   
 3   150.7     17.00   
  4   157.5     18.24   
1975 1   167     20.32   
 2   182.7     24.29   
 3   190.7     26.54   
 4   197.3     25.27   
Source: CSO (1976) Economic Trends, Annual Supplement, Number 2, London, 
HMSO, 96-7 
 
* Percentage increase on same quarter of previous year (my calculation) 
 
In light of these indicators, and despite the fact that the Labour government had 
recognised the balance of payments as a prior claim on resources and announced 
plans to cut expenditure programmes in 1976-77, the figures for public expenditure, 
the PSBR, monetary expansion and inflation, continued to dampen confidence.  In 
order to address them the Treasury would need to be able to make strong cases that 
the reductions in public expenditure and government intervention in the wage 
bargaining process that it had advocated in December 1974 were justified.  On the 
issue of incomes, the prevailing exchange rate strategy provided just such an 
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opportunity, as the Treasury argued that incomes policy was absolutely essential 
because of the depreciating pound, despite its preferences to see it fall.   
 
The sterling exchange rate  
 
Pressure on sterling had emerged late in 1974, and in light of unresolved questions 
about the appropriate exchange rate strategy, between 13 December and 24 January, 
the Bank of England had spent $377 million on intervention in the foreign exchange 
markets to support the rate (TNA T 358/207, Hedley-Miller to Folger, 24 January 
1975).  The rate remained under pressure throughout January, however through 
further selective intervention the Bank was able to stabilise the rate at an effective 
depreciation of 22 per cent below Smithsonian, or a spot rate against the dollar of 
$2.38.  However, further pressure emerged in anticipation of the April Budget, and 
in its aftermath, the Treasury’s exchange rate strategy gained a coherence that 
demonstrated its intentions to allow the rate to fall and conceal its failure to act 
decisively to prevent the slide, in order to justify the need to introduce an incomes 
policy.   
 
Pressure on sterling re-emerged in the week prior to the April Budget, when on the 
morning of 7 April, the transactions of one middle-Eastern seller pushed the rate 
down to $2.38.  At first, the pressure appeared to be insubstantial, and stabilised after 
a $5 million reserve switching operation, however by the early afternoon the Bank 
had used a further $18 million in this way, and requested authorisation from the 
Treasury for the authority to commit up to $50 million in the markets to prevent any 
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sudden depreciation (TNA T 358/207, Note for the Record, 7 April).  The Treasury 
granted the Bank a discretionary authority in this amount, however its interventions 
in the market proved to be insufficient, and on 8 April sterling began to slip against 
the dollar and other currencies, falling to £2.37 by 10.15 am.  On the grounds that it 
was thought to be undesirable for there to be a sharp slide in the rate immediately 
prior to the Budget, a further $30 million was authorised for reserve switching 
operations to hold the rate (TNA T 358/207, Note for the Record, 8 April 1975).    
 
These flurries on the exchanges were a concern for the Treasury in so far as it was 
reluctant to see a sudden deterioration in the sterling rate that would unleash the 
sterling balances, however whilst it had rejected the possibility of depreciating 
sterling by 20 per cent, it nevertheless remained the intention to achieve a 10 per 
cent depreciation over the coming year.  This was to be achieved by relying to the 
maximum extent possible on ‘autonomous factors to depress the rate so that the main 
responsibility for depreciation is seen to lie elsewhere than with HMG’ (TNA T 
358/207, Walker to Mitchell, 11 April 1975).  The Treasury had also forecast how 
this would be expected to proceed throughout the spring, noting that the uncovered 
interest rate differential would narrow from over 4 per cent to around 2 per cent, and 
that the dollar had shown signs of strengthening.  In addition to this, it was felt that 
market apprehension would build in the run up to the referendum on the EEC, 
beginning around 23 April, and on this basis, Treasury policy was to intervene 
parsimoniously in order to stabilise the rate at an effective depreciation of 22 per 
cent below Smithsonian until this pressure emerged (ibid).   
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This appraisal of the situation proved remarkably accurate, as pressure on sterling 
again emerged on 22 April, just over one month before the referendum.  In response 
to this pressure, the Bank had committed $50 million before 11.30 am in order to 
dampen suspicions that it was the government’s intention to let the rate fall as had 
been reported in the media, and which appeared to be confirmed by reductions in 
interest rates (TNA T 358/207, Barratt to France, 22 April 1975).  In response to the 
pressure the Governor of the Bank had requested $200 million to assert control over 
the markets, which the Treasury agreed to on the condition that spending in the 
exchange markets should be conducted on a prudent basis, given that as ‘it is indeed 
our policy to get the rate down […] we ought not to slog away spending money to 
try and stop this happening’ (ibid). 
 
Whilst these early developments showed that the Treasury’s attempts to get the rate 
down with relative stealth over a twelve-month period appeared to be on course, as 
the end of April approached the Bank had been spending increasing amounts in the 
markets to defend the rate, provoking Treasury concern that the use of the reserves 
was no longer being exercised prudently.  On 25 April, with the effective 
depreciation expected to hit 22.7 per cent, the Bank had already used $105 million of 
the $200 million approved by the Treasury on 22 April, and the Bank indicated that 
it was likely to request authority to exceed the $200 million already agreed (TNA T 
358/207, Mitchell to Hedley-Miller, 25 April 1975).  When Derek Mitchell was 
informed that the Bank had already spent $40 million on the day, he made it clear 
that he expected the Bank to make contact with him before intervening in the event 
of further disquiet in the markets, and expressed his hope that ‘this move to keep the 
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Bank under control will not be frustrated by parallel approaches to us, e.g. from the 
Governor’ (ibid).   
 
The Bank and the Treasury therefore had different positions with regard to what 
constituted a desirable scale of intervention, and this was borne out at a strategy 
meeting in early May.  Examination of the figures showed that between 21 April and 
2 May, $304 million had been spent in defence of the rate, including $188 million on 
2 May alone (TNA T 358/208, Note of a Meeting, 5 May 1975).  The Governor’s 
view was that the need for this stemmed from the fact that the UK’s prevailing rate 
of inflation indicated to the markets that some measure of depreciation was 
inevitable, and he argued that ‘if the market got the impression that the authorities 
were intervening merely to smooth the depreciation it was probable that the rate 
would fall substantially’ (ibid).  On the other hand, Derek Mitchell noted that there 
was a real possibility that Britain could lose a substantial amount of its reserves in 
any decisive attempt to halt sterling’s decline, and Douglas Wass agreed that ‘there 
need not be a commitment to massive intervention when [sterling] reached a 
particular level’ (ibid).  Wass then proposed that the Bank be granted authority to use 
up to $100 million per day for smoothing operations, and whilst the Governor put 
the case for $250 million, the Chancellor came down on the side of the Treasury, 
authorising the Bank to use $100 million per day in smoothing operations, up to a 
maximum of $250 million (ibid).    
 
As the Governor had feared, and in light of its exchange rate strategy, as the 
Treasury had hoped, the amounts authorised proved insufficient to end further 
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speculation on sterling, and in the morning of 13 May, the Chancellor agreed to 
increase the Bank’s authority to intervene with up to $400 million (TNA T 358/208, 
Hedley-Miller to Wass, 13 May 1975).  The result of this decision was that by 3.30 
pm the sterling rate stood at $2.30, with the Bank’s expenditure on the day reaching 
$229 million (ibid).  This figure continued to increase throughout the afternoon, and 
by the end of the day, $313 million of the $400 million authorised had been used 
(TNA T 358/208, Note for the Record, 13 May 1975).  The remainder of this money 
had been used by the end of the following day, leading to a further request from the 
Bank for authority to use $100 million for the purposes of ‘parsimonious 
intervention’ (TNA T 358/208, Note for the Record, 14 May 1975).   
 
Douglas Wass (2008, 133) notes that in general, the Treasury’s view was in line with 
that of the Governor, although there was unease about whether attempts should be 
made to hold sterling to any fixed parity and the fact that the size of reserves would 
not permit any large scale support of the exchange rate.  He notes that the different 
views of the Treasury and the Bank ‘did not, in 1975, give rise to any material policy 
differences’ (ibid, 134).  However it is difficult to see how the views of the Treasury, 
which were strongly against using the reserves to support a given parity in order to 
achieve depreciation, and those of the Bank, which wished to use the reserves for 
this purpose, could be any more disparate.  This is especially brought out by the 
extent to which the Treasury felt the need to remind the Bank that spending the 
reserves to support the rate when it was government policy to secure depreciation 
was counter-intuitive, and its reluctance to authorise the use of the foreign reserves 
for such purposes. 
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In the context of the disagreement between the Bank and the Treasury on the aims 
and appropriate scale of market intervention, pressure on the rate and the scale of 
intervention contributed to the end-month reserves figures falling from $7,132 
million for April to $6,491 million for June, but given that this was less than $300 
million lower than the figure for January (see Bank of England, 1977, table 23; TNA 
T 354/416, Reserves Objectives, 11 August 1975),3 it is clear that the situation was 
not critical, and the exchange rate, despite peaking at over $2.40 in February and 
March, had only fallen from $2.34 on the first Friday of January to $2.28 on the 
second Friday of June (see Bank of England, 1975, table 27).  Nonetheless, the 
Treasury used the situation in order to advocate policy change. Mary Hedley-Miller 
in the Overseas Finance Division noted: 
There has developed an expectation that the Government is “going to act”. 
For as long as this expectation is disappointed, 25 per cent [below 
Smithsonian] will not be regarded by outside observers and operators as                                                         
3 Wass (2008, 134) discounts the monthly, published reserves figures for 1975 as a 
reliable indicator.  He notes that they ‘do not give any indication of the size of the 
intervention’ because there were inflows as various borrowers drew on their lines of 
credit from time to time, but moreover because ‘the Treasury occasionally 
“doctored” the true reserves figures by switching from spot to forward transactions 
or by timing the drawings on external loans’ (ibid, 134), however he cites no 
documentary evidence giving examples of when this occurred or to what extent, 
which creates the impression that his analysis reflects a selective approach to the 
kinds of indicators deemed of importance. 
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sustainable.  If the exchange rate accordingly is going to be pulled down by 
market forces, mere money, as opposed to policy change, will not succeed in 
offering a sufficient opposing force (TNA T 358/208, Hedley-Miller to Wass, 
11 June 1975).   
 
The Treasury continued to associate the relatively modest slide in the rate with a lack 
of overseas confidence in British counter-inflation policy.  On 18 June Derek 
Mitchell wrote to the Governor of the Bank, enclosing a paper that discussed the 
question of whether continued intervention in the foreign exchange markets ‘would 
have any real value or whether it would simply mean throwing away the reserves’, 
indicating that he was inclined to the latter view (TNA T 277/3056, Mitchell to 
Richardson, circulated to PCC as PCC (75) 65, 18 June 1975).  The paper noted that 
the primary case for intervening in the market was that the changing portfolio 
preferences of major sterling balance holders could force the situation to breaking 
point.  This position seemed strengthened given that the Kuwaiti ambassador had 
indicated that ‘Kuwaiti policy could change substantially if the dollar rate 
depreciated to $2.20’ (ibid), which appeared to represent the threat of a major 
diversification out of sterling.  On the other hand, the paper argued that it was 
unclear intervention of even $500 million would be sufficient to hold the rate, and 
that a different approach was required.  On this basis, the conclusion was reached 
that ‘until action is taken on inflation that external opinion regards as adequate, the 
exchange rate is bound to be subject to chronic bouts of selling pressure and to go on 
falling’ (ibid).   
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The slide in the exchange rate therefore, was not only favoured by the Treasury as an 
end in itself, but also provided the government with an opportunity to argue that the 
decision to continue with purely voluntary forms of collective bargaining was no 
longer in its hands because it was not credible in the eyes of sterling holders on 
whom the government’s broader economic strategy was dependent.  This was 
especially convenient in light of the Treasury’s preference for a return to incomes 
policy that it had expressed in December 1974, and the long-standing contingency 
planning that had begun at that time and remained unresolved on the grounds that 
officials had not managed to find a scheme that would be effective and politically 
acceptable.  The appearance of crisis in the foreign exchange markets attributed to a 
lack of counter-inflationary credibility had, as Wass had predicted in December 
1974, provided the opportunity for the government to depoliticise the issue of 
incomes policy.   
 
Counter-inflation strategy 
 
As part of its contingency planning, the Treasury had identified three potential ways 
of coping with Britain’s inflationary conditions in December 1974, each of which 
carried some degree of political or economic risk.  The first suggestion was 
implausible, and involved taking no action on inflation and simply living with it.  
The second suggestion was to allow unemployment to increase to diminish the 
relative bargaining power of workers.   Finally, it was suggested that the Treasury 
could design and implement a new incomes policy (TNA T 277/3053, PCC (74) 3, 
10 December 1974).  The official assessment discounted the first two options, the 
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first on the grounds that it would create an economic crisis of such an extent that it 
could ‘lead to reform of the currency’ (ibid), and the second because the increase in 
unemployment would create a political crisis that could lead to the defeat of the 
government (ibid).  Incomes policy was therefore felt to represent a credible 
economic solution with a manageable political downside. 
 
On 8 January three proposals for a new incomes policy were presented to the 
Treasury PCC.  The first involved the sharpest break with the Social Contract, and 
would impose a two-month freeze in wages, which would be followed by a statutory 
pay norm that would be set below the rate of increase of the cost of living (TNA T 
277/3053, PCC (75) 2, 8 January 1975).  The second scheme was similar in the sense 
that it would impose a statutory pay norm that would be set at below the rate of 
increase in the cost of living, however it would avoid the initial pay freeze by 
making payments on account to those groups of workers who would otherwise have 
had settlements during the first two-months of the policy (ibid).  The final scheme 
proposed to use direct controls on pay that were limited to delaying powers similar 
to those used in the incomes policy of 1966, to work in tandem with tax measures 
designed to stop firms from granting excessive pay increases in the first place (ibid).   
 
Despite the trade unions’ long-standing aversion to incomes policies, the government 
began referring to pressure on sterling as a justification for incomes restraint.  On 15 
January it was noted that the government had ‘decided that the position on the 
foreign exchanges, coupled with the damage which inflation is doing to the whole of 
our national life, now make it necessary to introduce forthwith effective measures to 
  169 
limit the growth of incomes’ (TNA T 338/314, Posner to Hopkin, 15 January 1975).  
It was argued that the sterling position made it ‘essential to aim at a reduction in the 
rate of inflation to about 10 per cent by the early autumn of 1976’4, although the 
Treasury’s view was that even this might be too much of a stretch for a purely 
voluntary policy (ibid).    
 
However, the potential efficacy of a statutory policy was questioned from within the 
Home Finance Division, where officials did not believe that resort to a statutory pay 
policy was the only option the government had for breaking into the wage / price 
spiral.  It was noted that statutory policies were often no more than a crude disguise 
for traditional deflation, and that ‘as so often in the past, the Treasury’s reaction to 
this situation is likely to be to try and cut real incomes even if this is not what the 
situation requires, and try to overcome a financial crisis by doing damage to the 
economy’ (TNA T 357/424, St. Clair to Couzens, 16 January 1975).  Instead, it was 
suggested that the desired effects could be achieved through a drastic cut in or 
abolition of VAT, drastic reductions in the rate of Corporation Tax, and the use of a 
more extensive system of subsidies in order to keep the prices of nationalised 
industries’ products as low as possible (ibid).   
 
This scepticism about the efficacy of incomes policy was also shared at the political 
level, and the Chancellor remained unconvinced about the possibility of 
implementing a scheme of this kind without provoking confrontation with the                                                         
4 Wass (2008, 105) recalls that this figure was based on ‘the rather arbitrary 
assumption of the minimum that would stand any chance of acceptance.’ 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unions.  Even in response to a proposal from the Secretary of State for Prices in early 
February, which involved the application of a norm but did not rule out continued 
collective bargaining and direct action on prices, Healey noted that it was unclear 
whether the application of a norm could be presented as consistent with present 
policy (TNA T 357/425, Note of a Meeting, 13 February 1975).  The Prime Minister 
echoed this view at Cabinet two weeks later, reporting that MES had agreed that for 
the time being the government’s involvement in wage bargaining would remain 
limited to leadership, coupled with the insistence that ‘the TUC guidelines should be 
honoured in the spirit as well as the letter’ (TNA CAB 128/56, CC (75) 10th 
Conclusions, 27 February 1975), despite the fact that this had proven wholly 
ineffective in the past.  Lever was also unsure about an incomes policy that would 
lead to a contraction of aggregate demand by reducing real incomes, and he 
described it as an attempt to ‘avoid an exchange crisis by policies of self-mutilation’ 
(TNA CAB 197/50, Lever to Wilson, 26 March 1975).  He argued instead for action 
along similar lines to those proposed by Wilson at Cabinet in February, which 
recognised that it was important to tackle the ‘evil’ of inflation, but also noted that 
contraction of the economy should be avoided in favour of ‘acting vigorously to 
make the social contract more effective’, and that any necessary incentives for 
industry should be provided at the cost of public, not private consumption (ibid). 
 
Amongst ministers therefore, there was a wide-ranging acceptance that something 
needed to be done about inflation, but this was coupled with uncertainty about how 
an incomes policy could be made to operate without unduly damaging the economy 
and antagonising the trade unions.  However, during May, the Treasury made a 
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strong case associating sterling weakness with the lack of confidence of overseas 
opinion in counter-inflation strategy, which argued that without an incomes policy 
there would be catastrophic consequences for the pound.  On 14 May, PCC received 
a paper that once again argued it was time for the government to make a choice 
between living with inflation, allowing unemployment to increase, or introducing a 
new incomes policy (TNA T 277/3057, PCC (75) 55, 14 May 1975). 
 
One again, this choice was presented as if there were no choice at all.  In response to 
the suggestion of taking no action on inflation, it was noted: 
If “living with it” came to look like enduring a long period of double figure 
inflation, the situation might well become unstable socially and politically as 
well as economically.  People would lose faith completely in the Government 
to exert any control over inflation and there would be a progressive loss of 
faith in money as a store of value […] the currency would eventually be 
destroyed, both internally and externally (ibid). 
The option of using increased unemployment as a weapon against inflation was also 
discounted as a suitable keystone in counter-inflation strategy, as whilst it could have 
an important role to play in controlling wage increases, it would be insufficient on its 
own to have the desired effect, even if it were allowed to rise above the one million 
mark, which would also cause a significant degree of political discontent (ibid).  On 
this basis, a subsequent Treasury paper concluded that ‘the majority of us feel […] 
that the objections to a non-statutory no-norm policy are too strong to make it 
acceptable’ (TNA T 277/3055, PCC (75) 56, 14 May 1975).   
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The £6 pay policy 
 
Having presented the government with a ‘non-choice’ in light of the bleak prospects 
associated with alternatives to incomes policies, the Treasury also set about 
examining potential different forms of incomes policy.  This included highlighting 
the difficulties of implementing tax-based incomes policies such as that proposed by 
the New Zealand economist, Peter Elkan.  The Elkan scheme was ‘a scheme to tax 
earnings in the whole economy in excess of some norm as a general surcharge on tax 
liability and recycle the proceeds in some subsidisation of the price level’ (Wass, 
2008, 110).   The Short Term Economic Policy Group (STEP) noted that the premise 
was a simple one: ‘since employees are taking too much from employers, they 
should be required to give the excess back’ (TNA T 277/3076, STEP (75) 16, 25 
June 1975).  However, the apparent simplicity of the scheme concealed a more 
complex political and economic reality, based around the fact that it would require 
workers to pay a tax, described as a ‘Pay Adjustment Factor’, to their employers.   
This would no doubt be unpopular in itself, however, it was also the case that as this 
was ‘not, and does not look like an ordinary tax […] the alleged preservation of free 
collective bargaining would be limited from this standpoint’ (ibid).  The use of 
taxation in an incomes policy was also inherently problematic, and it had been 
established back in February that before any tax could be levied it would be 
necessary to establish liability (TNA T 357/425, Note of a Meeting, 13 February 
1975), and Wass (2008, 108) notes that on this basis, the Inland Revenue ‘were 
strongly opposed to the idea of a tax on incomes additional to incomes tax.’   
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However, despite these concerns about the acceptability and practicability of an 
incomes policy, the TUC’s position on the matter had begun to shift, and Michael 
Foot, who it has been suggested was recognised within the trade union movement as 
‘an honest and reliable interlocutor’ (Flinders and Buller, 2005, 535; see also 
Harmon, 1997, 103), was able to report to MES that in his discussions with union 
leaders, it was increasingly accepted that there was a ‘need for more widespread 
commitment to the pay guidelines’ (CAB 134/3930, MES (75) 30, 21 May 1975).  
This softening of approach within the TUC was reflected by Len Murray’s 
engagement with Denis Healey, Michael Foot, and Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt, 
on an initiative designed to reduce the rate of inflation to 15 per cent by the end of 
the year, which would involve either the application of a general percentage norm, a 
threshold style system, or a flat rate (TNA PREM 16/342, Note of a Meeting, 4 June 
1975).  Discussion of the benefits of a flat rate policy had also occurred in the 
Downing Street Policy Unit between Bernard Donoughue and press officer, Joe 
Haines, who had made the case that for acceptability’s sake, any incomes policy 
should be simple.  ‘Everybody’, he argued, ‘would understand what they could buy 
with £5 or £6’ (Donoughue, 1987, 63).  However, the flat rate policy was accredited 
to the initiative of Jack Jones of the TGWU within Whitehall, and the £6 flat rate 
idea was described as the ‘Jack Jones formula’ in Prime Ministerial briefs of 19 June 
(TNA PREM 16/342, Hunt to Wilson, 19 June 1975).      
 
Throughout June, in tandem with the TUC’s softening attitude, the Chancellor’s 
position on incomes policy had also been hardening, and when he reported events in 
the foreign exchange markets to the Cabinet on 12 June, he took the opportunity to 
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use sterling to justify the need for a new incomes policy, noting that pressure on the 
pound had occurred ‘against a background where British wage settlements were 
being made at four times the level of settlements in West Germany, and where 
British inflation was likely to run at more than double the rate in our principal 
competitor countries.  There was an urgent need’, he went on, ‘for a new incomes 
policy’ (TNA CAB 128/56, CC (75) 27th Conclusions, 12 June 1975).  By 20 June, 
Wass (2008, 112) notes that Healey had made up his mind and ‘gone out for a full-
blooded Incomes Policy.’   
 
However, at Cabinet that day, it was heard that ‘the TUC were extremely unlikely to 
accept [a figure of 10 per cent] and even if they accepted it would find it almost 
impossible to ensure compliance’ (TNA CAB 128/56, CC (75) 29th Conclusions, 20 
June 1975).  However, Healey was not deterred, and again invoked the external 
situation in order to make the political argument.  He informed his colleagues that 
‘the economic situation of the country required the Government to be more drastic in 
its action than has been suggested’, and that this meant keeping ‘wage increases 
below 10 per cent, or a flat rate of £5’ (ibid).  The argument was also gaining 
broader acceptance.  Shirley Williams, for instance, also noted that time was of the 
essence, and that a 15 per cent norm would not be acceptable because ‘the country 
could not afford a wages increase norm higher than 10 per cent’ (ibid).  As a result, 
the Prime Minister noted in his summation that the meeting had produced a relative 
consensus on the need to swiftly arrange an incomes policy that could deliver a norm 
of 10 per cent, whilst making every effort to achieve this without resort to statute 
(ibid).   
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This was the crux of the issue.  Despite agreement at the official and ministerial 
levels of the urgency of introducing a credible new pay policy, the problem of 
securing TUC support remained.  These difficulties were borne out at a meeting with 
the TUC later in the day on 20 June, when the Chancellor once again emphasised the 
need to introduce an incomes policy because of pressure on sterling, whilst failing to 
reveal that it was the Treasury’s intention to let the rate fall.  He argued that failure 
to secure a 10 per cent norm would be disastrous for confidence and would fail to 
stop major sterling balance holders from carrying out their threats to diversify (TNA 
PREM 16/342, Note of a Meeting, 20 June 1975).  Len Murray however, informed 
the meeting that ‘he would not like to think that the TUC were being framed for a 
policy that they could not deliver’ (ibid), whilst Hugh Scanlon of the Amalgamated 
Union of General Engineering Workers, frankly noted that ‘as far as his own union 
was concerned, it could not go along with anything that implied a reduction in the 
standard of living of its members’ (ibid).  Jack Jones saw no better prospect for the 
success of such a tight incomes norm, suggesting that ‘the prospect of anything less 
than 20 per cent was remote’ (ibid).  
 
However, just as the foreign exchange position had provided a convincing case for 
introducing an incomes policy of some kind to ministers and the TUC alike despite 
Treasury preferences for depreciation, on 30 June a further slide in the pound 
occurred which forced the issue of incomes policy to a swift conclusion.  The pound 
had fallen 4 cents against the dollar on the day, closing at $2.18, which was below 
the threshold that the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian monetary authorities had indicated 
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was the limit of their tolerances, and both had suggested they would diversify their 
sterling holdings imminently (TNA T 358/209, Note of a Meeting, 30 June 1975).  
As such, Derek Mitchell advised that the government should make ‘a very early 
announcement of incomes policy’ (ibid).   
 
This possibility was a discussed at Cabinet the following day, where it was agreed 
that the Chancellor would address the House of Commons in the afternoon with a 
statement designed to demonstrate the government’s determination to get inflation 
down to 10 per cent by the third quarter of 1976, and that if a satisfactory voluntary 
agreement could not be reached, the government would be prepared to legislate 
(TNA CAB 128/57, CC (75) 31st Conclusions, 1 July 1975).   Both Donoughue and 
Haines expressed concern to the Prime Minister that the Cabinet was ‘being faced 
with an attempt by the Treasury to stampede it into a statutory pay policy’, and that 
the proposed announcement was ‘a straightforward announcement of such a policy’ 
(TNA PREM 16/343, Donoughue and Haines to Wilson, 1 July 1975), however, the 
statement to the House went ahead as planned despite these objections.   
 
Healey informed the Commons that if ‘no agreement can be reached which meets 
these conditions, the Government will be obliged to legislate to impose a legal 
requirement on both public and private sector employers to comply with the 10 per 
cent limit’ (Hansard, 1 July 1975, col. 1190), and Donoughue (1987, 67) notes that 
this paved the way for the rest of the summer to be spent agreeing the precise details 
with the TUC, arguing that the statement demonstrated that ‘the famous Treasury 
“bounce” technique had been launched, with the Bank of England as a powerful 
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ally.’  However, as Pliatzky (1984, 130) notes, this interpretation is objectionable on 
the simple grounds that it ‘is another instance of talking about the Treasury as 
though the Department was somehow separate from its Ministers and could operate 
without them.’    
 
Nor was it the case, as Flinders and Buller (2005, 535) have argued, that the £6 pay 
policy was simply the result of ‘the convergence of interests of a small number of 
personalities for a limited period of time [that] allowed these “agents” to overcome 
the obstacles inherent within Britain’s industrial relations institutions for a short 
time.’  It is clear that the Treasury successfully manipulated the appearance of the 
external situation by presenting a slide in the pound as the result of a lack of 
confidence in British counter-inflation policy, despite the fact that it had been in 
favour of depreciation and limited intervention in the foreign exchange markets so it 
could occur.  This argument was used at both official and political levels to make a 
decisive case, and resulted in a situation in which the TUC accepted that there was 
no alternative to an incomes policy because of market conditions.  However, 
incomes policy was not the limit of the Treasury’s aspirations for credibility, which 
also involved much tighter control over expenditure and a reduction in the PSBR. 
 
Public expenditure  
 
Like incomes policy, the Treasury had held preferences for cuts in public 
expenditure and a reduction in the PSBR since December 1974, however given the 
government’s commitments under the Social Contract, expenditure issues were 
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highly sensitive, especially in light of the TUC’s response to the April 1975 Budget.  
It had suggested that the principal theme of the measures had been to ‘reduce the 
amount of money that the public sector would otherwise require to borrow’, which 
would in turn ‘increase the already growing level of unemployment’ (MRC 
MSS.292D/560.1/13, Econ Ctee 8/1, 14 May 1975).  In light of these feelings, 
reductions in public expenditure remained politically difficult, and the government 
addressed the matter in two ways: firstly, through the application of cash limits, and; 
secondly, by justifying cuts from the February 1976 Public Expenditure White Paper 
with reference to an external financing crisis, which led the government to draw 
from the first credit tranche of the IMF and the 1975 oil facility.  
 
The most significant problem relating to public expenditure the government faced 
was the inadequacy of the system of planning and control that had stemmed from the 
Plowden Report, which was known as the Public Expenditure Survey Committee 
(PESC) system.  As Wass (2008, 8-9) notes, PESC planned public expenditure ‘in 
terms of the prices ruling for the items to be purchased at the time of the annual 
survey’ during ‘a regular annual drill […] in Whitehall.’  One of the principal 
weakness of the PESC system was the lack of incentive that it provided for planners 
to be cost-effective, because as planning occurred in volume terms, no matter how 
much programmes were overspent, money would be forthcoming to make up the 
shortfall.  This means that under inflationary conditions, ‘the Treasury was asked, in 
effect, to underwrite the inflationary element in departmental spending’ (ibid, 8).5                                                          
5 On the weaknesses of PESC, see also Wright (1977, 143-4), Pliatzky (1984, 132), 
and Barnett (1982, 78).   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The system was not only weak in theory, but had also shown to be inadequate by the 
outturn figures for public expenditure in comparison to planned expenditure.  
Pliatzky (1984, 131) has described the Treasury’s attempts to keep public 
expenditure within limits during this period as a kind of Sisyphean task, in which it 
attempted to ‘push public expenditure downhill, only to find it roll back up again to 
an even higher point.’  However, he also notes that there were other factors at work 
in accounting for the rises in expenditure above the planned amount.  He argues that 
‘it would have been astonishing if expenditure in 1974-75 had turned out as it had 
been planned three years earlier, with a U-turn and a change of government and the 
social contract in between’ (ibid, 132).  This implies that his view was not simply 
that the system needed reform, but that policy changes were also required.  
Nevertheless, it was the system that gained notoriety, firstly, for allowing public 
expenditure for the financial year 1974-75 to run at £5,000 million more than 
planned, as revealed by Wynne Godley to the Expenditure Committee of the House 
of Commons, and the following year, allowing expenditure to run at a level £1,600 
million more than planned, eclipsing the £1,100 million cuts the Chancellor had 
made in his April Budget (ibid, 131-2).   
 
Whilst Browning (1986, 70) records that the Treasury argued that the increases were 
accounted for ‘mainly by policy changes which it had not seemed worthwhile to 
announce specifically’, it was well aware of these systemic shortcomings, and as 
early as August 1974, it had been noted that because ‘a programme of activity, or the 
defined aims of policy, are agreed in physical terms […] unless a change of policy is 
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agreed, the spending department gets pay and prices rises “for free’” (TNA T 
353/145, Cash Limits, 15 August 1974).  It was also recognised that this opened up 
the system to accusations that it was ‘either positively feeding inflation or at least 
doing nothing to improve it’, and that planning in cash terms would seem to have the 
advantage of promoting prudence and efficiency on the part of programme managers 
(ibid).   
 
Despite the politically neutral appearance of introducing a scheme of cash limits 
across a broad range of expenditures, its reliance on the Treasury’s ability to make 
an accurate prediction about the rate of inflation in the coming year meant that 
Treasury officials were reluctant to introduce it immediately.  This is because 
making predictions about the rate of inflation would represent a gamble with 
potentially unsettling consequences that could undermine the whole basis of the 
system.  For instance, if the limits were set too high, the incentives for programme 
managers to spend wisely would be lost, whereas if they were set too low, ‘the 
pressure for some interim relief may be beyond containment and the system is 
brought into disrepute (for once allow the first fixed to be exceeded and no 
Department will ever believe in their immutability again)’ (ibid).  Even more 
significantly from a political point of view, and given the prevailing uncertainties 
about the rate of inflation, with limits set too low it was argued that ‘the government 
would be risking unpredictable and unplanned cuts in its policies’ (ibid, original 
emphasis). 
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The PCC shared this initial assessment of the difficulties of rolling out a system of 
cash limits when the issue of public expenditure control was discussed in February 
1975.  Nonetheless, it also suggested that the political difficulties that might result 
from the implication that the target volumes of some programmes might not be 
reached ‘might be more defensible in a crisis situation’ (TNA T 277/3054, PCC (75) 
32, 25 February 1975), and here, just as was the case with incomes policy, it was 
clear that the Treasury’s preference for depreciation could help a potentially 
unpopular policy measure gain acceptance.  By the beginning of May, head of the 
Public Sector side of the Treasury, Sir Douglas Henley, was fairly certain such a 
crisis would be forthcoming, and noted that any action taken to limit its effects 
would inevitably involve adopting some form of cash control on public expenditure 
(TNA T 331/950, Henley to Pliatzky, 5 May 1975).  Finally, by 19 May and in the 
same context of the Treasury’s preferences for sterling depreciation that had helped 
it to get the issue of incomes policy back on to the agenda, the Chancellor informed 
his Cabinet colleagues that the Treasury had been instructed to begin examining the 
practicalities of planning public expenditure in cash terms (see TNA CAB 129/183, 
C (75) 63, 19 May 1975).   
 
The decision to introduce a system of cash limits on two-thirds of voted government 
expenditure and local authority expenditure over which central government had no 
control was part of the Chancellor’s statement on counter-inflation policy on 1 July 
(Hansard, 1 July 1975, col. 1190), and Barnett (1984, 77) notes that the introduction 
of cash limits ‘was probably the most important change [on the public expenditure 
front] for very many years’.  However, it is important not to overstate their 
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importance as part of short-term economic strategy. Barnett (ibid, 68) himself 
acknowledges that the statement on cash limits was ‘short and fairly weak’, and as 
Pliatzky (1984, 134) notes, ‘cash limits could not in any event be introduced before 
the next financial year.’  As such, whilst the Treasury’s preference for depreciation 
and its refusal to allow the Bank to intervene substantially in the foreign exchange 
markets had allowed for inadequacies in the systems of wage determination and 
expenditure planning to be addressed by arguing that the markets would allow no 
other alternatives, the Treasury still believed that a substantial reduction in public 
expenditure was called for.   
 
This was reinforced in light of the fact that despite the perception of the cuts in the 
April Budget as a step in the right direction, the Fund’s managing director expressed 
a view that ‘the proposals were less convincing than he had thought’ when he was 
informed that the proposed reduction in the PSBR was by comparison with the 1975-
76 forecast, and that when compared with the current year there would be an 
increase of £1 billion (TNA T 354/415, Note for the Record, 2 April 1975).  In light 
of its preferences for public expenditure cuts, which were shared by the IMF, the 
Treasury began making a case for further reductions.  This was based around the fact 
that there had been a deterioration in the rate of growth of GDP, which no longer 
looked likely to reach 3 per cent, and the fact that the acceptable timeframe for the 
correction of the balance of payments had been significantly shortened because of 
the extent of Britain’s external indebtedness and the erosion of its credit rating (TNA 
T 277/3055, PCC (75) 49 (revise) 8 May 1975).  These more pessimistic 
assumptions indicated that there would be a significantly reduced amount of 
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resources available for domestic personal consumption, which led the Treasury to 
conclude that if the government wished to keep the tax burden relatively close to 
1974-75 levels, ‘a very substantial cut would be required in public expenditure for 
the year 1979 – perhaps rather more than £3 billion at 1974 prices’ (ibid).   
 
This view was presented to the Cabinet on 22 May, in what Wass (2008, 119) 
describes as a ‘long and argumentative’ meeting.  Whilst there was no prospect of 
the Cabinet agreeing to specific cuts at the meeting, Healey asked that ministers be 
prepared to identify cuts of £3,000 million in the PESC exercise so that when the 
time came, the government would have a range of options (TNA CAB 128/56, CC 
(75) 25th Conclusions, 22 May 1975).  However, there were substantial dissenters.  It 
was argued in general discussion6 that because the measures would cause increased 
unemployment, government tax revenue would be reduced and the overall savings 
would be much less than the cuts proposed, and that as such it would be wiser to 
plan public expenditure in a full employment context (ibid).  Benn also argued that 
there was ‘a wholly feasible alternative policy based on import controls – which the 
Government would be compelled to bring in within a year in any case – combined 
with increased investment in the context of fuller employment’ (ibid), but Wilson 
concluded the meeting by acknowledging the absence of consensus, whilst noting 
that ‘only by asking officials to proceed with the expenditure survey on the basis put 
forward […] could they ensure that they would have available sufficient options later 
in the year should major cuts have to be made’ (ibid).                                                           
6 The minutes do not make it clear which Cabinet members specifically raised these 
points. 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Securing agreement to plan for cuts should they be needed however, was one thing.  
Getting the cuts implemented was quite another, and this was a high priority for 
officials.  The Treasury believed that ‘a suitably chosen set of expenditure measures 
would help to give a much needed boost to the government’s international reputation 
and creditworthiness’, and that a well judged package would show ‘that of their own 
volition they had taken a firm decision to put the economy right, and to subordinate 
purely political commitments to this overriding need’ (TNA T 277/3056, PCC (75) 
68, 25 June 1975).  The external financing prospects offered just such an opportunity 
for the government to argue convincingly that its credibility amongst those overseas 
needed such a boost, when in July it was noted that funds may be needed before the 
end of the year to keep the sterling situation under control, and that ‘only the IMF is 
capable of providing [finance] on the scale and terms which we are likely to need’ 
(TNA T 354/415, Barratt to Wass, 30 July 1975).   
 
External financing and the IMF loans 
 
The possibility of drawing on the oil facility and the first-credit tranche was 
discussed in principle between Treasury and Fund officials in Washington D. C. on 
14 and 15 August.  The Fund once again expressed concern about the levels of the 
PSBR and DCE, and requested information about what measures the UK proposed to 
keep them down, however on the grounds that the drawings Britain intended to apply 
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for were for all intents and purposes condition free,7 the most important thing to 
come out of the meetings was the fact that the Fund staff were not sure that Britain 
could show a demonstrable need to borrow from the oil facility, and noted that the 
ability to show a loss of reserves would alleviate this problem (TNA T354/416, 
Cassell to Fogarty, 18 August 1975).   
 
Despite the Fund’s initial impression that Britain did not need to draw on the oil 
facility, a review of the external financing prospects by the Overseas Finance 
Division in October suggested that Britain would have to acquire between £100 
million and £900 million over the coming six months.  It also argued that the higher 
figure was equally as likely as the lower, and that as such it was ‘a matter of simple 
prudence that we should set out now to fill the gap (or the larger part of it) by a 
drawing of £575 million […] on the IMF oil facility’ (TNA T 354/416, Mitchell to 
Wass, 15 October 1975).  This view was supported by projections for future market 
and bilateral borrowing, and net sterling inflows, which were judged to be poor.  As 
figure VI.3 below shows, if these sources of finance were not supplemented, it was 
predicted that Britain would suffer a loss of reserves of £502 million over six 
months, and on this basis, it was argued that ‘it would seem imprudent to allow for                                                         
7 Despite this, in discussions about the content of a possible letter of intent, UK 
officials were surprised to find the Fund’s suggestions ‘liberally peppered with 
“ceilings”, “limits” and “targets”’, however after noting that this kind of language 
appeared inappropriate for a low-conditionality drawing of the kind under 
discussion, managed to get ‘most, but not all, of the offending words removed’ 
(TNA T 354/416, Cassell to Fogarty, 18 August 1975, 3). 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any further rundown as a deliberate element in external financing’ (TNA T 354/416, 
External Finance: Prospects and Policy, 15 October 1975). 
 
Figure VI.3, Overall Financing Prospect, £ million (not seasonally adjusted) 
 Second Half 1975 Current Six 
Months*  
First Half 1976 
    
Financing 
Requirement (a) 
113 -606 -725 
    
FINANCING    
    
Foreign Currency 
Borrowing (b) 
319 414 324 
Net Sterling Flows 
(c)  
-710 -310 -50 
Total Financing (d) 
((b) + (c)) 
-391 +104 +274 
Reserves Loss  
((a) –(d)) 
-278 -502 -451 
Source: TNA T 354/416, External Finance: Prospects and Policy, 15 October 
1975 
 
* Fourth quarter of 1975 and first quarter of 1976 
 
There were also concerns about the timing of any approach for a loan from the oil 
facility because it was available for the calendar year only, and because any UK 
drawing would have implications about the resources available for others 
considering drawing on the facility.  As such, the managing director indicated that 
the UK should reach a decision by 26 October at the latest, and it was on this basis 
and the fact that should Britain not draw in 1975 resources would be lost, and not a 
critical external financing need, that the Treasury felt that an application to the Fund 
should be made at this time (ibid).   
 
  187 
Therefore, it was on the basis that the external financing position was potentially 
difficult, but not imminently critical, and because the IMF resources would be lost to 
Britain once and for all at the end of the calendar year, that Healey held exploratory 
discussions with Witteveen on the prospects for a UK drawing at the beginning of 
November.  By this stage, he had decided that he wished to draw on both the oil 
facility and the first credit tranche as a demonstration that Britain was ‘firmly 
embedded in the international monetary system’ (TNA T 386/69, Note of a Working 
Dinner, 3 November 1975).  In these discussions, Healey informed the managing 
director that he was committed to tackling inflation with the £6 pay policy, however 
Witteveen continued to express concern about the size of the PSBR (ibid).  On this 
matter, the Chancellor was once again reassuring, noting that the imposition of cash 
limits would add the effective control over public expenditure that had been lacking, 
and that he was aiming for a further cut of £3.75 billion at 1975 prices in the 1976 
Public Expenditure White Paper that would affect targets for 1978-79 (ibid).   
 
On 6 November, the Chancellor revealed to Cabinet that he intended to draw on both 
the oil facility and the first credit tranche on the grounds that Britain’s external 
creditworthiness had still not improved enough to allow for market borrowing (TNA 
CAB 128/57, CC (75) 46th Conclusions, 6 November 1975).  The intention to apply 
carried with it a number of implications, none more so than the fact that it 
represented the use of Britain’s final unconditional sources of borrowing in the 
international monetary system.  Therefore, despite the TUC’s assertion that it had 
‘deep concern over the Government’s arbitrary decisions in the public expenditure 
field over the last year’, and its view that ‘further cuts in public expenditure 
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concerning these services will be regarded as an intolerable attack on the living 
standards of working people and a fundamental breach of the social contract’ (MRC 
MSS.292D/560.1/14, Econ Ctee 1/2, 8 October 1975), the government appeared to 
have maximum incentive to act to restore confidence if it was to have any chance of 
avoiding conditionality applied by the Fund as a result of needing to draw on the 
higher tranches in 1976.   
 
Healey used this argument in support of cuts in the 1976 Public Expenditure White 
Paper at Cabinet on 13 November.  He argued that Britain must show itself to be 
moving towards external balance because: 
it might well prove impossible in the interim to borrow overseas in order to 
finance the current account deficit, and the Government would then be forced 
to borrow from international institutions on conditions which would almost 
certainly include public expenditure cuts even more severe than those now 
contemplated (TNA CAB 128/57, CC (75) 48th Conclusions, 13 November).  
To avoid such a situation, he argued that it would be necessary to cut public 
expenditure by £3,750 million in 1978-79 (ibid).   
 
Barnett (1984, 80) notes that in light of Healey’s threat of resignation over the issue, 
‘there was probably never any doubt we would achieve our target’, however 
agreement was not reached easily.   By 28 November Barnett had concluded his 
bilateral discussions with spending ministers, and a Cabinet paper was circulated 
informing ministers that savings totalling £2.6 billion had been agreed, leaving a 
further £1.15 billion to be found (TNA CAB 129/186, C (75) 137, 28 November 
  189 
1975).  In light of this, Douglas Henley wrote to Edmund Dell’s Private Secretary to 
make the point that in his view ‘the Chancellor should secure the whole of the 
£3,750 million […] not £3,600 million, £3,500 million or £3,400 million’, and 
interestingly, given the relatively light conditionality associated with the loans 
Britain had applied to the IMF for, noted that this ‘could make the difficult task of 
negotiating an acceptable letter of application for the IMF drawings less severe if the 
Chancellor can claim a major success on the expenditure cuts’ (TNA, T 385/33, 
Henley to P.S. Chief Secretary, 3 December 1975).   
 
The government had therefore made two related arguments for agreeing substantial 
cuts for 1978-79 from the 1976 Public Expenditure White Paper.  Firstly, it had 
argued that Britain faced an imminent external financing crisis that required it to 
borrow from the IMF, because confidence was too weak for it to borrow elsewhere.  
Secondly, it argued that if even more substantial cuts were to be avoided in the 
future, Britain would have to restore this confidence by demonstrating rectitude.  On 
this basis, Cabinet agreed to a further £1,033 million of cuts in its meeting on 11 
December (TNA CAB 128/57, CC (75) 55th Conclusions, 11 December 1975), and 
in so doing created a situation in which the IMF executive board could not only 
approve the IMF loan, but could do so having ‘commended the UK authorities for 
their political courage’ (de Vries, 1985a, 466). 
 
* 
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Conclusions 
 
At the beginning of 1975, the Treasury had clear preferences for a return to formal 
incomes policy in order to tackle inflation, and for cuts in public expenditure to help 
bring the balance of payments into equilibrium at a faster rate and preserve overseas 
confidence, which were initially frustrated by political objections arising out of the 
government’s commitments under the Social Contract.  However, by the end of the 
year, it had made considerable progress on implementing both, and did so by 
suggesting that 1975 had been year of two crises – firstly in the foreign exchange 
markets as sterling fell in the spring and the summer, which it argued had made it 
absolutely necessary to agree an incomes policy and impose cash limits on public 
expenditure, and; secondly, in external financing, which it was argued, made it 
absolutely necessary to apply to the IMF, and therefore to cut public expenditure in 
1978-79 in order to bolster Britain’s creditworthiness amongst a rapidly shrinking 
pool of potential lenders.   
 
However, this chapter has shown that 1975 was a year of two ‘non-crises’.  Firstly, it 
has demonstrated that the fall in the exchange rate that had occurred at the beginning 
of the year had been desired by the Treasury on the grounds that it would help 
improve the competitive position of British industry, that the Treasury had prevented 
the Bank of England from intervening decisively in the foreign exchange markets to 
arrest the slide, and that it had not resulted in substantial losses from the foreign 
reserves relative to their position at the beginning of the year.  Despite these 
preferences, the fall in the rate was used as evidence that confidence in British 
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counter-inflationary policy was dangerously low, and used to justify the introduction 
of the £6 pay policy and cash limits on public expenditure, to which there had been 
substantial political opposition.  Secondly, it has shown that the external financing 
difficulties at the end of the year were only anticipated, and based on forecasts 
subject to a wide margin of error.  In light of these indicators, the application to the 
IMF was made not on the basis of need, which the Fund itself initially expressed 
doubts over, but because access to these resources would be lost if not drawn by the 
end of the calendar year.  However, by presenting the application as a response to a 
further deterioration in confidence, the government was able to argue that it was 
absolutely essential for large cuts in public expenditure programmes to be agreed for 
1978-79 if Britain was to restore confidence and avoid being forced to take even 
more drastic action in its search for further finance.  By the end of 1975 therefore, 
the government’s preferences for orthodox policies, and its intention to use strategies 
of depoliticisation to deliver them, was increasingly clear.   
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Chapter VII 
 
Engineering depreciation, the 22 July measures and the application to the IMF, 
January – September 1976 
 
In the previous chapter it was shown that by the beginning of 1975, the Treasury had 
strong preferences for incomes policy and public expenditure cuts, but had faced 
political opposition from the left of the Labour Party and the TUC.  However, it had 
also recognised the fact that an impression of external crisis had the potential to help 
justify policies of retrenchment, and as a result was able to use a slide in the 
exchange rate that it believed was inherently desirable to secure ministerial and 
union agreement to a formal incomes policy in all but name, and had identified a 
potential problem for financing the external deficit in the upcoming year.  This was 
used in order to justify a drawing from low-conditionality IMF facilities, and 
promoted the impression that should confidence not be restored, Britain would be 
forced to adopt more severe austerity measures, which helped to secure agreement 
for extensive cuts in the February 1976 Public Expenditure White Paper.  It was also 
shown that during preparations for the drawing the Fund questioned Britain’s need 
for the loan in terms of reserves loss, and that a principal reason for approaching the 
IMF was because funds available from the oil facility would be lost at the end of the 
calendar year.  
 
This chapter demonstrates how the Treasury continued to manipulate perceptions of 
the external situation in order to secure further domestic retrenchment.  It will show 
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that whilst there were still sizeable sterling balances, the Treasury continued to 
favour further depreciation of the exchange rate and believed the risk of extensive 
diversification was tolerable if the rate could be brought down by ‘autonomous 
forces.’  As a result, when the pound came under pressure in early March, neither the 
Treasury nor Healey were concerned because it consolidated the need for incomes 
policy, and when the G10 suggested Britain take a short-term stand-by in June, 
ministers were provided with the strongest possible justification for further public 
expenditure cuts on confidence grounds if they wished to avoid a conditional 
drawing on the Fund.  Despite securing these cuts in a package of measures 
announced on 22 July, they were not as substantial as officials had hoped, and it was 
once again argued that an approach to the IMF was absolutely essential on the 
grounds that there were no plausible alternatives given the continued need to finance 
the external deficit.    
 
Depreciating sterling 
 
As figure VII.1 shows, throughout 1975 sterling had fallen from $2.20 in the middle 
of July to a rate between $2.05 and $2.10, around where it stayed from October until 
the end of the year.  Nevertheless, despite the achievement of a substantial 
depreciation, 1976 saw the Treasury once again actively engaged in discussions 
about the appropriate level for sterling in terms of the competitiveness of British 
industry.  However, this project continued to present familiar difficulties because of 
the scale of the sterling balances, which were still over £7 billion in 1975-76 (Bank 
of England, 1977, table 19/1), and the size of the foreign reserves, which had fallen 
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from $6.2 billion in the first quarter of 1975-76 to $5.8 billion in the second quarter 
(ibid, table 23).  The outcome of these discussions reflected the belief that ‘the 
pound, at above $2, had been overvalued from the point of view of the 
competitiveness of British industry’, and as such, within the Treasury there was a 
strong and widespread belief that further progressive depreciation was required in 
order to offset rising domestic industrial costs (Pliatzky, 1984, 143) despite the fact 
that the governor of the Bank of England had reservations about attempting to 
manipulate the currency downwards by market intervention (Burk and Cairncross, 
1992, 22) 
Figure VII.1, Sterling / Dollar spot rate, July – December 1975 
 
Sources: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, compiled from 1975, table 27, 
1976a, table 28 and 1976b table 29 
 
As early as the middle of January, Treasury officials had noted that there was good 
cause to act to weaken the effective exchange rate by taking action on the MLR in 
order to maintain competitiveness (TNA T 382/2, Walker to Hedley-Miller, 13 
January 1976), and in the middle of February, PCC heard the argument that not only 
would it be necessary to continue borrowing overseas until North Sea Oil came on 
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stream, but that an improvement in competitiveness would be required.  At a meeting 
on medium-term economic strategy, the committee was informed that ‘if we are 
seeking to achieve our objectives for both unemployment and the balance of 
payments a depreciation of about 20 per cent […] would be required’ (TNA T 
277/3175, PCC (76) 6th Meeting, 16 February 1976).  Whilst the prevailing view was 
that Healey was unlikely to believe that the economic prospects were bleak enough 
to justify such a severe depreciation of the pound, the Permanent Secretary 
concluded that it would be unwise to count on some exogenous factor helping to 
improve prospects, and that the dilemma between improving competitiveness and 
scaling down the full employment objective could not be avoided on the grounds that 
20 per cent was not likely to be achievable because of political objections, both at 
home and abroad (ibid).   
 
With the rate at $2.02 on 20 February (Bank of England, 1976b, table 29), these 
figures indicate that the desired sterling rate was around $1.60, if both the 
government’s balance of payments and full employment objectives were to be 
achieved.  This view was confirmed at the following meeting of PCC on 18 
February, however this target was tempered on practical grounds because it was 
noted that such a large depreciation would provoke an unfavourable reaction from 
the sterling balance holders, would open up Britain to retaliation from foreign 
competitors, and that if the government was unable to conceal its role in engineering 
the slide, aggravate trade union leaders and jeopardise agreements on the second 
round of incomes policy.  Despite the belief that it was desirable for the exchange 
rate to fall more quickly, the extent of depreciation thought to be feasible over the 
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first half of the year was 10 per cent, and it was also noted that if this could be 
achieved with relative stealth, it would once again be possible to rally the TUC’s 
support in defence of the pound (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 7th Meeting, 18 
February 1976).       
 
The most significant policy change with regard to the sterling exchange rate in the 
context of continuing parsimonious intervention for smoothing purposes only, was a 
reduction in the MLR by a quarter of one per cent on 5 March 1976.  This occurred 
after the Bank of England had sold pounds in order to cream off dollars on the 
previous day and to prevent a rise in the rate caused by a short-lived demand for 
sterling.  That day the pound fell below $2 for the first time, breaching an important 
psychological barrier, and as figure VII.2 below shows, continued to fall, going 
below $1.85 at the beginning of April.  
Figure VII.2, Sterling / Dollar spot rate, February – April 1976 
 
Source: Bank of England (1976b) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 16 (3), 
table 29 
 
  197 
Browning (1986, 72) adroitly captures the orthodox interpretation of this policy 
change, noting that the Bank’s actions contributed to market opinion that believed 
British authorities were selling on a falling market in order to deliberately force the 
rate down, which seemed to be confirmed by the interest rate cut.  He notes that 
these events can be interpreted in two ways: firstly, that the Treasury and the Bank 
of England had failed to react in a timely fashion to ongoing events in the foreign 
exchange markets, or; secondly, that this represented a failure in a planned strategy 
to depreciate sterling to about $1.90.  Either way, he concludes that ‘the impression 
was given, and remains, that the Bank of England and the Treasury between them 
could have handled the affair better’ (ibid, 96).  Burk and Cairncross (1992, 22-3) 
also share this view, arguing that because the rate did not stabilise at around $1.90, 
the Treasury cannot be said to have achieved its aims, and Pliatzky (1984, 143) 
likewise notes that ‘nobody had wanted or bargained for the slide in the exchange 
rate which now took place and could not be halted.’ 
 
These accounts however, significantly overstate the extent to which ministers and 
officials perceived the events in the foreign exchanges in March as indicative of 
crisis or policy failure.  Whilst the Bank of England noted that ‘a quite exceptional 
amount of guidance has been necessary for agencies, radio and television’, which 
advised that the Bank had been in the market to an undisclosed extent, but 
‘discounted any talk of an engineered “devaluation”’ (BE 3A 38/4, GLBM to 
McMahon, 15 March 1976), the Treasury’s continued pursuit of depreciation led to 
an entirely positive account of sterling’s depreciation immediately after the slide 
began.  PCC was informed on 11 March: 
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In the morning of the previous Thursday sterling had been particularly strong 
and in accordance with agreed tactics the Bank had creamed off dollars into 
the reserves to prevent the rate rising […] There was heavy selling pressure 
in the afternoon and the view formed that the Bank was selling on a falling 
market though this was not the case.  On Friday there was a change in MLR 
which was largely the result of market forces.  This confirmed the view that 
HMG were trying to get the rate down (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 14th 
Meeting, 11 March 1976). 
The Permanent Secretary went on to describe the resultant fall in the rate as a 
fortuitous event, but noted that due to the sophisticated understanding of the UK’s 
exchange rate strategy amongst foreign observers, it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to conceal the ways in which the desired depreciation could be achieved 
without unleashing the sterling balances (ibid).  As such, he noted that whilst any 
overt measures to bring the rate down were still to be avoided, it would be necessary 
to ‘extract as much advantage as possible out of the present situation […] and not 
allow the rate to creep up’ (ibid).   
 
The account that the Chancellor gave to his Cabinet colleagues on the same day was 
not as forthcoming with regards to giving ministers an informed view about the 
details of the strategy for sterling.  His comments were prefaced by informing other 
Cabinet members that no public comments should be made about the rate without his 
express permission, and after the receipt of his clearance for any proposed remarks, 
ministers should still be aware of the degree to which a careless statement could 
exacerbate the situation (TNA CAB 128/59, CC (76) 9th Conclusions, 11 March 
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1976).  Healey then noted that the slide in the pound had occurred in a context in 
which Britain had not intervened in the foreign exchange markets other than to 
smooth the rate since the adoption of floating rates in 1972, and that the fall had 
ultimately been triggered by ‘an unfounded rumour that Nigeria was selling her 
sterling [which] led the market to conclude the Government was trying to bring the 
rate down [and was] reinforced on Friday 5 March, when the Minimum Lending 
Rate was reduced by one-quarter per cent (a change which it was beyond the 
Government to prevent after lunchtime on Thursday)’ (ibid).  He furthermore added 
that reports on the British economy by the OECD suggesting that sterling needed to 
fall by 5 per cent had added to the cautious feeling about the British government’s 
intentions for sterling amongst market actors (ibid).  
 
A week later the Chancellor reported the situation to his colleagues in MES.  In 
advocating the continuation of a medium-term economic strategy focussed around 
the operation of a tight incomes policy and a depreciation of the currency, Healey 
noted that the approximate 4.5 per cent fall in the rate over the previous few days 
was not a matter of concern.  In his view, ‘it would for the present be wise to take 
any opportunity that offered to let the pound sterling float downward’ (TNA CAB 
134/4048, MES (76) 6th Meeting, 17 March 1976), and that the events on the foreign 
exchange markets had been ‘accidental, but fortunate’ (ibid).  Healey also noted that 
the scale of the pound’s fall was nearly half of what the Treasury deemed necessary 
for the first half of 1976 (ibid), however, as shown above, it would have been more 
accurate, given the government’s balance of payments and full employment 
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objectives, to have described the fall of 4.5 per cent as 50 per cent of the 
depreciation deemed to be feasible, but only 25 per cent of that deemed desirable. 
 
As the slide continued the Treasury advised the Chancellor that it would be prudent 
to draw on the stand-bys agreed with the IMF the previous December.  At a meeting 
with the overseas executive director of the Bank of England, Kit McMahon, on 20 
April, the Bank was advised that the Treasury was ‘now minded to recommend to 
the Chancellor that steps should be taken forthwith to draw the first credit tranche’ 
(TNA T 381/15, Barratt to Jordon-Moss, 20 April 1976).  The following day, the 
Chancellor’s Principal Private Secretary, Nick Monck, was copied into a minute 
from the Overseas Finance Division noting that: 
Immediately after the Budget, there did not seem to be the necessity to rush 
at once into a drawing in the interests of reducing actual net currency losses 
during April.  But with recent further losses, and with no immediate prospect 
of new developments which might change the mood of the market, it seems 
sensible now to make arrangements for an early drawing (TNA T 381/15, 
Littler to Jordon-Moss, 21 April 1976). 
In light of this, on 22 April the Chancellor agreed to the proposal to draw SDR 200 
million under the first credit tranche agreement (TNA T 381/15, Monck to Littler, 22 
April 1976), and the remainder of the SDR 700 million had been drawn from the 
Fund by 12 May (see de Vries, 1985a, 466).   
 
Nevertheless, there was still no undue concern from the Treasury about the path of 
the exchange rate.  Indeed, Britain continued to enjoy the benefits of an ongoing 
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depreciation attributed purely to market forces, one official noting that ‘the present 
sterling crisis, like the one last year, is helping incomes policy in the short run [and] 
the chances of getting a satisfactory “bargain” with the TUC this summer is 
improved’ (TNA T 378/21, Britton to Posner, 26 April 1976).  Indeed, on 12 May, 
when the final drawings were made from the low conditionality stand-bys from the 
Fund, Sir Bryan Hopkin wrote to Wass noting that the recent falls in the exchange 
rate had been entirely welcome, and that in combination with promising signals from 
the TUC on the second round of incomes policy, it offered ‘the prospect of a marked 
and sustained improvement in competitiveness’ (TNA T 378/21, Hopkin to Wass, 12 
May 1976).  The IMF’s executive board also felt that there was little cause for 
concern about the sterling rate, noting that the market’s interpretation of events in 
the UK had been entirely irrational and had contributed to sterling becoming 
undervalued, which was being addressed by a rise in the MLR to 10.5 per cent (IMF 
EBM/76/65, 23 April 1976).  
Figure VII.3, Foreign Reserves, January – May 1976, end month 
 
Source: Bank of England (1977) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 17 (2), 
table 23 
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However, despite the fact that the fall in the rate had been entirely welcome, and 
remained short of what the Treasury deemed desirable in terms of the government’s 
employment and balance of payments objectives, it had still been forced to manage 
the practical aspects of the depreciation, namely by ensuring that the exchange rate 
strategy was not so transparent as to threaten the incomes policy or unleash the 
sterling balances.  This had required the Treasury to authorise the Bank’s use of the 
foreign reserves in order to conceal the extent of official complicity in the 
depreciation, and as figure VII.3 above shows, the level of the foreign reserves 
showed a steep decline from a figure around $7 billion at the end of February 
throughout March and April, reaching a nadir of below $5 billion before being 
bolstered by the drawings on the IMF stand-bys in May. 
 
The Medium Term Assessment, public expenditure and the June stand-by 
 
In light of the fact that the Treasury and the Chancellor viewed the depreciation in 
sterling at the beginning of the year as inherently desirable, of more immediate 
concern for the Treasury were the implications for policy of the Medium Term 
Assessment (MTA).  The MTA was forecast on the basis of realistic assumptions 
that the PSBR would peak at £12.3 billion in 1977, or 10.3 per cent of GDP, only 
falling to £8 billion, or 4.8 per cent of GDP by 1980 (TNA T 277/3177, PCC (76) 
35, 25 May 1976).  These figures suggested a strong financial case for further public 
expenditure reductions on confidence grounds given the importance of borrowing for 
the overall medium term strategy for financing the balance of payments, however 
other predictions in the MTA suggested that it would not be possible to make as 
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strong a case on resources grounds, with GDP predicted to grow by over 4 per cent 
in 1977 and 1978 and by over 3.5 per cent in 1979 (ibid).  The conclusions therefore 
were that the MTA ‘provided no justification for overturning the general strategy on 
public expenditure’ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 22nd Meeting, 14 June 1976), 
although some members of the committee did believe the case could be made by 
arguing that it would be ‘important to err on the side of making available more 
resources than necessary’ in order to ensure there would be sufficient room for 
export led growth (ibid). 
 
The fact that the MTA did not provide a decisive resources based justification for 
further expenditure cuts which could be used to bolster the strong financial 
arguments was problematic from the government’s perspective in light of the fact 
that it remained clear that there was a continuing need to moderate the public 
sector’s claim on resources in order to meet the demands of external financing until 
North Sea Oil came on stream.  This was especially the case given that the Cabinet 
had felt it was easier to justify cuts to the TUC if and when it could be shown that 
there was pressure on resources.  However, when the increasing demands being 
made on the contingency reserve were discussed at Cabinet during April and May, it 
was once again pressure on the sterling rate, despite preferences for depreciation, 
that were used in order to make the case for resisting further claims by spending 
departments. 
 
At the second Cabinet meeting of Callaghan’s administration, Barnett had revealed 
that with only one month of the financial year passed, the contingency reserve had 
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only £93-142 million remaining that was not subject to firm or agreed bids, and he 
noted that ‘if all the other claims on the reserve were accepted, then public 
expenditure would be out of control’ (TNA CAB 128/59, CM (76) 2nd Conclusions, 
29 April 1976).  He noted that the associated difficulties with making offsetting 
savings meant that it would be preferable to simply resist any new claims than it 
would be to make new reductions (ibid), and the Chancellor informed his colleagues 
that it was essential for action to be taken, because: 
There was a serious danger that foreign confidence would collapse if the 
Government allowed the public expenditure limits which they had set 
themselves to be exceeded […] and all of this meant that the Cabinet must 
resist to the maximum extent possible any additional claims on the 
contingency reserve (ibid).   
 
Despite the accepted difficulties of fostering acceptance for new cuts, a meeting on 
expenditure commitments between public finance officials from spending ministries 
and the Treasury on 4 May noted a general acceptance ‘that no programmes could be 
sacrosanct in these circumstances’ (TNA T 371/87, Jones to Pliatzky, 4 May 1976).  
Furthermore, it was the Treasury view that officials from other departments had not 
limited their sympathies on public expenditure difficulties to suggestions of 
imposing moratoriums on capital building projects, increases in fees and charges and 
reductions in subsidies.  Officials had also proposed a 1 per cent reduction in cash 
limits, a negative supplement for the Rate Support Grant, and the postponement of 
Regional Development Grants, which the Treasury had not considered on its list of 
possible savings (ibid).  More significantly however, it was noted that officials ‘did 
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not want to rule out savings that would require legislation and there was even a 
willingness to recognise that transfer payments, e.g. pensions and unemployment 
benefit might have to be cut in real terms as part of a general reduction in living 
standards’ (ibid). 
 
The acceptance of the need to make politically tough expenditure decisions by a 
broad range of officials was a further significant step away from the Social Contract 
in terms of economic priorities.  However, whilst the Chancellor advised the Cabinet 
that if the scale of excesses in local authority expenditure were to become public 
knowledge there would be serious damage to British credibility, he argued that at the 
current time he did not personally feel that it would be appropriate to make further 
cuts in expenditure, but that as a bare minimum it would be necessary to demonstrate 
that the White Paper targets were going to be met on the grounds of overseas 
confidence (TNA CAB 129/189, CP (76) 15, 14 May 1976).  He noted: 
There is a considerable body of opinion, not merely among our political 
opponents, but also among those in the financial sector on whose confidence 
we depend both at home and abroad, which believes that we ought to be 
cutting public expenditure this year; and that if we fail to do this of our own 
free will, we will sooner or later be compelled to do so by the force of 
circumstances (ibid).  
 
The financial case for cuts therefore clearly resonated at the political level given that 
confidence in Britain’s medium term economic strategy was essential if it was to be 
able to continue borrowing to finance the deficit, however, given the resources case 
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projected by the MTA, it looked as if making an overwhelming case to Cabinet on 
the basis of financial arguments would be difficult.  However, the proposal by the 
G10 to extend a $5.3 billion stand-by to the UK for six months in light of the slide in 
sterling provided British officials and ministers with the opportunity to use the 
external financing constraint it imposed in order to lock Britain in to multilateral 
solutions to its difficulties and therefore help nullify support for the left’s AES.  It 
also had the added benefit of making resources cases against cuts seem irrelevant in 
comparison to financial cases for them because of the implications of a scenario in 
which Britain were to be unable to repay in December.   
 
Healey (2006, 427) recalls that he was able to get the June credit without difficulty, 
however Burk and Cairncross (1992, 44) are correct to note that he had been 
‘disingenuous when he insisted that there were no strings attached to the stand-by.’  
As Hickson (2005, 89) explains, a bilateral loan of this kind would normally be 
made available for ‘a period of three months, renewable indefinitely at three-
monthly intervals’, and that as such, application of the strict time limit should be 
interpreted as a strategic aspect of the United States’ foreign economic policy in 
order to force Britain under Fund conditionality in December.  However, meetings 
concerning the arrangement of the loan do not indicate that a majority of officials 
were against short-term financing, and show that some key actors, including Healey, 
already fully accepted the need to borrow from the IMF in 1976, and that American 
suggestions for an accelerated approach to the Fund were rejected principally on 
political grounds. 
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On 4 June, when various proposals to ease the management of sterling were 
discussed, there was considerable support from British officials for courses of action 
that involved immediate drawings on the conditional tranches of the Fund, or a 
contingent liability to do so should Britain be unable to repay any short term credit 
received.  At a meeting with the Prime Minister, Healey reported that his discussions 
with Lever, the Bank of England, and the Treasury, had led to the proposal of three 
potential courses of action.1  The first was favoured by the Governor of the Bank, 
and involved an immediate application to the Fund which would inevitably have 
conditions attached to it with regards to expenditure, and the Chancellor felt that it 
was this aspect of the strategy that had appealed to Richardson (TNA PREM 16/832, 
Note of a Meeting, 4 June 1976).  The second option was to try and ride out the 
crisis on the basis that sterling was now undervalued, and that given time, it would 
inevitably float upwards.  The Chancellor reported that this was the view of Sir 
Douglas Wass (ibid).  The final proposal was to activate a $3 billion swap with the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the EEC, which would allow the British 
authorities to intervene effectively, and contained a contingent liability to go to the 
Fund.  The Chancellor noted that this was his favoured view, and that of Harold 
Lever (ibid).   
 
Therefore, both the Chancellor and the Bank were in favour of accepting either 
direct or contingent Fund conditionality at the beginning of June, and Healey also 
informed Callaghan that in his view, there could be ‘no doubt that they would need 
to cut public expenditure next year’ (ibid).  In response, the Prime Minister said that                                                         
1 Notes of these meetings can be found in BE 2A 77/1.
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for the short term at least, the government should hold to its position of emphasising 
the importance that existing public expenditure targets were met, and make no 
reference to additional cuts until after 16 June and relevant Cabinet discussions.  He 
noted, ‘there would be a dilemma next year about public expenditure and the PSBR 
[…] but there was no need to say anything more at the moment’ (ibid).  However, 
British plans to arrange a stand-by were overtaken by the initiative of Jelle Ziljstra, 
the President of the Netherlands National Bank and ‘the “head prefect” within the 
central banking community’ (Wass, 2008,198), although Wass suggests that this 
initiative was probably the result of a suggestion to Ziljstra made by Arthur Burns.  
On 4 June he telephoned the Bank ‘to enquire informally of the governor whether it 
would be helpful if an attempt was made to mobilise substantial backing for sterling’ 
(BE 2A 77/2, Governor’s telephone call with Ziljstra to confirm G10 standby, 4 June 
1976).  Richardson informed him that he had ‘precisely the same thought in mind 
and had been planning to call Dr. Ziljstra and his other European colleagues that 
afternoon’ in order to mobilise $1 billion funds from the Europeans to supplement 
$2 billion that could be mobilised through the FRBNY swap (ibid).       
 
However, when the Chancellor met with Edwin Yeo on the following day, there was 
a suggestion that Britain should make an accelerated approach to the Fund, to which 
Healey responded by saying he could accept no more than a contingent liability to 
take such action, on the grounds that the ‘whole relationship between the 
Government and the Unions would be jeopardised’ (TNA T 381/10, Note of a 
Meeting, 5 June 1976).  However, the Chancellor also informed Yeo that he wished 
to make public expenditure cuts for the financial year 1977-78 on the grounds that 
  209 
this would make Britain eligible for borrowing from the higher tranches of the Fund, 
although he hoped that in the event such cuts were made that this would be 
unnecessary (ibid).  In the short term however, it was his aim to have access to ‘a 
very large sum of money, since the larger it was the less likely it would be to use it’ 
(ibid).  In light of the initiative by Ziljstra, Healey was able to announce to the House 
of Commons on 7 June that a $5.3 billion stand-by had been arranged, and that ‘if 
any drawing on them could not be repaid by the due date, Her Majesty’s 
Government would be prepared to seek further drawing from the International 
Monetary Fund’ (Hansard, 7 June 1976, col. 915). 
 
Wass (2008, 350) notes that the June stand-by ‘was an initiative of the Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster’ and that ‘there was very little involvement by the Treasury 
or by the Bank at working level.’  He goes on to note that ‘experts in those 
institutions had, throughout the period 1974-76, insisted that the only worthwhile 
credit the UK should seek should be medium- or long-term’ (ibid, 350).  ‘They did 
not’, he suggests, ‘want to face the refinancing problem which short-term credit 
presented’ (ibid, 350).  However, whilst the loan was undoubtedly arranged hastily, 
did not receive the kind of extensive contingency planning that the Treasury 
undertook in other policy areas, and British officials clearly held a range of views on 
the desirability of short-term credit, they do not appear to have made the kind of 
vigorous substantive objections that Wass’ account implies.  As such, the six-month 
time limit applied to the June stand-by should not unquestionably be seen to 
represent a condition enforced on a reluctant or ignorant UK government; it is clear 
that the conditions were accepted in full knowledge that there would be every 
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possibility that Britain would have to cope with the fullest extent of Fund 
conditionality later in the year.  In this respect, the June stand-by formed an 
important part of a holding strategy that allowed the government to negotiate 
political constraints to public expenditure cuts that it thought were necessary on 
confidence grounds regardless of any resources case against them, and in light of the 
sense of urgency that conditions attached to the G10 facility implied for creating an 
impression of rectitude in British policy, the Treasury was able to play a strong hand 
it its advocacy of further fiscal measures in July. 
 
The case for retrenchment: Treasury orthodoxy 
 
Momentum for further expenditure cuts gathered at a political and official level 
throughout June, as Britain drew on the $5.3 billion stand-by, making it more 
important that action was taken in order to restore overseas confidence in sterling if 
there was to be any prospect of avoiding a conditional Fund drawing.  However, 
because of the degree of aversion to expenditure cuts in the left of the PLP, 
achieving them required a good degree of political manoeuvring, and in the days 
immediately following the announcement of the June stand-by, the Chancellor 
continued to express his objections in principle to any further cuts.  At the 
Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy (now re-initialled EY) on 7 June, he 
reported the situation to his colleagues.  Healey noted that in the previous week 
sterling had been under great pressure, and that this had been coupled with pressure 
from the City, the opposition, the IMF, and the Bank of England, to introduce 
immediate cuts in public expenditure, but that he had so far been able to resist them 
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because the statement issued by the central banks that had provided the loan had 
associated sterling’s weakness with disorderly market conditions, and noted that the 
pound was now at an unjustifiably low level (TNA CAB 134/4025, EY (76), 5th 
Meeting, 7 June 1976).  A similar message was relayed to the Cabinet on 10 June, 
with Healey emphasising that he had ‘resisted pressure to make immediate cuts in 
public expenditure and that ‘he had no intention of cutting public expenditure in the 
current year’ (TNA CAB 128/59, CM (76) 8th Conclusions, 10 June 1976).   
 
However, at both meetings, the Chancellor’s statements on his principles about 
public expenditure were augmented with a realistic appraisal of what would be 
necessary in practice.  This diverged considerably from the ideal scenario, and 
reflected the established Treasury preferences for reducing the PSBR by making cuts 
in public expenditure.  In the course of discussion at EY it was argued that despite 
his ability to resist immediate calls for cuts in current expenditure, so far as the 
exchange rate went, the figure of $1.70 was to be regarded privately as ‘a figure as a 
minimum level below which the rate should not be allowed to fall, even at the cost of 
adjusting economic policy’ (TNA CAB 134/4025, EY (76) 5th Meeting, 7 
June1976).2   The Chancellor also informed his colleagues that there would need to 
be a reduction in the PSBR for 1977-78, either through increases in taxation or 
reductions in expenditure (ibid), and at the full Cabinet meeting, Healey noted that 
‘Ministers would need to consider the level of expenditure in future years when the                                                         
2 This was despite the assertion earlier in the year that the desired rate for sterling, if 
both the balance of payments objectives and the full-employment objectives were to 
be obtained was around $1.60. 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report of the Public Expenditure Survey was available in July’ (TNA CAB 128/59, 
CM (76) 8th Conclusions, 10 June 1976).   On 15 June, general discussion at EY 
once again reflected the view that ‘it might well be necessary to cut back on other 
demands of the economy – eg from public expenditure – to make room for exports’ 
(TNA CAB 134/4025, EY (76) 6th Meeting, 15 June 1976).  Furthermore, the 
recognition of the necessity for further cuts was clearly shown by the fact that it was 
noted that should it become necessary for Britain to go to the Fund, ‘this should be 
after, and not before, the adoption of policies which they would require’ (ibid). 
 
The Treasury also believed that further cuts in public expenditure were necessary for 
1977-78, and at PCC on 21 June, Douglas Wass noted that they had become 
inevitable on financial grounds, but that it would be necessary to make ‘a very strong 
case, which went beyond asserting merely that our creditors would demand it.’ This 
was because there was likely to be substantial resistance as unemployment was 
already high, and it would be argued that a more politically acceptable way of 
cutting the PSBR would be to increase taxation (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 24th 
Meeting, 21 June 1976).  His case therefore centred around three key points.  The 
first was that external creditors wanted to see the PBSR cut, and wanted to see this 
achieved through public expenditure cuts; secondly, he noted that pressure on 
resources in the manufacturing sector may arise during the year and that action 
should be taken pre-emptively as the opportunity presented itself, and; finally, that 
any delay would either mean the whole burden would have to fall on taxation, 
threatening the pay policy, or that expenditure cuts would have undesirably 
disruptive effects (ibid).  However, the main case for public expenditure cuts 
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remained the extent to which the medium term strategy was dependent on borrowing 
in order to finance the deficit, and PCC noted that a reduction in the PSBR would 
‘improve the UK’s chances of obtaining further finance from the IMF [and ease] the 
difficulty of financing so large a PSBR in 1977-78’ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 
25th Meeting, 23 June 1976).   
 
Despite the accepted view that a reduction in the PSBR through public expenditure 
savings was desirable, there was less unanimity of opinion on the size of any 
potential package.  Leo Pliatzky argued that ‘it was very doubtful whether the 
Cabinet could agree on cuts amounting to more than £1 billion, which would do real 
damage to the fabric of the public services’ (ibid), but it was noted that there was a 
real possibility that this would not be sufficient on either confidence or resource 
grounds.   Alan Lord, Head of the Treasury’s National Economy Group, argued that 
‘in order to free resources for the upturn, a £2bn cut in public expenditure would be 
desirable’, which could be adjusted through taxation if the deflationary effects 
proved to be too great (ibid).  Sir Derek Mitchell also said that size of ‘the desirable 
cuts was nearer to £2bn than to £1bn’, as did Russell Barratt from the Overseas 
Finance Division, who noted that ‘there was a real risk that the IMF and the markets 
would judge that cuts of £1bn were inadequate, with the result that the government 
would be forced to take further action in disorderly conditions’ (ibid).  Lord Kaldor 
went even further than this, writing in a note to Denis Healey that he felt that the 
‘announcement of £1 billion expenditure cuts for 1977/78, however composed, will 
come as an anti-climax’, and argued that with the addition of a tax element, the 
package announced should ‘be in the range of £3 billion plus for 1977/78’ on the 
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basis that ‘it is much better, if an announcement is to be made, to announce a 
programme of action which is bigger than expected rather than one which (even if it 
is believed to be genuine) is smaller than what people think is necessary’ (TNA T 
364/17, Kaldor to Healey, 1 July 1976, original emphasis).   
 
With support for an increasingly large fiscal package emerging from the Treasury, 
Sir John Hunt wrote to the Prime Minister to advise him that the stand-by facility 
arranged in June had only bought time, and that without being ‘seen to be taking the 
necessary action the next sterling crisis could well be upon us well before the 
expiration of the stand-by period’ (TNA PREM 16/833, Hunt to Callaghan, 24 June 
1976).  He furthermore advised Callaghan that recently produced forecasts had 
indicated that a cut in the levels of public expenditure would be prudent, but that 
because irrational market opinion believed that the PSBR was too high, resources 
cases for or against cuts were becoming increasingly irrelevant because sterling 
would remain vulnerable until these views were changed by a substantial reduction 
(ibid).   The gathering support for further public expenditure measures therefore 
required a further round of discussions of economic strategy at the full Cabinet level 
in order to make the case, however, this also required making a substantial case 
against alternative strategies involving import controls, notably the AES.  
 
The case against retrenchment: the AES 
 
The AES had emerged from the ideas of Stuart Holland expressed in The Socialist 
Challenge, which argued that Britain’s economic crisis was a result of the state’s 
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failure to fundamentally restructure the relationship between capital and labour in a 
structural context in which there had emerged ‘a new mode of production [which] 
divorced macro policy from micro structure’ (Holland, 1975, 14).  Writing of the 
Labour government of 1964-70, he argued that ‘its capacity to control the economy 
was always in question’, and suggested that the rise of multi-national firms had 
locked the economy in to an irreversible trend towards monopoly because the 
government lacked the means to manipulate the distribution of resources and 
investment towards a truly social-democratic national interest (ibid, 29-30).  As 
such, a fundamentally revised approach to managing the economy was required, 
which would have to restructure the power relationships governing the way in which 
investment decisions were made.  
 
The most coherent accounts of the AES that appear in the published literature did not 
emerge until the 1980s, and argued that the success of the strategy required a 
fundamental restructuring of the state’s key institutions, including the police, the 
armed services, and the civil service, as part of an expansion of the role of the state 
in economic management by changing the character of Britain’s ties with the world 
economy (Rowthorn, 1980, 88-90).  Francis Cripps (1981, 93) also noted that the 
strategy would require the ‘overthrow of the Establishment of top civil servants, 
managers and professionals’, whilst the London CSE Group (1980, 22) agreed that it 
would be necessary to reorganise ‘production and the regulation of class conflict that 
is inherent in our economic system.’  Most significantly for day-to-day management 
of the economy however, it was believed that the expansion of the economy alone 
would simply exacerbate the tendency to import commodities, and that ‘given the 
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depth of the problem it is inconceivable that higher exports alone can be sufficient, 
and something must therefore be done about imports’ (Rowthorn, 1980, 93).  A 
rejection of the liberal approach to free trading was understood to be the key that 
would give Britain’s ‘geriatric’ industries space enough to be run-down whilst new 
industries were given time to establish themselves on the basis of sufficient 
investments to make them internationally competitive (London CSE Group, 1980, 
96-7).   
 
However, in government there was a long standing scepticism about the potential 
efficacy of direct measures to correct the balance of payments on principle, with 
Harold Lever noting in November 1975 that ‘the liberalisation of international trade 
is not just a philosophical aspiration bequeathed to us by Victorian professors of 
political economy.  It is plain common sense’ (TNA CAB 197/50, Lever to Wilson, 
20 November 1975).  Even whilst acknowledging that the imposition of selective 
import controls would result in the government being ‘warmly applauded by many 
of our supporters, as well as by chauvinistic opinion which always welcomes a 
nationalistic gesture’ (ibid), he noted that there were three strong objections to 
import restraint.  Firstly, he argued that controls would do little to help employment 
in the short-run.  Secondly, the prospect of retaliation would lengthen the recession 
and make it more difficult to improve the standard of life for the British people.  
Lastly, he argued that access to international lines of credit would be severely 
limited, which would in turn reduce the prospects for achieving domestic reflation in 
the immediate future, (ibid).   
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The Chancellor of the Exchequer also shared these views, and had noted at the 
beginning of January that import controls would be slow to take effect and that their 
eventual success would be entirely dependent on the acquiescence of others, which 
could not be guaranteed.  Furthermore, the suggestion that the imposition of 
generalised import controls would help the British balance of payments was 
dependent on the assumption that British industry would undertake the required 
rationalisation when it was equally likely that it would simply allow industries to 
ease up behind a wall of protection unless it could be guaranteed that they would be 
in place for up to five years (TNA CAB 134/4048, MES (76) 12, 29th January 1976).  
The Chancellor made a similar case in an MES paper of 12 March, which questioned 
the assumptions of the AES with regards to its benefits for the efficiency of British 
industry (see TNA CAB 134/4048, MES (76) 32, 12 March 1976), and in May, a 
paper was circulated to EY arguing that the kind of import restrictions implied by 
such an alternative strategy represented ‘a step back to the kind of controlled 
economy we had after the war’, and would contribute to the creation of a 
‘psychology of shortage’ (TNA CAB 134/4025, EY (76) 19, 27 May 1976).    
 
At EY on 15 June, Healey once again presented a critique of the AES, which was 
formed of five points.  Firstly, he argued that import controls would produce only 
small effects in the first two years when Britain was likely to be in greatest 
difficulty; secondly, they would not be acquiesced in by those overseas; thirdly, they 
would prove to be an additional burden to domestic industrial capacity because they 
would require a diversion of production from exports; fourthly, it would not be 
certain that British industries would take advantage of the protection that import 
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controls afforded them, and; finally, because they would have to remain in place for 
at least four years, there was a risk that the potential change in government would 
result in industrialists lacking faith in the continuation of the policy (TNA CAB 
134/4025, EY (76) 6th Meeting, 15 June 1976).  Nonetheless, in spite of these 
criticisms, as the debate over a possible public expenditure package intensified 
throughout the summer, it was the issue of cuts versus protection that was at the 
centre of discussions. 
 
The 22 July measures 
 
Whilst the Treasury had identified a strong case for public expenditure cuts on 
financial grounds, which was accepted by the Chancellor after being aired at various 
committees, and had produced an array of arguments against import restrictions 
which were also subscribed to by Healey, it had not yet made the case with sufficient 
force in order to convince the more left-leaning Cabinet members that its arguments 
were robust.3  On this basis, Tony Benn circulated a paper to Cabinet dated 2 July 
arguing that powerful financial institutions were demanding the proposed public 
expenditure cuts, that they would harm Labour’s supporters by raising the level of 
unemployment, and that because of the lags involved, would have the most severe                                                         
3 The trade unions had also expressed concern about the government’s policies.  At 
the beginning of 1976, it had been noted that ‘many trade unionists would become 
disenchanted with the Social Contract and the approach to industrial strategy and 
improved economic performance if unemployment reached the levels forecast’ 
(MRC MSS.292.D/560.1.15, Econ Ctee 4/2, January 1976). 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consequences in the year directly preceding the general election (TNA CAB 
129/190, CP (76) 43, 2 July 1976).  He argued that the resources based case for cuts 
was not convincing, and that whilst there was the prospect of bottlenecks emerging 
in some industries, these would be best dealt with on a selective and direct basis 
rather than through across the board cuts which would bear no correlation to 
industry’s needs (ibid).  In addition to direct, selective assistance to industry, Benn 
proposed the government should ‘strengthen its capacity to restrict inessential 
imports, both by preparing to introduce compulsory selective measures and by 
negotiating import ceilings with major importers and foreign suppliers’, and increase 
taxes on imported commodities including alcohol, tobacco and oil (ibid).   
 
However, despite criticising the Chancellor’s proposals for cuts at Cabinet on 6 July, 
the Prime Minister noted that ‘whether on resource grounds or for confidence 
reasons, there seemed to be a majority in the Cabinet which favoured an early 
statement by the Government of action to reduce next year’s public sector borrowing 
requirement’ (TNA CAB 128/59, CM (76) 13th Conclusions, 6 July 1976).  In 
anticipation of a full discussion of the measures, and the opportunity for other 
members to circulate their own papers to Cabinet on the matter, it was clear that 
Tony Benn did not cut an isolated figure, with the Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Peter Shore, suggesting that the arguments that had been made against 
import controls may have been overstated.  Without proposing an alternative as 
detailed as that of Benn, he noted that a measured approach to creating a package 
that would reduce Britain’s dependency on foreign borrowing whilst commanding 
support for prices and incomes policies at home was the most appropriate solution, 
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and that under the circumstances, ‘the situation of deficit, falling reserves and high 
unemployment precisely fits the terms of Article XII of the General Agreement of 
Tariffs and Trade and Article 108 of the Rome Treaty and would justify in 
international economic law the imposition of general restraints on imports’ (TNA 
CAB 129/190, CP (76) 49, 13 July 1976).   
 
However, Healey once again employed familiar arguments against import restraint, 
and argued that because Britain had drawn on the $5.3 billion stand-by there was no 
alternative to cutting expenditure if confidence was to be restored to a sufficient 
degree to enable Britain to avoid a conditional Fund drawing.  He wrote: 
The $5.3 billion standby credit which we secured at the beginning of June 
has barely given us breathing space.  I have had to draw a substantial amount 
from this standby in order to create the market conditions in which we can 
take the necessary decisions in an orderly way […] The rate has been steadier 
in the last fortnight […] mainly because of the belief that we shall be 
announcing important policy decisions concerning public expenditure and the 
PSBR for 1977/78 by the end of this month.  If such an announcement is not 
made or is found to be inadequate, then sterling will again come under 
pressure on a scale which we cannot be confident of resisting even if we use 
all our present resources (TNA CAB 129/191, CP (76) 52, 13 July 1976).   
Failure to undertake this action, he argued, would mean that in a worst case scenario, 
Britain would have to draw on the IMF simply to repay the June stand-by, which 
would leave it with no lines of credit available to finance the deficit in 1977 and 
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1978 at all, which, he argued, would mean that the IMF would undoubtedly enforce 
measures ‘beyond those that would be announced this month’ (ibid).4   
 
On this basis, Healey was adamant that it would be critical to get the PSBR down to 
around £9 billion, or 6.5 per cent of GDP.  This implied a reduction of £1.5 billion 
from the forecast level, and he suggested that because real take home pay had fallen 
by approximately 5 per cent since the first quarter of 1975, it would be undesirable 
for a significant amount of this to come from tax increases.  This meant at least £1 
billion would have to come from public expenditure in order to satisfy foreign 
opinion that British policy was moving in the correct direction and prevent outcomes 
that were expected to be even worse for all concerned (ibid).   When the Chancellor 
put this case to Cabinet, Shore argued that there still had been ‘no argument to show 
that cuts of £1,000 million would be sufficient to re-establish confidence in our 
economic policies [and] the package would therefore be a first instalment only and 
that was what made it so unacceptable’ (TNA CAB 128/59, CM (76) 15th 
Conclusions, 15 July 1976).  However, despite allowing others the opportunity to put 
their views to Cabinet formally, there was no extensive debate about the adoption of 
an alternative strategy at the meeting, and in summation the Prime Minister said that                                                         
4 Healey made the same arguments at a meeting with the TUC on 14 July, noting that 
‘early action was required to prevent a run on sterling because if a run did occur it 
could use up the stand-by credit and force Britain into borrowing from the IMF […] 
and would almost certainly force more severe expenditure cuts’, although the TUC 
responded by saying that there should be ‘no rush to cut public expenditure’ (MRC 
MSS.292.D/560.1/16, Econ Ctee 12, 14 July 1976). 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the ‘criticism of the Chancellor’s strategy had not been matched by convincing 
arguments in favour of any alternative course: indeed all alternative courses would 
seem to involve public expenditure cuts of at least equal size [and] he did not accept 
the view that the present package was merely a first instalment’ (ibid).  Furthermore, 
he did not believe that continuing discussion would yield a unanimous view, but that 
there was a clear majority in favour of announcing a PSBR target of £9 billion for 
1977-78 and cuts of £1,000 million before the recess (ibid).   
 
On 16 July the TUC rebuffed the Chancellor’s arguments by suggesting that ‘the 
confidence of sterling holders was not the only confidence that had to be 
considered’, that the ‘confidence of trade union members in their leadership was 
crucial to the success of the social contract policies’, and that it ‘did not believe that 
there was an economic case for cuts in public expenditure’ (MRC 
MSS.292D/560.1/16, Econ Ctee (S) 13, 16 July 1976).  However, with the Cabinet 
considering the composition of a package of measures, the Treasury, the Chancellor, 
and the Prime Minister, had made a convincing case that public expenditure cuts 
were required because of the fall in the exchange rate and the conditions attached to 
the June stand-by.  They argued that if the rate was not stabilised the conditions of 
the stand-by would otherwise force the government to adopt more severe measures 
as part of an IMF package, even though large sections of officials and economic 
ministers had been in favour both of the depreciation, and the recourse to short-term 
financing and the contingent implications for conditionality that came with it.   
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The Cabinet began its discussions of the makeup of savings on 19 July, and had 
agreed reductions of £952 million by 21 July, which, it was argued, would carry 
more conviction than a round £1,000 million cut in the sense that it did not appear to 
be an arbitrary attempt to appease market opinions, and looked as though the 
government had taken account of the arguments made by the TUC and other 
interests at home.  As a result, Callaghan suggested that the Cabinet meet later in the 
day in order to discuss measures that could supplement the public expenditure 
element of the package in order to bring the PSBR to £9 billion, and make the final 
decision on the adequacy of the £952 million expenditure cut (TNA CAB 129/59, 
CM (76) 19th Conclusions, 21 July 1976).   
 
Denis Healey then put a further proposal for supplementary measures to the Cabinet 
in a paper dated 21 July.   He argued that ‘there was a powerful feeling in the Party, 
which I am sure the Government share, that this month’s package must at least be 
sufficient to do the job’ (TNA CAB 129/191, CP (76) 56, 21 July 1976).  On this 
basis, he proposed a 2 per cent surcharge on employers’ National Insurance 
contributions to begin in January 1977, and argued that ‘without the surcharge there 
is a serious risk that the package will prove insufficient’ (ibid).  This element of the 
package was the subject of greater Cabinet controversy than the public expenditure 
portion, because despite the acceptance in principle that meeting the PSBR target of 
£9 billion was desirable, the consideration of a tax element to supplement public 
expenditure cuts had not been taken into account when other decisions had been 
made.  Tony Benn argued that ‘the proposal completely transformed the context in 
which the Cabinet had discussed the proposals for cuts in public expenditure’ on the 
  224 
grounds that both ‘the TUC and the Labour Party were prepared for a $1 billion 
package [and now] they were suddenly to learn that the Government’s package was 
twice as big’ (TNA CAB 128/59, CM (76) 20th Conclusions, 21 July 1976).  He 
reiterated the view that the government had a protectionist alternative that had not 
been seriously considered, and in discussion it was argued that ‘if the Cabinet had 
known that such a proposal might form part of the package, they might well have 
argued for a very different selection of public expenditure cuts’ (ibid). 
 
Nevertheless, these arguments did not carry sway with the Cabinet because time had 
become a critical factor in decision making.  It was noted that there was ‘a general 
public expectation of a statement the following day […] and it simply was not 
possible now to go back again over all the ground which the Government had 
covered in the last four meetings (ibid).  The meeting therefore ended with the Prime 
Minister’s assertion that whilst the addition of the tax element would create 
opposition, he did not think it would strain relations with the trade unions to 
breaking point.  As such, there was a majority within the Cabinet that believed that 
‘if action were to be taken, it should be on a large enough scale to avoid any 
likelihood of further trouble in the autumn, and that there was therefore a balance of 
opinion in favour of imposing the surcharge on employers’ National Insurance 
contributions’ (ibid). 
 
One issue that was not resolved during discussions of the July measures however, 
was the adoption of a monetary target, which had long been an ancillary 
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consideration for British officials.  In March, the Bank had considered the 
significance of monetary aggregates, and noted that the out-and-out monetarist: 
simply asserts that a change will alter pro rata – though only after a long and 
variable delay – the flow of monetary demand […] he also asserts that since 
the volume of real output is to an large extent determined by non-monetary 
factors […] changes in the flow of monetary demand will, over time, be 
closely reflected in the inflation rate (BE C 40/1429, Targets for Monetary 
Policy, 19 March 1976). 
The problem in so far as the Bank was concerned was that monetarists had no 
explanation of the mechanism through which changes in monetary demand were 
reflected in the inflation rate, or how it occurred in practice.  The Bank noted that 
monetarists simply say that ‘the facts […] prove that it does: you can rely on the 
lessons of experience and do not need to ask why’ (ibid), but that ‘most economists 
do not find this satisfactory as an intellectual stance’ (ibid). 
 
Despite this continuing uncertainty over the relevance of monetary aggregates, it had 
been recognised in April 1975 that a drawing from the higher tranches of the Fund 
would require a commitment to DCE, which the Chancellor did not believe would be 
a problem politically (see TNA T 354/415, Bridgeman to Gray, 22 April 1975).  
However the Monetary Policy Group noted that the establishment of targets for its 
constituent parts, including the PSBR and sales of public sector debt, would be 
difficult administratively and may require politically unsettling public expenditure 
cuts if they were to be met (see TNA T 354/415, MPG (75) 8, 30 April 1975).  This 
remained the judgement in July, and explains the exclusion of a monetary target as a 
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publicly announced portion of the package (see TNA T 386/116, Bridgeman to 
Wass, 14 July 1976) despite the view of Sir Bryan Hopkin and Gordon Richardson 
that a target should be announced for confidence reasons (see TNA 386/116, Hopkin 
to Wass, 15 July 1976, TNA 386/116, Richardson to Healey, 21 July 1976 and BE C 
40/1430, Richardson to Healey, 21 July 1976). 
 
Although on balance it was thought best to exclude a target for a monetary aggregate 
from the July statement, the agreement of public expenditure cuts had paved the way 
for the Chancellor to address the House of Commons on 22 July announcing that 
although the recovery of the economy was expected to bring the PSBR down to 
£10.5 billion, ‘given the economic prospect as we now see it […] the PSBR shall be 
reduced to £9 billion or less’ (Hansard, 22 July 1976, col. 2012).  He went on to tell 
the House that the government had avoided making mechanical cuts across all 
programmes, and emphasised the fact that the government had ‘deliberately decided 
to maintain the social security benefits like pensions so as to provide the maximum 
support to those in need here at home’ (ibid, col. 2013).5  
 
* 
                                                         
5 Interestingly, despite his vocal opposition to the measures at the Cabinet meetings, 
Benn recorded in his diaries that although he was instructed by Callaghan to sit on 
the front bench during the statement and presumed that he looked as though steeped 
in gloom, he was ‘sound asleep and […] didn’t hear any of the Questions or 
Answers’ (Benn, 1989, 600). 
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The IMF application 
 
Having secured political agreement to a substantial package to reduce the PSBR to 
£9 billion by arguing that the weakness of sterling, Britain’s obligations under the 
G10 stand-by agreement, and the inadequacy of alternatives had made the package 
absolutely essential, preparations for a Fund drawing began almost immediately. The 
IMF staff report from the 1976 Article VIII consultation had noted that ‘there is no 
question that [British] economic strategy required a substantial reduction in the fiscal 
deficit but, because of high and still rising unemployment, there are different views 
about the timing of the action’ (IMF SM/76/153, 7 July 1976).6  This was clearly 
reflected in the political debate over the 22 July measures, but appeared to have been 
resolved with the Chancellor’s announcement of the package to the House of 
Commons. However, on the day after the announcement, preparation for an 
application to the higher tranches of the Fund were already beginning within the 
Treasury, an official from the Overseas Finance Division writing to the Chancellor’s                                                         
6 At the Article VIII discussions on public expenditure, Finch from the IMF noted 
that all of the difficult decisions the government had made would be to no avail if 
further expenditure cuts in the region of £3 billion were not made, and Bridgeman 
from the Treasury noted that the difficulty they were having was to judge when they 
would have to occur (BE 6A 399/1, Note for the Record, 20 May 1976).  On the 
Fund’s closing statement, it was noted that the Fund had been predictable, and 
‘concentrated on the need to reduce the PSBR urgently’, and that the size of the 
reduction required ‘may be quite large’ (BE 6A 399/1, Note for the Record, 26 May 
1976). 
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Principal Private Secretary, noting that it would not be possible to turn the process 
into a charade, and that agreements would have to be made covering the balance of 
payments, the public finances and monetary aggregates (TNA T 381/15, Littler to 
Monck, 23 July 1976).   He noted that when, not if, Britain became involved in 
negotiations with the IMF, ‘the programme we present must be defensible’ (ibid).   
 
However, these preparations had begun despite the fact that there had been relatively 
few recent tremors in the foreign exchanges, and as figure VII.4 below shows, the 
sterling / dollar spot rate had remained relatively stable throughout July and August 
in a band between $1.76 and $1.80, with the reserves having fallen to $5,029 million 
by the end of August (Bank of England, 1977, table 23).    
Figure VII.4, Sterling / Dollar spot rate, July – September 1976 
 
Source: Bank of England (1977) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 17 (2), 
table 29 
 
This period of stability however, did not prove to be long lasting, and by early 
September pressure on the rate had re-emerged.  At this time a paper was circulated 
to PCC arguing that there would be no feasible alternative to an application for the 
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conditional tranches of the IMF on the grounds that there was expected to be a large 
financing gap, with the current deficit forecast at $1.5 billion for the second half of 
1976 and $3 billion for 1977, in addition to an increasingly large deficit on the 
structural capital account (TNA T 277/3178, PCC (76) 53, 3 September 1976).  Of 
the three possible ways of financing the deficit – increasing sterling holdings, public 
sector borrowing, and drawings on multilateral facilities – it was argued that none 
had good prospects.  It argued that despite the current large interest rate differential, 
it was unrealistic to expect any large inflows into sterling, and that public sector 
borrowing could ‘be expected to meet only a part of the requirement and is forecast 
to decrease in 1977’ (ibid).  As a result, there was ‘still a substantial gap in each 
period to be met by recourse to multilateral facilities or the reserves’ (ibid).  The 
paper concluded that the ‘financing gap is too large to be bridged by market or 
Government borrowing either bilaterally or from the EEC; and we do not believe it 
is realistic to look for a renegotiation of the G-10 short-term stand-by.’  Furthermore, 
it was noted that even if this were possible, ‘it would entail going to the Fund early 
next year immediately before the Budget in even less propitious circumstances’ 
(ibid).   
 
Once again the Treasury displayed an awareness of the difficulties that would be 
caused by an autumn approach to the Fund.  Firstly, there was no doubt that the IMF 
would want to see the UK commit to the adoption of policies it perceived to be 
‘safe’, whereas for political reasons the government would want to avoid having 
difficult decisions with regards to economic-management placed at the centre of the 
public debate and subject to foreign conditionality (ibid).  Nevertheless, the message 
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of the document was clear, and by now familiar: if the government did not take 
action of the kind suggested by the Treasury, ministers would simply be postponing 
the inevitable, and when the adjustment eventually had to be made, it would be more 
painful.   
 
By 9 September, events on the foreign exchanges had served to consolidate the 
Treasury’s argument, as an increasing amount of foreign reserves had been spent in 
defence of $1.77, and the Prime Minister made the decision that ‘he did not favour 
continued heavy spending to defend the rate’ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 31st 
Meeting, 9 September 1976).  However, this reserves loss provided the Treasury 
with the justification for further re-prioritisation of economic policy objectives, as 
Wass informed PCC on 14 September that there was a need to emphasise two over-
riding objectives, which were ‘securing an improvement in the current balance and 
finding adequate sources of finance in the interim; [and] secondly, making the pay 
policy stick’ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 32nd Meeting, 14 September 1976).  The 
implications of this, he argued, were that the ‘need to reduce unemployment and the 
industrial strategy would have to be put on the back burner for the time being’, and 
this view was broadly shared by other members of the committee (ibid).   
 
Leo Pliatzky went on to make the case that ‘economically there could be no doubt 
that a major downward adjustment was still needed, including further reductions in 
public expenditure’, but that there were major political barriers because ‘even 
holding public expenditure at the current time was a sufficiently large problem’ 
(ibid).  In combination with the fact that ‘the Chancellor was in any case hooked on a 
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money supply target’ (ibid), the political difficulties of expenditure cuts made the 
possibility of a monetary package look more attractive, however, given the 
inevitability of negotiations with the Fund, the Overseas Finance Division noted that 
‘plainly further unequivocal deflation would be helpful’ (ibid).   
 
In early September therefore, the Treasury believed it was necessary to apply to the 
Fund, and there was also substantial opinion that further deflationary action was 
required, which could not be taken immediately because of the potential political 
consequences.  However, the post-July package forecasts in the MTA showed that 
the measures had not been as effective as hoped, and that despite the reductions, the 
PSBR was projected to be £10.8 billion for 1976 and £9.9 billion for 1977 (TNA T 
277/3179, PCC (76) 55 (revise), 15 September 1976), which was above the critical 
target for confidence the Treasury had identified in July.  This served to consolidate 
the view that the external financing requirement was unmanageable and that further 
expenditure reductions would be required.   
 
These forecasts would be a further dent to overseas confidence, and therefore served 
to damage Britain’s creditworthiness, which was inherently problematic in light of 
the expected deficit on current account of £3 billion for both 1977 and 1978, which 
added a medium-term argument for going to the Fund to supplement the short-term 
arguments that focussed on the difficulties the government would face when the $1 
billion already drawn from the G10 stand-by had to be repaid in December (ibid).  
The Overseas Finance Division therefore argued that not only was the Fund drawing 
essential in light of the immediate situation, but that Britain’s medium-term 
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financing problems would remain, making the Fund drawing ‘the indispensible key 
to further borrowing, whether from official or from market sources’ (ibid).   The 
argument that Britain had no prospect of financing its deficit over the coming two 
years without accepting the need to apply to the Fund carried with it several policy 
implications.  Firstly, Britain would have to undertake not to introduce generalised 
import controls, but most significantly, it would have to make commitments to 
quantitative, quarterly targets for the PSBR and DCE, in order to get approval for the 
loan, which as a bare minimum would require it to meet the £9 billion PSBR target 
already announced (ibid).   
 
Healey finally outlined the case for an early approach to the IMF in a paper for EY 
on 23 September.  He outlined three principal difficulties for economic strategy with 
regards to external financing and the balance of payments.  The most substantial of 
these was the fact that before support for the pound had been suspended on 9 
September, intervention in the foreign exchange markets had reduced the level of 
foreign reserves to below $5 billion.  Secondly, drawings of $1,030 million from the 
G10 loan would need to be deducted from this figure, and that for practical purposes 
the reserves were insufficient from the perspective that they were ‘not even the 
equivalent to two months’ imports’ (TNA CAB 134/4026, EY (76) 41, 23 September 
1976).  Finally, Healey noted that the deficit on capital account was projected to be 
£3 billion for 1977, and on the basis of speculative projections, was not predicted to 
improve substantially throughout 1978 (ibid).   
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Healey’s recommendation therefore was that an application to the IMF should be 
made in October for all of Britain’s remaining entitlement under the Fund, with 
negotiations scheduled to occur in November before an initial drawing could be 
made in early December in order to repay the June stand-by before the end-month 
reserves announcement (ibid).  He noted that it would be the government’s aim to 
reach agreement with the Fund on the basis of existing fiscal and monetary policies, 
but that irrespective of how the negotiations with the Fund progressed, it would be 
necessary to pay close attention to monetary aggregates, and that it may be necessary 
to take further measures to tighten the money supply (ibid).  Finally, it was noted 
that it was necessary for the government to consider ‘the implications of further 
changes in fiscal policy (including the adverse effects on employment) against the 
implications of any possible alternative strategy’ (ibid).   On the basis of these 
arguments, EY agreed on 23 September that alternative courses of action should be 
considered as contingencies for the eventuality that negotiations with the IMF broke 
down, but that in the meantime, the Chancellor should be authorised to open 
negotiations with the Fund. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The agreement to apply to the IMF for a conditional drawing at the end of September 
concluded an important nine months for British economic strategy.  This chapter has 
shown how, at the beginning of the year, the Treasury continued to favour the 
depreciation of sterling.  It has also shown that the Treasury had clearly defined 
preferences for further cuts in public expenditure that were shared by the Chancellor, 
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and that the superiority of cuts over proposed alternative strategies was emphasised 
on the grounds that alternatives would limit Britain’s ability to finance the deficit in 
the medium term because they would severely damage Britain’s creditworthiness, 
expose Britain to retaliation from overseas competitors, and distort incentives to 
invest in domestic industries.  Having made the case that there really was no 
manageable alternative to expenditure cuts, political objections were overcome at 
Cabinet level by arguing that the decline in the rate and the need to repay the short-
term G10 stand-by had made it essential to restore confidence if there was any 
chance of a conditional Fund drawing being avoided, and allowed for the measures 
of 22 July to be agreed. 
 
Finally, the chapter has shown that the 22 July measures were not as extensive as the 
Treasury had hoped, and that by early September there was strong official opinion 
that further deflation would be required, coinciding with pressure on sterling and a 
decline in the reserves.  These events were used in order to make a robust case for 
going to the Fund, and which would undoubtedly require more measures of the kind 
the Treasury desired.  Therefore, economic policy-making continued to be driven by 
the use of market rhetoric to conceal government preferences for the exchange rate 
and to overcome political objections to the public expenditure cuts desired in order 
to allow Britain to continue financing the deficit, and by arguing that any alternative 
course of policy would logically result in more severe austerity.  However, the 
clearest example of the government using market rhetoric and multilateral 
institutions in order to make a convincing case that there was little alternative to its 
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preferred strategy of fiscal rectitude tied to multilateral borrowing was to come 
during the IMF negotiations in the final quarter of the calendar year.  
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Chapter VIII 
 
The IMF negotiations, October – December 1976 
 
In the previous chapter it was shown how the Treasury continued to favour the 
depreciation of sterling and reductions in public expenditure at the beginning of 
1976, despite increasing trade union hostility to cuts in the previous year.  It also 
demonstrated how, just as the sterling and external financing ‘crises’ in 1975 were 
used in order to legitimise the introduction of incomes policy and cuts in the 1976 
Public Expenditure White Paper, the fall in the exchange rate in March and the 
contingent implication to go to the Fund attached to the G10 stand-by arranged in 
June, were convenient for the Chancellor in building a case for a further round of 
public expenditure cuts.  This was made on the basis of the need to restore 
confidence for the purposes of financing the deficit, and effectively locked British 
policy in to a multilateral solution on the grounds that the alternatives were not 
feasible.   However, it was also shown that the cuts achieved in July were not of the 
magnitude the Treasury had desired, and that the MTA forecasts were then cited as 
demonstrating an imminent need to make conditional drawings from the IMF.   
 
This chapter will show how the views of the Treasury officials and the IMF were 
very similar, and demonstrates how the Chancellor and his officials were able to 
negate political opposition to a decisive round of public expenditure cuts and the 
introduction of monetary targets by associating the package with IMF conditionality.  
The chapter begins by reviewing reaction to the IMF application, and shows how an 
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alternative proposal to negotiate an arrangement to guarantee the sterling balances 
was treated as of entirely secondary significance by both the British Treasury and its 
overseas counterparts.  It then reviews preparations by UK ministers and officials for 
the Fund’s visit, followed by an account of the negotiations with the IMF, which is 
divided into three phases.  In phase one, there appeared to be a significant degree of 
difference between officials of the Treasury and the Fund, however this reflected the 
different forecasts used by each team and the limited negotiating brief ministers had 
authorised.  It also shows how the views of Treasury officials were similar to those 
of the Fund when revealed to their ministerial superiors.  In phase two, attention 
turned to the ministerial level and concentrated on winning the political argument for 
the proposed measures.  This involved once again making the case against 
alternative strategies, which was achieved by arguing that the logic of the financial 
markets would make even more severe austerity measures essential in the event the 
AES was adopted.  Finally, in phase three, it was necessary to close the negotiating 
gap on the second year of the package, which was achieved by introducing 
contingent elements into the British commitments, and therefore required no 
substantive concession to be made either by British policy-makers or the IMF.   
 
Reaction to the application and the sterling safety net 
 
The turbulence on the foreign exchanges that had led to the Bank’s withdrawal from 
the foreign exchange markets on 9 September and contributed to the decision to 
make an application to the Fund continued throughout the month.  As the Labour 
Party Conference began on 27 September, at which the government was defeated on 
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its public expenditure plans, the Chancellor was preparing to travel to Hong Kong 
for a meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers (Hickson, 2005, 101).  
However, as sterling fell to $1.63 on 28 September, Healey thought that the risk of 
travelling was too great, and ‘decided to return from Heathrow as he did not want to 
be out of contact on his journey’ (ibid, 101).  In light of these events, Healey 
announced his intention to apply for the additional tranches of borrowing from the 
Fund on the following day, which led to a slight recovery of the pound to just over 
$1.66 (see Bank of England, 1977, table 29).   
 
Edwin Yeo was particularly pleased with the Chancellor’s decision to apply to the 
Fund, and telephoned Healey to congratulate him on ‘announcing the application to 
the IMF and gave him his good wishes’ (TNA T 381/16, Note for the Record, 29 
September 1976).  He also suggested that there had been a number of reasons why 
the exchange rate had improved, and would continue to do so.  In Yeo’s view, in the 
end, ‘greed would overcome fear’, ‘the market had been heartened by the 
cancellation of the Chancellor’s travel plans’, and finally, ‘the market had welcomed 
the announcement’ (ibid).  Reaction to the announcement however, was not 
universally favourable.  Tony Benn (1989, 616) noted in his diary that ‘the smell of 
1931 is very strong in my nostrils’, and when the TUC discussed the issue with 
government ministers on 16 October, it expressed concern that real factors in the 
economy were being de-prioritised in favour of simple monetary factors, and argued 
that the government should take ‘resolute action in showing international financial 
institutions that they would not be forced into taking action deleterious to the UK’s 
economic recovery’ (MRC MSS.292D/560.1/17, Econ Ctee 3/3, 16 October 1976, 
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pages).  Instead of taking the course favoured by those financial institutions, the 
TUC instead advocated an import deposit scheme, a review of the system of food 
subsidies, which was to be phased out, and the introduction of a two-tiered interest 
rate, which would provide a favourable rate to those borrowing to invest in British 
industries.  ‘A more imaginative approach was needed’, it argued, ‘as jobs were 
being lost in the immediate situation’ (ibid). 
 
It was precisely these kinds of representations, and their acceptance by the 
government, that the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Arthur 
Burns, believed was at the heart of the problem in British economic policy-making.  
On hearing of Britain’s application to the IMF, he made it clear that he felt that there 
was still work to be done before British economic policy could be considered to be 
back on track.  Kit McMahon noted that he had received a number of unsolicited 
comments from Burns on UK policy and sterling.   He had been informed that Burns 
felt that ‘there was no hope for us until we satisfied the world’s financiers’, and that 
‘Mr. Healey did not yet understand this unpalatable fact [and] an application to the 
IMF was no good – “Britain does not want another loan”’ (TNA T 381/16, 
Comments on the UK and Sterling, 3 October 1976).  Burns’ prescription for Britain 
involved three elements: firstly, Britain should abandon ‘all this nationalisation 
nonsense’; secondly, the government needed to ‘give [its] people some incentive’; 
and lastly, he said it would be necessary to ‘reduce “these awful public deficits”’ 
(ibid).  Furthermore, when McMahon attempted to explain the political difficulties 
that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor had been facing, and identified the 
progress they had already made, it was noted that Burns ‘brushed [his] remarks 
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loftily aside, saying that we could not go on being “run by the trade unions” and that 
the British people, having a great fund of common sense, would respond and make 
any necessary sacrifices when they were shown the right policies’ (ibid).   
 
However, the progress that British policy had made since the end of 1974 
demonstrates the extent to which the Treasury and the Chancellor had been working 
towards restoring the profitability of industry and reducing the public sector’s claim 
on resources, but by gradual means borne of the need to recognise the potential for 
such policies to exacerbate social and political conflict at home.  Harold Lever 
however, had come to the view that the arrangement of a safety net for the sterling 
balances was required, and would provide a lasting solution despite the fact that the 
Basle agreements of 1968 had proven to have exacerbated difficulties rather than 
contributed to an orderly run-down of the sterling balances.  Significantly however, 
Callaghan also believed that a sterling safety net of some kind would significantly 
ease some of the problems of British economic management, because he ‘had come 
to the conclusion that the reserve status of sterling had been the cause of instability 
in sterling when he had been the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1960s, and was 
also convinced that this was the cause of the current crisis’ (Hickson, 2005, 150).   
 
As figure VIII.1 below shows, the total of private and official sterling balances was 
over £7 billion at the end of March 1976, but had been subject to a steady run down 
throughout they year that was reflected in the slide in the value of sterling.  In light 
of the problems caused by the sterling balances, the idea of arranging some kind of 
guarantee facility to reduce Britain’s vulnerability to lapses of confidence in the 
  241 
markets had been under consideration for some time,1 but had been shelved on 
practical grounds, and the difficulties of arranging such a scheme were no doubt 
consolidated by the failure of the Basle agreements to help run the balances down. 
Figure VIII.1, Sterling Balances, March – December 1976, £ million 
  Official Balances Other Balances Total 
          
Year Date Total 
Oil 
Producers Total 
Oil 
Producers   
1976 Mar-31 4020 2623 3234 473 7254 
 Jun-30 3099 1964 3223 444 6322 
 Sep-30 2750 1541 3435 449 6185 
 Oct-20 2561 1404 3325 467 5886 
 Nov-17 2483 1397 3356 482 5839 
 Dec-31 2639 1421 3484 497 6123 
Source: Bank of England (1977) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 17 (2), 
Table 19 
 
At the end of May 1976, the Treasury had noted the view that ‘if a medium-term 
credit facility could be negotiated, this would be well-worth having, and that if the 
making of an offer of new guarantees for official holders were a condition of getting 
it, this would probably be a price worth paying’, but only if it was likely that the 
credit would have to be drawn (TNA T 381/5, Walker to Barratt, 24 May 1976). If 
not, it would simply lead to a further accumulation of overseas sterling as had 
occurred after 1968.  It was also believed that the issue of arranging a safety net was 
delicate politically, because if it became ‘known that HMG considered such a facility 
to be desirable or necessary but that negotiations had proved abortive’, confidence 
would be further shaken with the potential to lead to a fast and disorderly run down                                                         
1 Schemes of this kind had also been under consideration at the IMF since at least as 
early as May 1975 (see BE OV 38/121, Ryrie to Jordon-Moss, 19 August 1976). 
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of the balances with disastrous consequences for sterling.  On this basis, it was 
suggested that any substantive discussion of a scheme of this kind should be delayed 
(ibid).   
 
However, the Bank of England felt the problem of the sterling balances was a 
secondary problem, and that as such, the arrangement of a safety net for sterling 
should be considered as secondary to an application to the Fund.  It June it noted that 
‘it is important to emphasise that [the sterling balances] are not the main cause of our 
exchange rate problems’, and that ‘movements out of the balances have not been a 
primary cause or a main component of recent outflows’ (TNA T 381/5, Coping with 
the Sterling Balances, 4 June 1976).2  As such, the Bank’s view was that a safety net 
scheme was ‘unlikely to be a practical one in the near future, or indeed until we have 
drawn substantially from the Fund’ (ibid).  The Bank also shared the Treasury’s 
fears about the implications of discovery of negotiations of such scheme, arguing 
that a ‘garbled leak could lead sterling holders to feel that something was being 
cooked up behind their backs’, and that even if it did not prove impossible to secure 
the agreement of the United States and Germany to discuss such a scheme, it would 
be difficult to agree terms that did not prove to be too onerous (ibid).  As such, when 
Derek Mitchell reported the prevailing views on the practicability of a safety net to 
the Chancellor’s Principal Private Secretary, he argued that ‘it would get us nowhere                                                         
2 The breakdown in the period 5 – 18 March, when the slide began was: switching 
out of sterling, -$375m; transactions with UK residents, -$110m; sterling balances, -
$180m; UK banks’ external loans and sterling advances, -$100m; leads and lags, -
$275m; residual, -$270m, total, -$1,350m (BE 3A 38/4, WJH to McMahon, no date).  
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to pursue ideas for funding at the moment’, and that even if opportunities for 
informal discussions at a political level presented themselves, he believed it wise ‘to 
advise even against this’ (TNA T 381/5, Mitchell to Monck, 4 June 1976).   
 
In anticipation of the announcement of the 22 July measures however, Harold Lever 
argued that the case against trying to make arrangements for a safety net had 
subsided.   He suggested that the ‘cuts would scarcely lessen the need for a safety net 
– only perhaps its urgency – and they would greatly strengthen our hand in asking 
for it’ (TNA T 381/5, Lever to Healey, 9 July 1976).  He furthermore argued that 
whilst the impending German and American elections represented obstacles to a 
swift agreement on the sterling balances, that they would not be insurmountable.  
Rather, he suggested that although ‘Governments fighting election campaigns will be 
very reluctant to agree to any longer-term scheme which includes a financial 
commitment’, he believed that the ‘Americans and Germans can hardly refuse to 
discuss our ideas now, especially when they know that they cannot be expected to 
take up a firm position until after their elections’ (TNA PREM 16/797, Lever to 
Healey, 15 July 1976).   
 
The Chancellor however, did not share Lever’s optimism.  It was Healey’s view that 
he did not ‘think we should have any illusions about how far the ground could 
usefully be prepared ahead of the American and German elections’, and that 
‘discussion in this area could all too easily misfire’ (TNA PREM 16/797, Healey to 
Lever, 16 July 1976).  The UK Executive Director to the IMF, William S. Ryrie, 
shared this scepticism about the plausibility of coming to an arrangement on the 
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sterling balances prior to the American and German elections and an agreement for a 
conditional drawing from the IMF.  On 10 August he noted that he was ‘sceptical 
about the viability of the safety net idea at present’, on the grounds that the idea 
would ‘have a heavy political cost and would use up funds needed for other 
purposes’ (TNA T 381/6, Ryrie to Barratt, 10 August 1976). He also doubted that an 
agreement on a safety net for sterling would have less onerous policy implications 
for Britain than other courses of action.  He noted that he had doubts about ‘whether 
it is true […] that a safety net would involve no greater conditionality than drawing 
our remaining rights in the Fund’, and that ‘if the thing were negotiable at all […] it 
would only be on conditions which would be still more severe’ (ibid). 
 
The Overseas Finance Division put a similar view to PCC, noting that such a scheme 
would ease the external financing situation, but that it would not solve it.  But 
furthermore, the support of the major nations on which its success depended would 
not be forthcoming ‘unless we had already been to the Fund and had an agreed 
economic strategy’ (TNA T 277/3179, PCC (76) 58, 13 September 1976).  The 
Chancellor gave a further endorsement of this position in a note to Callaghan on 22 
September when he bluntly stated that an agreement on the balances would be ‘no 
substitute for an IMF stand by’, and that his view was that Britain ‘shall have to get 
the standby settled first: without this no additional facility stands a chance’ (TNA 
PREM 16/798, Healey to Callaghan, 22 September 1976).  Finally, on 6 October the 
Prime Minister noted that the idea should be temporarily shelved because ‘he would 
not want to go against the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s judgement’ (TNA PREM 
16/798, Note of a Meeting, 6 October 1976). 
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Reactions to the IMF application were therefore mixed.  Whilst Edwin Yeo and 
Arthur Burns both believed it to be a positive step forward, Burns did not feel that it 
would solve any of the fundamental problems that faced Britain, which he believed 
were in the underlying philosophy towards economic management and the way in 
which vested interests in the UK had been co-opted into policy-making.  The TUC 
was also disappointed because of the implications of further cuts, and both Harold 
Lever and Callaghan believed that the sterling balances were the cause of the 
problem, and could be negated with an arrangement of a safety net for sterling.  
However, there was a wide range of official opinion that did not believe this strategy 
to be plausible before agreement with the Fund, which was eventually accepted by 
political elites, and allowed attention to begin focussing on preparations for the 
Fund’s arrival. 
 
Preparations for the Fund’s visit 
 
At the highest ministerial level, preparations for the Fund’s visit began with 
Callaghan’s attempts to elicit statements of support from foreign leaders, most 
notably Gerald Ford and Helmüt Schmidt.  On 29 September, the Prime Minister 
telephoned Ford in order to discuss the IMF loan and the conditionality likely to be 
associated with it, telling the President that within the UK ‘there are strong pressures 
for an alternative that I believe will be bad for this country.  But not only bad for this 
country, but bad for the Western world and our value as an ally and partner and we 
are putting great things at risk if this pressure on sterling continues’ (TNA PREM 
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16/798, Note of a Conversation, 29 September 1976).  Callaghan went on to explain 
that this made it essential that Britain was able to secure an early agreement with the 
IMF that did not involve ‘too much haggling’, and that after the agreement was 
made, it would be necessary to arrange ‘some protection against the special risk that 
could arise from the possible withdrawal of the sterling balances’ (ibid).   
 
Ford was sympathetic to the situation in which Britain found itself, and said that he 
believed Callaghan’s conference speech, in which he had publicly rescinded the 
commitment to full employment through the expansion of domestic demand, had 
appealed very strongly to him and members of his administration (ibid).  In response 
to Callaghan’s suggestion that Britain may no longer be able to ‘take a long view 
about world interests, about Western interests and about Britain’s role as a partner’, 
Ford informed the Prime Minister that he and his administration would be ‘strongly 
in favour of what you want to do through the IMF’, and that hopefully this would 
include avoiding trade limitations (ibid).  However, Callaghan was able to secure no 
specific commitment from the President on the kind of support that could be relied 
upon, other than Ford’s reassurance that the United States would ‘do what we can 
with the IMF on your behalf’ (ibid).   
 
At Chequers on 10 October, Callaghan also raised the issue of the IMF application 
with Chancellor Schmidt.  Schmidt informed the Prime Minister that in his view, 
Britain faced two problems, which were its budgetary excesses and the sterling 
balances.  However, he also said that he felt that Britain’s present policies could not 
fail in conquering inflation, albeit at a cost of being left with two million 
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unemployed (TNA PREM 16/799, Note for the Record, 10 October 1976).  Schmidt 
also revealed that as the German reserve currently stood at $38 billion, it would be 
possible for Germany to contribute around $4.5 billion to a safety net for sterling 
(ibid).  However, the German view more generally on a sterling balances agreement 
was not reflected by his statement, as when Derek Mitchell met the State Secretary 
of the German Ministry of Finance, Karl Otto Pöhl, on 3 November, Mitchell was 
told that there was a political will to help Britain on the part of the Germans, but that 
it applied ‘at present only to the passage of our application to the IMF’ (TNA PREM 
16/799, Meeting with Herr Pöhl, 3 November 1976).  As such, German support for 
some form of safety net could only be counted on ‘once we had completed 
negotiations with the IMF’ (ibid).3   
 
At an official level, preparations for the IMF negotiations focussed on the kinds of 
policy changes that would be required in order to restore confidence and ease the 
external financing difficulties.  The economic policy options report presented to PCC 
by the macro-economic group on 25 October noted that according to ‘normal 
standards of demand management, we are all agreed that there is no question of 
excessive demand on real resources at the present time’, but that regardless of this 
fact, ‘none of us believes that there is much chance of financing the external deficit – 
which means convincing both the Fund and the Market – without further fiscal                                                         
3 Morgan (1997, 506-7) notes that some of Callaghan’s Cabinet colleagues, 
including Benn and Dell, ‘felt that the Prime Minister was pursuing his own, 
externally directed policy by using his links with Ford and Schmidt to bypass the 
IMF to direct attention to his own favoured project of funding the sterling balances’. 
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action’ (TNA T 277/3179, PCC (76) 68, 25 October 1976).  Furthermore, it was 
suggested that this fiscal action should take the form of public expenditure cuts for 
three reasons.  Firstly, because the forecasts suggested that the fall in real take home 
pay in the coming year was already reaching the limits of political acceptability; 
secondly, that public expenditure problems would help to address the structural 
imbalances in the economy, and; lastly, that public expenditure reductions would do 
much more, pound for pound, than increases in taxation (ibid).   
 
The importance of taking further fiscal action was also discussed at a meeting on 25 
October after pressure on sterling had emerged in light of a Sunday Times article that 
had claimed that UK officials and the IMF had already reached agreement that a 
suitable rate for sterling would be $1.50.  In a general discussion of the appropriate 
response to the renewed pressure on the rate, there was a general agreement that any 
scheme of import controls or import deposits would look like a panic measure, and 
that whilst they may later have a role to play in a broad package, they were not 
appropriate in the current situation (TNA T 378/22, Note of a Meeting, 25 October 
1976).  Gordon Richardson argued that it would be necessary to intervene 
substantially in the foreign exchange markets in order to stabilise the rate, but that 
this should be ‘preceded by the announcement of a comprehensive package […] with 
a large public expenditure element’ that should also be made before the conclusion 
of the IMF negotiations (ibid).  This view was also shared by Derek Mitchell, who 
thought a further cut of £2 billion would be appropriate, although Leo Pliatzky 
indicated that he did not believe this would be possible in the current financial year 
because of the difficulties in securing Cabinet agreement for more cuts (ibid).  The 
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conclusions that the Chancellor took from this meeting were important ones.  He 
noted that whilst fiscal action was required, it was clear ‘those who would lend us 
the large sums required would insist on policy measures’, and on this basis, he 
‘accepted the majority view that they should aim to stick to the longer timetable, 
involving deferring announcement of fiscal action until after the IMF negotiations’ 
(ibid). 
 
Pressure on sterling and the demands of external financing therefore had the effect of 
shaping the Treasury’s preferences for measures to restore confidence in the markets 
so that it could continue to finance its balance of payments deficit.  This was also 
beneficial because it helped to restore the competitive position of British industry, 
and would help to justify cuts in public expenditure, freeing resources to be diverted 
to exports.  However, it was also the case that the expectation of conditionality 
associated with a high credit tranche drawing from the IMF was recognised by the 
Chancellor to be a good reason for deferring action in the face of potential political 
objections.  Into November, the Treasury and the Bank of England continued in their 
quest to restore confidence so it was possible to attract the required external 
financing, by once again arguing that nothing less than further fiscal action would 
satisfy the markets, which was reinforced by the predictions included in the 
Treasury’s autumn National Income Forecast (NIF).   
 
Douglas Wass (2008, 238-9) notes that gloomy predictions about the unemployment 
prospects were ‘crowned by an even more sombre financial forecast’, with the 
‘deterioration [in forecasts] ascribed to the slacker state of the economy and hence to 
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lower tax receipts and higher expenditure.’  He notes that this had created the 
inevitable prospect that developments ‘would cast a dark shadow over the 
forthcoming negotiations’ (ibid, 239).  The forecast circulated to EY noted that the 
July forecasts had assumed an annual rate of growth of GDP of 4.5 per cent for the 
eighteen months beginning in the first half of 1976, and that on this basis the outturn 
for the PSBR would have been £9 billion (TNA CAB 134/4026, EY (76) 54, 2 
November 1976). However, it was noted that since July, ‘the indicators have 
increasingly suggested that the economy is growing more slowly than we thought’ as 
a result of the sharp depreciation in sterling and the fact that industry had not taken 
as much advantage as expected of the impetus its competitive position had been 
given by the slide in the rate, either in world markets or at home (ibid).  In 
combination, it was reckoned that these two factors ‘account between them for a 
reduction of some 2 [per cent] in the annual rate of economic growth’ (ibid).   
 
The new forecasts assumed that the increase in earnings for the 1977-78 pay round 
would be kept to 10 per cent despite the faster rise in prices, and that Britain would 
be able to meet all of its external financing needs without changes to policies and 
without a further slide in the sterling exchange rate other than that required to 
maintain competitiveness (ibid).  GDP was expected to grow moderately, at a rate of 
2.5 per cent until the end of 1977, whilst unemployment was expected to peak at 
1.75 million at the end of 1977 before remaining flat throughout 1978.  There was 
also expected to be a deficit on the current balance in 1977 of just over £1.5 billion, 
and a year on year increase in the RPI of 16 per cent up to the middle of 1977, before 
falling back to 8 per cent in 1978 (ibid).  Most significantly however, ‘higher 
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unemployment and higher interest rates mean that the forecast of the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement […] in 1977-78 has to be revised significantly upwards 
(from £9 billion to £11 billion)’ (ibid).  On this basis, it was noted that ‘faced with 
this prospect, I do not think that it would be right to take no action, even if our 
creditors would allow us’ (ibid). 
 
The Treasury therefore believed that there was a case for action to be taken 
regardless of issues of confidence and credit-worthiness on the basis of its forecasts.  
However, these forecasts have been the subject of retrospective controversy.  Healey 
(2006, 432-3) notes that the ‘Treasury had grossly overestimated the PSBR, which 
would have fallen within the IMF’s limit without any of the measures they 
prescribed’, and that ‘we could have done without the IMF loan if we – and the 
world – had known the real facts at the time.’  However, as Burk and Cairncross 
(1992, 225), note, although ‘some writers have suspected that the forecasts were 
deliberately steeped in gloom in order to procure those decisions […] there is no 
reason to think this was so.’  Indeed, the documents reveal that the Treasury was 
remarkably forthcoming about the degree of error likely to be contained within its 
figures.  In the forecasts circulated to EY for instance, the Treasury wrote in 
summation: ‘uncertainties about the future development of the economy are much 
greater than usual.  It is important, therefore, that the precise figures used in the new 
forecast […] should not be taken too literally’ (TNA CAB 134/4026, EY (76) 54, 2 
November 1976).  Wass’ (2008, 239) account reflects this, noting that ‘the reliability 
of the financial forecast was open to a good deal of doubt’, and that ‘the team 
responsible for it made it clear that they had had the greatest difficulty in producing 
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an internally consistent set of numbers owing to the huge uncertainties surrounding 
the external outlook.’   
 
It was on the basis of these forecasts, and in the full knowledge of the uncertainties 
contained therein, that Cabinet gave its approval for officials to begin contingency 
planning on the reduction of public expenditure levels for 1977-78 (see TNA CAB 
128/60, CM (76) 28th Conclusions, 26 October 1976).  At the PCC meeting on the 
contingency plans, it was noted that it made strategic sense for the Fund to make the 
opening bid and then to argue against it, because in so far as confidence was 
concerned, what really mattered was achieving a package that reflected the Fund’s 
wishes (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 37th Meeting, 26 October 1976).  However, 
although both Bryan Hopkin and Leo Pliatzky felt that there would be no reason for 
the PSBR to be reduced to as low a figure as £9 billion, the general view was that the 
22 July measures had not worked because the cuts ‘were too small and too 
cosmetic’, and that to ‘introduce another package that failed to restore confidence 
would give us the worst of all worlds’ (ibid).  The conclusions of the meeting 
reflected Sir Douglas Wass’ view, that ‘it was of overriding importance that the 
Fund negotiations should be successful, that a fiscal package was probably 
unavoidable, and that it was highly important from the point of view of confidence 
that it should contain a large public expenditure element’ (ibid).  On 4 November, 
Derek Mitchell quantified his view of the scale of reduction in the PSBR required, 
noting that he believed the target should be closer to £8 billion than £9 billion, and 
that the majority of the reduction should take the form of public expenditure cuts 
(TNA T 381/17, Mitchell to Monck, 4 November 1976).  
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These views were also held by Kenneth Berrill in the CPRS, who argued that the 
projected PSBR of £11 billion was a strong argument for further deflationary 
measures, and that whilst this action would make the achievement of a third round of 
pay policy difficult and reduce the rate of growth in the economy, it was essential 
that Britain restore confidence (TNA PREM 16/836, Berrill to Callaghan, 2 
November 1976).  His conclusion was that there was ‘clearly a great deal to be said 
for taking further deflationary action’ in order to restore Britain’s creditworthiness, 
ensure sufficient reserves for the support of sterling, and bring the date at which the 
balance of payments showed demonstrable improvement forward (ibid).  However, 
his view was also sensitive to the political demands of the situation, and he noted 
that despite agreement that further deflation was required, ‘we must present the case 
[against cuts] as though we really believed it and not that we half agreed that further 
deflation was appropriate and life-restoring’ (ibid).    
 
Phase one: the negotiating mandate and the forecasts 
 
The Fund team arrived at the beginning of November, led by Alan Whittome, head 
of the Fund’s European Department, with David Finch of the Exchange and Trade 
Restrictions Department, as his deputy.  As shown above, by the time the Fund team 
arrived there was a substantial body of official opinion within the UK that believed a 
further substantial reduction in the PSBR was required in order to restore confidence 
on the basis of the autumn NIF.  Despite these views however, the remit of British 
officials was limited, with Wass informing PCC that ‘on no account should officials 
  254 
express any view, except on his specific authority, about what policy changes were 
desirable.  The discussion should be entirely technical and exploratory and on our 
side should be on the basis of “present policies”’ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 38th 
Meeting, 2 November 1976).  Given the degree of sympathy at an official level for 
further deflationary action, this can only be explained in terms of the presentational 
advantages that would come by having it appear that officials had fought valiantly 
against cuts.4  
 
On 4 November, the Fund held preliminary discussions with British officials, and it 
was noted that ‘it is plain – but not unexpected – that the team are under instructions 
to focus very heavily on the PSBR and public expenditure’ (TNA T 381/17, Littler to 
Wass, 4 November 1976).  However, Britain’s opening presentation to the Fund was 
not delivered until 8 November, by which time the Fund team had had the chance to 
review the figures from the NIF, by which, it was revealed, the Fund team had been 
‘considerably shaken’ (TNA PREM 16/800, Littler to Wass, 8 November 1976).  
Bryan Hopkin explained that whilst the forecasts were very disappointing, there 
were better prospects for the year ahead and that the main difficulty Britain faced 
was getting over ‘the intervening period of extreme difficulty’ (ibid).  The Fund’s                                                         
4 Morgan (1997, 544) notes that ‘it was widely believed that the British Government 
[…] were deliberately allowing the IMF negotiators to hang around in London [to 
demonstrate] that the British Government did not intend to grovel or crawl before 
their foreign paymasters’, and the documents reveal that there was a significant 
presentational element to this.   However, it was not because British officials were 
powerless to resist IMF proposals, but because they largely agreed with them. 
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response was in partial agreement, and Whittome noted that the Fund ‘fully endorsed 
the general strategy of seeking recovery through a shift of resources to the export 
and manufacturing sectors [and] could see no other acceptable strategy’ (ibid).   
Nevertheless, this was clearly qualified by the view that the Fund ‘doubted whether 
the problem was simply that of getting through a short period of difficulty’ (ibid), 
and subsequently, Whittome presented his general view about the implications of the 
forecasts provided by the Treasury: 
He said he saw great difficulty in IMF insistence on action which would 
significantly worsen, for any long period, the already bad unemployment 
prospects.  At the same time he did not think we could rely on the forecast 
balance of payments improvement as a reason for taking a relaxed attitude 
towards the PSBR and monetary prospects; his fear was that in these 
respects, the forecasts simply did not add up (ibid).  
 
On this note, the discussion ended with those involved in no doubt that the IMF were 
concerned about the size of the PSBR and monetary aggregates as had been 
predicted.  It was noted by the Bank that ‘at this somewhat formal session, it was 
difficult to judge the way negotiations might go’ (BE 6A 399/1, Note for the Record, 
8 November 1976), but it was clear that in order to reach a satisfactory agreement, 
targets for both the PSBR and DCE would have to be incorporated into the package 
of measures.  Whilst, as has been shown, this view was compatible with those of a 
number of high-ranking British officials, making progress with the Fund team was 
hampered by the limited negotiating mandate.  Alan Whittome made a point of 
mentioning this in a conversation with Derek Mitchell on 9 November, when he 
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noted that ‘he had detected that every one in the Treasury had clammed up on 
discussion of policy changes’ (TNA T 364/50, Mitchell to Wass, 9 November 1976).  
Furthermore, he noted that if British officials and ministers were expecting the Fund 
to provide a prescription on their behalf, this expectation would be disappointed 
because the Fund ‘did not see how they could produce a set of objective proposals, 
divorced from a political context which they well understood, and so run the risk of 
being accused of a total lack of realism’ (ibid).  Early in the discussions therefore, 
negotiations appeared to be approaching a stalemate, on issues of procedure, if not 
principle.   
 
The progress that had been made between the two teams was then reported at PCC 
on 11 November, and in summary it was noted that the IMF team had thought a 
PSBR target of £9 billion would be too high, that a more appropriate figure would be 
in the range of £5-6 billion, and that it was ‘worth risking over-kill – even at the 
expense of temporarily higher unemployment – in order to get the changes in 
economic behaviour that we needed to lay the foundations for a stronger economy in 
the medium term’ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 39th Meeting, 11 November 1976).   
At a meeting with the Fund team that afternoon, Healey acknowledged that the tight 
negotiating brief of Treasury officials had limited the amount of progress that it had 
been able to make with the IMF mission (TNA T 364/50, Note of a Meeting, 11 
November 1976), but suggested that it would only be possible to get the mandate for 
negotiations broadened ‘if the IMF team could give some idea of the changes which 
they thought were desirable’ (ibid).  To this suggestion, Whittome responded with 
caution.   He noted that ‘it was no part of the Fund’s role to impose policies on 
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member countries’, even though ‘the Fund’s own constituency would not accept the 
prospect in the NIF’ (ibid).  As a compromise, Whittome agreed that he would return 
to Washington over the weekend and would aim to produce a recommendation for 
Healey, ‘provided the Chancellor could give a personal assurance that this procedure 
would not lead to a pillorying of the Fund team for attempting to impose policies on 
the British government’ (ibid).  This demonstrates the extent to which there was a 
feeling, even amongst the Fund officials, that the staunch negotiating position of the 
Treasury was designed in order to set the Fund up as the architect of an enforced 
deflation.  Given the preferences of British officials that had been revealed to 
ministers, there appears to be some truth in this. 
 
In the meantime, whilst Healey waited for Whittome to return with his suggestions 
on 16 November, attention was turned to preparing the Chancellor’s presentation for 
the upcoming EY meeting at which he would attempt to secure ministerial 
agreement for a broadened negotiating mandate.  The Treasury’s draft speaking note 
for Healey, prepared on 12 November, clearly demonstrated the official view that a 
substantial reduction in the PSBR was required.  It noted that in meetings to date, the 
Fund had clearly shown a preference for ‘a substantial reduction in the PSBR in 
1977-78 and a further reduction from that reduced level in the following years’, but 
more significantly, it was noted that ‘their ideas are not by any means unreasonable’ 
(TNA T 364/50, Draft Speaking Note, 12 November 1976).  However, it was not 
suggested at this stage to acquiesce to a substantial reduction, but that ‘as an opening 
gambit with the Fund, we should say that we judge a desirable PSBR for 1977/78, 
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given the constraints on policy and the damage to other objectives which might 
ensue from too strict a programme, would be about £9.5 billion’ (ibid).   
 
When Whittome returned to London on 16 November, he noted that the Fund had 
based its views on a suitable PSBR target on different forecasts to those used by the 
Treasury. This significantly eased the political constraints British policy-makers 
were facing, because, in the Fund’s view, it was the outturn figure that carried the 
most importance.  This made it acceptable for any reductions to achieve the desired 
target to be made from a figure of £10 billion rather than the £10.9 billion that the 
Treasury had forecast (TNA T 381/17, Note of a Meeting, 16 November 1976).  This 
confusion over forecasting had therefore amplified the degree of difference in 
opinions between the Fund team and British officials – which were already 
congruent in terms of the kind of action that was required, and differed principally 
on what would be politically acceptable – and therefore closed the negotiating 
position between the British government and the Fund by nearly £1 billion, without 
there having been any substantive discussions about actual policies between the two 
parties.  
 
At EY the following day, the Prime Minister noted that Treasury forecasts had been 
interpreted as on the high side, and that the IMF and the National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research would shortly be publishing more optimistic 
forecasts (TNA CAB 134/4025, EY (76) 19th Meeting, 17 November 1976), 
however, the possibility of carrying through a revised forecast into decisions on a 
fiscal package as had been implied on the previous day was not explicitly discussed.  
  259 
The Chancellor simply ‘stressed that it would be disastrous to agree a small 
reduction with the IMF by pressing them very hard if such a reduction did not also 
satisfy the market’ (ibid).  It was in this climate of uncertainty about which forecast 
would be used as the basis for any downwards adjustment of the PSBR that the 
committee authorised the Chancellor to explore a ‘PSBR in 1977-78 lower than the 
£10.9 billion in the October forecast […] but they should refuse to discuss anything 
lower than £9 billion’ (ibid).   
 
However, whilst this seemed to imply that the government had accepted the 
possibility of achieving a £1.9 billion reduction of the PSBR, which implied a target 
of well below £8.5 billion if made from the Fund’s forecast, the lack of transparency 
with regard to the point of departure continued to cloud the issue.  When Whittome 
visited Wass on the following morning, he told the Permanent Secretary that ‘he was 
still quite clear that he could not sell the sort of action we had in mind, even to 
himself, let alone the creditor countries’, and noted that although the Fund was 
reluctant to barter over figures, it was its view that the PSBR for 1977-78 should be 
in the range of £8-8.5 billion, and that for 1978-79, DCE should be targeted at £5 
billion, which implied a PSBR of £6.5 billion (TNA T 371/25, Wass to Monck, 19 
November 1976).  To this, Wass responded that he believed it ‘important not to 
exaggerate unnecessarily the differences between us’, but that he was having 
difficulties in forming a view about how to make progress without a firm idea of the 
quantitative conclusions the Fund had reached.  However, he nevertheless ‘accepted 
that, in principle, a two-year programme of the type they envisaged was a reasonable 
proposition’ (ibid). 
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Despite this agreement that the Fund’s proposals were of reasonable proportions, the 
negotiations continued to be frustrated by the Treasury’s limited negotiating 
mandate.  On 19 November, when Pliatzky informed Whittome that he had no 
authority to discuss the specific policy changes that would be required in order to 
reduce the PSBR by £3-4 billion for 1978-79, Whittome said that he ‘wanted to see 
“serious figures” of what could be obtained from public expenditure’ (TNA T 
371/25, Note of a Meeting, 19 November 1976).  However despite these frustrations, 
that evening, the Fund team received some reassuring news from the Chancellor, 
who said that he ‘hoped that the quantum of fiscal action or the target levels for the 
PSBR would be decided on the following Tuesday’, which would allow the 
government to talk to the Fund about more specific measures in the first week of 
December (TNA PREM 16/802, Note of a Meeting, 19 November 1976).  The 
Chancellor also took the opportunity to present his view that any reduction in the 
first year of the package greater than £1.5 billion would threaten Britain’s major 
NATO roles, and that a PSBR of below £9 billion would be difficult to justify, 
whilst the leader of the Fund team countered by saying that he would find it difficult 
to convince others at the Fund that this would be adequate (ibid).   
 
By the middle of November therefore, it looked as if negotiations between UK 
officials and the Fund team were in deadlock because of the Treasury’s inability to 
discuss specific policy measures and the Chancellor’s reluctance to discuss a PSBR 
target of below £9 billion.  However, substantial progress had been made in 
reconciling the two positions in a way that had conveyed significant presentational 
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advantages on any possible agreement.  Firstly, the Fund had indicated that 
reductions would need to be made from a lower PSBR forecast than that implied by 
the Treasury’s NIF, which reduced the gap between the two teams in terms of the 
size of fiscal reduction that would be required.  Secondly, the strict negotiating 
mandate given to the Treasury created the impression that British officials were 
fighting valiantly against austerity measures, despite expressing views in private that 
showed a substantial degree of overlap with the Fund.  But finally, and most 
significantly, the Chancellor’s suggestion that Whittome make the first proposal 
from which the teams would work meant that the basis of any agreement would be 
one that had originated with the IMF, and not British officials.  However, whilst this 
had the potential to act as a buffer between the government and the economic and 
social consequences of a deflationary package, it was still necessary for the Treasury 
and the Chancellor to win the political debate, and their attempts to do so began at 
Cabinet on 23 November.  
 
Phase two: the political arguments 
 
The beginning of Cabinet discussions opened up the opportunity for firm decisions 
to be taken on the measures to be adopted in order to secure the IMF loan.   The 
Chancellor began by making the case for a reduction in the PSBR in a paper of 22 
November, which argued that there was no alternative to agreeing with the Fund on 
such terms.  The Chancellor wrote that, ‘at the present planned levels of expenditure 
and taxation we shall face very severe financing problems over the next year or two’, 
and that Britain’s improved performance in the foreign exchange and guilt-edged 
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markets owed ‘much to the fact that people know we have the [IMF] team here – and 
to the expectations which that has created’ (TNA CAB 129/193, CP (76) 111, 22 
November 1976).  He furthermore noted that ‘we cannot expect that confidence to 
continue unchecked, if we do not act fairly soon to meet those expectations’ (ibid).  
He informed his colleagues that the Fund was ‘looking for a PSBR of about £8.5 
billion to be achieved particularly by means of public expenditure savings’, and that 
his own view was that ‘the broad scale of the action they now suggest is about right 
if we accept their view of the pattern of growth in the next two years’ (ibid).  As 
such, he proposed that the Cabinet authorise officials to discuss a fiscal reduction of 
£1.5 billion for 1977-78, rising to £2 billion for 1978-79 (ibid).  During the meeting, 
Healey assured the Cabinet members that although ‘the situation was very difficult 
[…] it would be worse if the negotiations broke down’ (TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 
33rd Conclusions, 23 November 1976).       
 
The Chancellor’s proposal and his justification however, did not meet with the 
universal approval of the Cabinet, who remained unconvinced about the salience of 
his arguments about external financing, and were concerned about the implications 
for the relationship with the trade unions.  The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Crosland, 
argued that ‘the proposed reduction in the PSBR in 1977-78 could not be defended 
on any reasonable grounds’ (ibid).  In his view, there was unlikely to be any pressure 
on resources, and the demands of external financing were not likely to be as great as 
predicted in light of the fact that the National Institute for Economic and Social 
Research had already reduced their own PSBR forecast to £8.3 billion.  In addition, 
he argued that ‘in terms of the Social Contract, there was absolutely nothing to be 
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said for the proposal’ (ibid).  As an alternative course, he suggested that the 
government propose to the IMF that the PSBR for 1977-78 be reduced by £1 billion 
to £9.5 billion, made largely of cosmetic measures such as the sale of BP shares, and 
public expenditure cuts with no demand or employment effects.   He furthermore 
argued that in negotiating this line, the Fund should be ‘left in no doubt that the 
consequences of pressing for more could only be to drive the Government into a 
protectionist attitude’ (ibid).   This proposal met with considerable approval from the 
Cabinet, however at this stage, Callaghan took a middle ground, and in summation 
noted that ‘many of the Cabinet at present felt that the scale of the public expenditure 
cuts at present proposed was too great to accept’, and that the government should 
proceed on the basis of attempting to secure an agreement with the Fund on the basis 
of a PSBR for 1977-78 of £9.5 billion (ibid).   
 
This demonstrated the degree of political difficulty in winning Cabinet support for 
proposals broadly accepted by officials and the Fund, which Callaghan relayed to the 
Fund later that day (see TNA T 364/50, Note of a Meeting, 23 November 1976).  In 
response, Whittome said that the Fund’s emphasis on the second year of the 
programme, when an upturn in exports should mean that adjustments would have to 
be minimal, was a demonstration of the Fund’s recognition of the political 
constraints that the government faced.  He also informed the meeting that ‘it would 
be a defeat for the IMF if their advice led to a Government falling’, but that 
nonetheless, ‘to the IMF a PSBR of £9.5 billion for 1977/78 was not convincing 
because they were sure it would not appear convincing to the millions of bankers all 
over the world whose response to the purchase prices of sterling would determine 
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where the exchange rate went’ (ibid).  On the basis of these discussions, and without 
Cabinet approval, the meeting was concluded with the agreement that beginning on 
24 November, the Treasury and the IMF would consider the implications of a 
reduction in the PSBR for 1977-78 to £8.5 billion, £9 billion, and £9.5 billion (ibid).   
 
After these packages had been reviewed, the Chancellor advised the Prime Minister 
that the first programme, a reduction in public expenditure of £0.5 billion in 1977-78 
and £0.5 billion in 1978-79, was seen by the IMF team to represent ‘a manifest 
failure of policy to respond to the prospect before us’ (TNA PREM 16/803, Healey 
to Callaghan, 25 November 1976).  The second proposal, to reduce public 
expenditure by £1 billion for 1977-78 and £1.5 billion for 1978-79, also received no 
interest from the Fund team on the grounds that they saw it carrying the risk of 
failing to restore confidence in the markets, which would lead to further pressure on 
sterling emerging in the near future (ibid).  The final package, of expenditure cuts of 
£1.5 billion for 1977-78 and £2 billion for 1978-79, ‘whilst [bringing] us up to the 
Fund’s suggested guideline for 1977/78’, still fell ‘some way short of the figures 
which the Fund team have been suggesting for 1978/79’ (ibid).5                                                           
5 The discussion of a package of £1.5 billion for 1977-78, rising in the following 
year, prompted Bernard Donoughue to note that the Cabinet seemed to be faced 
‘only by the choice between the suicidal extremism of the Treasury and the 
protectionist extremism of Mr. Benn’ (TNA PREM 16/803, Donoughue to 
Callaghan, 25 November 1976), however Healey was adamant that the largest 
package was the most promising basis for an agreement with the Fund, which was 
absolutely essential (TNA PREM 16/803, Healey to Callaghan, 25 November 1976). 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Cabinet was again updated on the status of negotiations on 25 November, and the 
Prime Minister invited his colleagues to circulate their own proposals in writing so 
that ministers would have time to consider them in advance of their meetings the 
following week (TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76), 34th Conclusions, 25 November 
1976).  It was argued that it was important to ensure that alternative courses were 
given a full exploration, although it was also noted that the alternative strategy was 
impracticable for the purposes of satisfying the Fund and the market (ibid), and that: 
The IMF had now abandoned the concept of a target for the PSBR in 1978-
79, having been persuaded that the uncertainties in such a calculation were 
too great; and they were moving towards the concept of a target figure for the 
adjustment, which would be varied in relation to growth.  It was suggested 
that if the target in 1977-78 were £8.5 billion, the carry-through of the 
expenditure cuts […] would mean that relatively little further expenditure 
savings would be needed (ibid). 
Whilst this strategy would also face political difficulties, the Prime Minister 
informed the Cabinet that the time had come ‘to decide which course was least 
unpalatable and least risky, and then seek maximum support for it’ (ibid).    
 
Healey put two papers before Cabinet, the first of which outlined the three packages 
that British officials had discussed with the Fund team and would form the basis of 
discussion (see TNA CAB 129/193, CP (76) 122, 30 November 1976).  In the 
second, he made his argument for coming to an agreement with the IMF.  In it, he 
noted that the argument for the fiscal adjustment was ‘not simply that this is what the 
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International Monetary Fund […] require as a condition of a standby credit’ (TNA 
CAB 129/193, CP (76) 123, 30 November 1976).  He noted that the argument was 
also ‘partly about finance, and particularly about external finance, and partly about 
the general direction of the economy and the pace at which it is progressing to our 
declared goals’ (ibid).  The external finance argument was that Britain continued to 
require £1 billion per annum in order to finance the structural deficit on capital 
account, and that it was a continuing necessity to be able to finance the tendency for 
sterling holders to convert their assets into other currencies (ibid).  He therefore 
recorded that his judgement – ‘reached independently of the Fund – is that there is a 
powerful case for a fiscal adjustment’, which would act so as ‘to reduce the PSBR to 
something like £8.5 billion in 1977/78 and perhaps to a similar figure the following 
year’, coming ‘largely, if not predominantly, through reductions in public 
expenditure’ (ibid).  Finally, he noted that whilst the proposals ‘are not agreeable and 
will be difficult to sell to the Party and the TUC […] if there were a better or more 
viable set of policies [he] should propose them’ (ibid).  
 
Several of his colleagues, notably Tony Benn, Anthony Crosland and Peter Shore, 
however, were convinced that there was an alternative course that Britain could 
pursue that the Chancellor had not considered, in the adoption of the AES.  In his 
own Cabinet paper, Benn outlined an alternative six-point plan for economic 
recovery, which included: 
1. An immediate decision to introduce overall import quotas for manufactures 
so Britain would be able to survive without the IMF loan if necessary. 
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2. The immediate introduction of import deposits to cover the interim period 
before import quotas could be implemented. 
3. The immediate enforcement of exchange controls. 
4. The reintroduction of a Capital Issues Committee to channel investment into 
priority areas. 
5. A lower interest rate for official holders of sterling as a secondary incentive 
to investment. 
6. Taking reserve powers to introduce planning agreements and increasing the 
funding of the National Enterprise Board (summarised from TNA CAB 
129/193, CP (76) 117, 29 November 1976). 
On the basis of these policies, Benn believed that it would be possible to persuade 
the IMF, GATT, and EEC, that this was the correct set of policies for British 
recovery, and that because of the degree of international interdependence that existed 
it would be possible to negotiate the IMF loan on the basis of those policies (ibid).  
 
Anthony Crosland’s paper took a similar line.  He argued that as there was no 
decisive case for cuts on resource grounds, and as confidence was the principal issue, 
it would also be necessary to consider the implications of a break in the Social 
Contract caused by further deflation (TNA CAB 129/193, CP (76) 118, 29 
November 1976).  He suggested that so long as Britain received the IMF loan, the 
market would believe that Britain had the means to control its economy, and that this 
would be possible on the basis of a £1 billion PSBR cut because: 
Our bargaining position with the IMF is in my view stronger than people 
realise.  For if they push us to the point of a siege economy and the full 
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panoply of import controls, this would gravely threaten the cohesion of the 
EEC, dangerously stimulate a move towards world protectionism, and bring 
into question the British contribution to the military defence of the West.  
Our very weakness brings us strength.  If we keep our nerve, we shall find 
that the IMF cannot not afford to give us the loan (ibid, original emphasis). 
 
Peter Shore’s paper was not as confident about securing the IMF loan on the basis of 
an alternative strategy, but he nevertheless believed that the case against imposing 
direct controls on imports had continually been overstated.  Significantly, he noted 
that new forecasts from the NIF suggested that import quotas would not create 
excess demand and force rationing in the UK, that there would be no case for 
retaliation under international law, and that although there was a possibility that such 
a path would risk de-railing the IMF negotiations, this was a risk the government 
was already taking (TNA CAB 129/193, CP (76) 124, 30 November 1976).   
 
However, despite this ministerial support for a scheme of generalised import 
controls, either as a realistic approach to addressing British economic decline, or as a 
strategic bluff to induce the IMF to grant the loan on softer terms in order to avoid 
taking a dangerous step towards world protection, there was no new work 
commissioned on examining the feasibility of such a scheme.  This work had been 
completed on 14 October in the form of two papers prepared by the CPRS on the 
cases for and against import controls, which had been prepared as ‘lawyers briefs’ 
for EY.  These papers were simply re-circulated to Cabinet under new cover.   The 
case for import controls was reliant on the argument that ‘the present strategy is 
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clearly not working now, that it will not work over the crucial years 1977-80, nor yet 
again over the longer term’, and that as such, ‘protection by quotas is thus the only 
viable way of attacking the cause of Britain’s long run economic decline and of 
laying the foundations for fast economic growth in the future’ by closing the balance 
of payments gap, helping to avoid destabilising capital flows, and reducing 
unemployment (TNA CAB 129/193, CP (76) 116, 30 November 1976, Case For).  
The intuitive case for import controls however, was paired with a considered 
demolition of the practical implications in the case against.   
 
In the case against it was argued that the alternative strategy ‘ignores the practical 
implications of the immediate situation [and] disguises, or assumes away, a number 
of fundamental industrial and economic difficulties, which will in practice prevent it 
from achieving the results claimed for it’ (TNA CAB 129/193, CP (76) 30 
November 1976, Case Against).   Firstly, it was argued that a system of quantitative 
restrictions would not work because it would not be possible to ‘get all of the fences 
up fast enough to prevent a collapse of sterling’, that such a scheme would be 
‘contrary to [European] Community Law’, that Britain ‘would certainly be exposed 
to retaliation by other countries’, and most fundamentally, ‘the whole philosophy 
behind our international policies – both political and economic – has been based on 
the assumption that our future lies in membership of the Atlantic Community’ (ibid).  
Secondly, and from a purely industrial perspective, it was argued that ‘protection 
would only succeed if industry organised itself to develop new and internationally 
competitive products and to launch new and major campaigns to sell them’, and that 
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there was ‘no reason to think that protection – even in the absence of retaliation – 
would produce anything of the kind’ (ibid).   
 
At Cabinet on 1 December, Benn spoke first in favour of his proposal.  In his diaries, 
Benn (1989, 663) records that he said it was essential for Britain to reflate the 
economy if the government was to carry the labour movement, and noted that ‘Mrs 
Thatcher would do it and in a way she would probably find it easier because no-one 
would suspect her of wanting to make it an entry point into a full siege economy’ 
(ibid, 665).  However, Fay and Young (28 May 1978, 33) note that Healey suggested 
Benn’s argument amounted to calling for Britain to ‘withdraw to the citadel, but only 
so long as we can slip out occasionally to borrow the money to buy the bows and 
arrows we’ll need to shoot at the besieging armies.’6  Second to speak was Peter 
Shore, on his more moderate approach, involving a £1 billion cut in public 
expenditure for 1977-78 and 1978-79 (TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 35th 
Conclusions), followed by Anthony Crosland – ‘the third gladiator in the ring’ (Benn 
1989, 667) - who argued that a government statement threatening a siege economy 
would be enough for the United States and Germany to ensure that the IMF ‘would 
act in such a way as to avert that possibility’ (TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 35th 
Conclusions).   
 
In general discussion, arguments against the imposition of generalised import 
controls were made on the basis that if Britain were unable to finance the deficit, it                                                         
6 Morgan (1997, 548) likewise notes that ‘Benn’s paper was demolished as 
Callaghan had long intended.’ 
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may be necessary to resort to such drastic measures as rationing, and that, whilst the 
IMF may make the loan available under those conditions, it was a risk that could not 
be taken on the grounds that ‘if this proved wrong the country would be in a 
bankrupt situation’ (ibid).  After this discussion, Healey made his own case for 
agreement with the IMF.  He argued that Britain had no alternative but to agree to 
the proposed action on the grounds that under any other conditions, market sentiment 
would not make it feasible for Britain to finance its deficit, save for printing money 
or increasing interest rates to a level that would severely undermine the affordability 
of credit for investment in British industry.  The onus of Healey’s argument was that: 
‘without the IMF loan the external deficit could not be financed, there would be no 
safety net for the sterling balances, no acquiescence by other countries in a scheme 
of import deposits, and no bilateral lending’ (ibid). 
 
The argument that Britain’s dependence on market confidence for financing its 
external deficit had also been rehearsed within the Treasury as part of its 
contingency planning for the break-down of negotiations, and demonstrated just why 
the proposed alternative strategies were so undesirable.  Firstly, it was noted that if 
‘the IMF talks were to break down […] a serious sterling crisis could be virtually 
taken for granted [which] could be self-perpetuating until the Government stepped in 
with strong measures to halt it’, and any adoption of an alternative strategy would 
make this inevitable because it would be inherently incompatible with an agreement 
with the Fund (TNA T 364/50, Hudson to Isaac, 30 November 1976).  Secondly, and 
significantly, ‘there would be no question of using the reserves to support the rate’, 
because after the repayment of drawings made from the June stand-by, the reserves 
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would be insufficient (ibid).  The implications of such a course brought about by an 
‘unwillingness by Ministers to reduce the PSBR’, it was argued, were that: 
It would be paradoxical – though by no means inconceivable – if it turned out 
the only way to bring the crisis to an end was by introducing just the sort of 
policies that the Government had refused to introduce in order to secure the 
Fund loan (ibid, 3, emphasis added).  
 
The argument that the only course open to the government was a large fiscal 
reduction had therefore been widely deployed at official and ministerial levels by the 
beginning of December, and played an important role in reducing the political 
opposition to the Treasury’s and the Chancellor’s preferred course of action, which 
was to make a large fiscal adjustment and agree with the Fund.  However, Benn 
(1989, 678) recalls that Cabinet on 1 December concluded with Michael Foot 
objecting to the Prime Minister’s summation, arguing that only a majority was in 
favour of continuing to negotiate with the Fund.  He said that agreement was ‘not 
unanimous and the Cabinet minutes always say “the Cabinet noted with approval the 
summing up of the Prime Minister.” Well, we don’t all approve of the summing up 
by the Prime Minister’.  Despite this objection however, Callaghan argued that Foot 
could surely agree that there was a majority in favour of continuing the negotiation 
with the IMF, and this intervention allowed for the Cabinet minutes to report that a 
majority agreement had been reached in favour of pursuing the negotiations on the 
basis of a fiscal reduction (TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 35th Conclusions, 1 
December 1976).  
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Phase three: finalising the package 
 
Following the Cabinet meeting on 1 December, Healey met with Witteveen and 
Whittome, and attention turned to the potential phasing of the drawings that Britain 
would be able to make from an agreed IMF loan.  Healey had identified a potential 
problem in the Fund’s proposal to pay the stand-by in eight equal instalments in light 
of the fact that the G10 stand-by would have to be repaid on 8 December.  He noted 
that if the IMF drawings would not be sufficient to cover repayments on the stand-by 
because Britain had only been able to make an initial drawing of £0.5 billion, there 
was a chance that Cabinet would not agree to a package of the size proposed (TNA 
PREM 16/804, Note of a Meeting, 1 December 1976).  Witteveen however, said that 
this was a matter for the UK and the G10 to agree between them, although it was 
possible that some front-loading of the drawings would be possible depending on the 
size of agreed package (ibid). 
 
On this note, attention turned again to the fiscal element of the agreement, and 
familiar arguments were repeated, with the managing director saying that a PSBR of 
£9.5 billion would be insufficient, and the Chancellor arguing that he was worried 
about swaying Cabinet when the package he had already proposed, including the sale 
of BP shares, would bring the PSBR down to £8.7 billion (ibid).  Healey and the 
Fund team then went to meet the Prime Minister, who told Witteveen that if a £2 
billion fiscal adjustment was the Fund’s final word, then negotiations were at an end.  
If this were the case, ‘he would lead Cabinet to a conclusion that the right course was 
to go for a protectionist economy and the introduction of quota restrictions on 
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imports forthwith’ (TNA PREM 16/804, Note of a Meeting, 1 December 1976).  In 
light of this, when the Fund re-convened with the Chancellor, Witteveen continued 
to press for another £0.5 billion cut for 1977-78, but eventually acquiesced to the 
Chancellor’s proposal on the condition that the UK would be willing to go beyond a 
£1.5 billion reduction in the second year (TNA PREM 16/804, Note of a Meeting, 1 
December 1976).   
 
On the following day, Cabinet met to discuss the size of the package that it should 
agree in order to secure the IMF loan.  The Chancellor began the meeting by 
relaying to other Cabinet members once again his view that the PSBR must be cut 
because it would not otherwise be possible to finance the deficit without severe 
inflation, or interest rates of such a high level that investment in British industry 
would be fundamentally damaged.  The problem as it presented itself was, he 
argued, that ‘potential creditors regarded the present PSBR as inconsistent with 
credit-worthiness’, and that to change this, a reduction of £1.5 billion must be made, 
with £0.5 million coming from the sale of shares in BP (TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 
36th Conclusions, 2 December 1976).   
 
Callaghan then revealed his hand.  He noted that whilst the package may create 
difficulties in carrying the Labour Party, he did not believe there would be an 
adverse reaction from the public at large because they were better informed on 
economic matters than they were often given credit for (ibid).  This statement was 
crucial in carrying the Cabinet, and it was noted that ‘the consequences for the Party 
and for the country would be very serious if it became known that proposals 
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supported by both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been 
rejected by the Cabinet’ (ibid).  As a result, Callaghan was able to conclude that ‘the 
majority took the view that in order to get the loan there should be adjustments of 
£1.5 billion in 1977/78 which the Chancellor had said should lead to one of £2 
billion in 1978/79’, and that although some members still thought that this was an 
unacceptably high price to pay, they were a minority, and that as such, the 
Chancellor should be authorised to put the proposal to the IMF (ibid). 
 
Callaghan (1987, 440) noted of the Cabinet meeting on 2 December that he had 
‘recognised the package would have an adverse effect on some of the Government’s 
supporters in the House’, but that after each minister had had the opportunity to 
express their view in turn, ‘it was obvious that there was a substantial majority for 
the Chancellor’s proposal, although a minority found it unacceptable.’  The question 
however, he felt, ‘was whether Denis could get the IMF on board on the basis of the 
Cabinet’s figure’ (ibid, 440).  Attempts at this reconciliation began that evening, 
when the Chancellor once again met with the Fund team, accompanied by Douglas 
Wass and Derek Mitchell, and informed the IMF staff members that ‘the 
Government would be ready to take action which would reduce the PSBR from the 
revised forecast of £10.4 billion to £8.7 billion’, and that the ‘first item at the 
Cabinet next Monday afternoon would be to give formal clearance to the quantum of 
£2 billion for 1978/9’ (TNA PREM 16/804, Note of a Meeting, 2 December 1976).  
This provoked some dispute about what Witteveen had agreed to at previous 
meetings, with the Chancellor noting that the managing director had agreed to a 
package of this size, but Whittome arguing that ‘the Cabinet’s position did not 
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represent the acceptable minimum for the fund’ (ibid).  This disagreement meant that 
the final matters of substance had to be deferred until Whittome could speak to 
Witteveen and report on his views the following day.  
 
When the discussions resumed, Whittome reported that he had received a message in 
writing from Witteveen saying that he wanted a cut of £1.5 billion in 1977-78, and a 
substantial addition for the following year, which Whittome had interpreted as 
meaning about £3 billion (TNA PREM 16/805, Note of a Meeting, 3 December 
1976).  To this, Healey said ‘that Dr. Witteveen could take a running jump’, which 
prompted Whittome to offer a compromise package that involved Britain accepting a 
£1 billion package in the first year, if the Chancellor could agree to a £1 billion 
larger package for the second year (ibid).  From this point onwards, Healey remained 
steadfast in his position, informing Whittome that whilst the second year was a little 
more open than the first, nothing more than £2 billion would be acceptable, and that 
he would not be able to fight with conviction for anything more (ibid). ‘It was 
easier’, the Chancellor suggested, ‘to ask for sacrifices which would enable the 
country to stand on its own feet than to do so in order to get a foreign loan’ (ibid). 
 
The resolution to this situation however, was neither difficult nor technical, and lay 
in the application of a ‘wait and see’ approach.  Whittome asked the Chancellor 
whether ‘it would be possible to give a contingent undertaking to do more than the 
Chancellor had proposed to Cabinet in 1978/79, which would be linked to achieving 
a lower level of employment than was now forecast’, to which Healey replied 
favourably so long as ‘it was made strictly contingent on the IMF’s optimistic view 
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of the economy and of the effect of the fiscal cuts being proved right’ (ibid).  With 
this agreement, the meeting ended uneasily, both parties expressing the possibility of 
meeting difficulties with its constituencies, but the basis of a final agreement was in 
place on terms that the Chancellor and the Treasury had deemed as necessary and 
appropriate from well before substantive negotiations with the Fund had begun.   
 
By 5 December, Whittome had secured Witteveen’s agreement to the Treasury’s 
proposed formula, ‘albeit reluctantly’ (TNA PREM 16/805, Wass to Stowe, 5 
December 1976, 1), however, the problem of carrying Cabinet still remained.  In 
order to do so, Douglas Wass had written a powerful statement in favour of agreeing 
with the Fund by making the argument that there was no other feasible course of 
action.  He noted: 
The announcement of the failure – or even the postponement – of the 
application for a drawing would be treated with dismay by the financial 
markets […] If the Government did not immediately announce a convincing 
package of measures to deal with the situation, sterling would become the 
subject of a major attack and the rate would fall.  We should have no means 
of stopping it […] money and capital markets too would fall sharply and 
interest rates would rise autonomously […] this situation would be 
intolerable.  We should have to take action to avoid a complete financial 
collapse (TNA PREM 16/805, Wass to Callaghan, 5 December 1976).   
The action that would have to be taken in this event would involve cuts in public 
expenditure of up to £1,000 million, tax increases of £430 million, the sale of BP 
shares, and a scheme of import deposits that would contract the economy sharply 
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(ibid).  The other only alternative would be to introduce the siege economy implied 
by the AES, and Wass felt that the objections to this course were so strong, and by 
now so familiar, that he did not need to go into them in detail.  He simply noted that 
it ‘would be a virtually irreversible step away from Europe and away from the 
system into which we have progressively integrated ourselves since the War’, and 
that as such, the AES was not ‘an immediate option in the event of a breakdown with 
the Fund’ (ibid).   
 
The Treasury had therefore consistently made the case that there were no plausible 
alternative courses of action in order to secure agreement with the Fund, and secure 
the public expenditure cuts it believed were necessary in order to stabilise sterling 
and restore Britain’s creditworthiness so it would be able to finance the deficit until 
North Sea Oil came on stream and British industry was restored to competitiveness.  
In light of these arguments, when Cabinet met on 6 December, Callaghan informed 
members that it was now a matter of urgency to give shape to the fiscal package, and 
Healey noted that this involved immediate agreement of £1 billion cuts for 1977-78 
and £1.5 billion cuts for 1978-79, which may later be revised dependent on the 
performance of the British economy by comparison to a growth rate for that year of 
3.5 per cent (TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 37th Conclusions, 6 December 1976).  The 
Cabinet spent the remainder of the meeting and two meetings on 7 December 
coming to an agreement on the shape of the fiscal package (see TNA CAB 128/60, 
CM (76) 38th Conclusions and CM (76) 39th Conclusions, 7 December 1976),7 whilst                                                         
7 In his memoirs, Callaghan (1987, 442) noted that these meetings were ‘dreary’ and 
‘like teeth extractions’. 
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in the Treasury, attention turned to negotiating the final wording of the letter of 
intent, including targets for DCE, which were finally agreed at £7.7 billion for 1977-
78 and £6 billion for 1978-79, in the early hours of 13 December (TNA PREM 
16/808, Monck to Stowe, 13 December 1976).  Whilst it was the feeling of British 
officials that the Fund was ‘trying to toughen up the monetary targets’ in order to 
offset worries about the fiscal cuts they had accepted (ibid), agreement on these 
figures provoked none of the intense political debate that had accompanied the fiscal 
reductions, and the letter of intent was agreed without objection on 14 December 
(TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 41st Conclusions, 14 December 1976), allowing 
Witteveen to recommend to the executive board of the IMF that the UK be given the 
stand-by the following day (IMF EBM/76/165, 15 December 1976).  The board then 
considered its decision, and reached the conclusions that ‘the program now 
undertaken can provide a firm basis for the urgently needed change in past economic 
trends of the United Kingdom’ (IMF EBS/76/519, 16 December 1976).        
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented a narrative of events from the middle of September until 
the conclusion of the IMF negotiations in December, and has demonstrated that 
throughout the final quarter of the year, the Treasury and the Chancellor continued 
their pursuit of further fiscal reductions by using market rhetoric, and ultimately, the 
conditionality of the International Monetary Fund, in order to navigate political 
opposition to the proposals and reconcile diverging views with their own.  This 
process began with the argument that it was necessary to approach the Fund for a 
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conditional drawing because of the dire external financing prospects Britain was 
facing in light of pressure on sterling, and despite calls for an attempt to be made to 
seek an agreement to guarantee the sterling balances.  The Treasury, supported by 
the timing of overseas elections, argued that not only would a sterling balances 
agreement not address the cause of the current difficulties, but that it was also 
implausible prior to any agreement with the Fund.  In any event, it was argued that 
such a course would incur even more rigorous conditionality than an IMF drawing.   
 
The autumn forecasts then allowed the Treasury to present a case for further cuts, 
despite the fact that it was widely acknowledged that the figures were highly 
uncertain.  In light of pressure on sterling, these forecasts convinced the Chancellor 
of the case that further action was required, and he decided to delay the action 
because of the widely anticipated application of conditionality by the IMF as part of 
the terms of agreement.  The IMF negotiations then proceeded through three distinct 
phases, during each of which the Treasury and the Chancellor strategically made the 
case that decisions about the size of the PSBR were effectively beyond the control of 
the government because of its need to finance the deficit, the absence of a plausible 
alternative, and the Fund’s conditions, despite broad agreement with the Fund, at 
least in private, on the scale of the action required throughout the negotiation. 
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Chapter IX 
 
Conclusions 
 
The conclusion of the IMF negotiations marked the end of an eventful two years in 
government for the Labour Party, in which they had moved from their promises of 
redistribution of incomes and wealth and the preservation of employment, through 
several rounds of expenditure cuts and direct action to limit the rate of growth of 
incomes.  All of these policies had been geared at restoring overseas confidence in 
the British economy so that Britain would be able to continue financing its balance 
of payments deficit in the medium-term, and correct it over the long-term by freeing 
resources for the export sector and letting the pound slide to help restore the 
competitiveness of British industry.  All of these changes had occurred despite the 
Labour Party’s manifesto commitments and political opposition from the labour 
movement and the left of the Parliamentary Labour Party.  However, policy change 
was not, by and large, characteristic of uncertainty and indecision, or the disciplinary 
exercise of structural power over British policy-makers.  Rather, it occurred in light 
of the consistent advocacy of the diversion of resources into export sectors of 
industry, public expenditure cuts, and robust counter-inflationary policies, by the 
Treasury and the Bank of England, and was achieved principally through the politics 
of depoliticisation. 
 
* 
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The depoliticisation of economic policy-making, 1974-76 
 
This thesis has argued that policy change in 1975 and 1976 was not determined by 
the disciplinary exercise of structural power over British policy-makers in the form 
of IMF conditionality, or a process of social learning catalysed by external crisis, as 
many accounts of this period suggest.  Rather, it has argued that market rhetoric and 
market rules, such as IMF conditionality, provided the government with the 
opportunity to pursue its preferences for depreciation, expenditure cuts and incomes 
restraint, whilst minimising political dissent through the politics of depoliticisation.   
This argument was constructed in a framework suggesting that states and markets 
should not be understood as analytically separate spheres that are able to impinge 
upon one another.  I argued that such approaches misrepresent the nature of the 
relationship between state and market, and oversimplify a fundamentally complex 
social and economic environment that shapes the way in which governments form 
their policy preferences and devise their governing strategies.  In the case of the 
1976 IMF crisis, evidence for arguments based on the artificial analytical separation 
of states and markets has been presented in a superficially appealing way, however 
the simple identification of the public statements of the Labour Party with the 
government’s preferences has amplified the extent to which policy-makers appear to 
have been influenced by external forces.   
 
Most existing accounts of the crisis therefore suffer from theoretical and empirical 
weaknesses that this thesis has attempted to address.  I argued that instead of 
perceiving of state and market in reified terms, the state should be understood as a 
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social form of the relations of capitalist production, and the class antagonisms 
inherent therein.  Understood in this way, it is clear that the state’s role is not that of 
a passive, neutral arbiter.  Rather, the state must fulfil specific functions in order to 
manage the circuit of capital and maintain conditions for profitable accumulation 
within its boundaries.  I also argued that the state’s nature as a national manifestation 
of the social relations of production in relation to the global character of 
accumulation provides strong incentives for governments to devise strategies geared 
towards restricting expenditure and inflation to prevent capital from seeking more 
profitable outlets abroad, but do not determine them at moments of crisis.  I then 
suggested that as policies of this kind frequently require social costs to be carried by 
the labour movement, governments often find it beneficial to employ governing 
strategies that depoliticise the consequences of austerity.  Finally, I argued that the 
government’s clearly established economic preferences from 1974-76 demonstrate 
that the state is not autonomous from the economy, but is conditioned to act in the 
general interests of accumulation by virtue of its status as a historical manifestation 
of the class struggle inherent in the social relations of capitalist production, and that 
the Wilson / Callaghan administration used market rhetoric, and ultimately IMF 
conditionality, to depoliticise the consequences economic policy retrenchment.  
 
In order for a convincing case arguing that governing authorities have used the 
politics of depoliticisation in an attempt to minimise political dissent to be made, 
certain observations about the nature of depoliticisation as a governing strategy must 
be made.  Firstly, it is necessary to identify and demonstrate the government’s 
preferences for policies geared towards the general reproduction of the social 
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relations of capitalist production. This is problematic for contemporary studies of 
depoliticisation, because by their very nature, a government’s preferences when 
employing a strategy of depoliticisation are not publicly revealed preferences.  As 
soon as state managers reveal their intention to pursue economic objectives in this 
way, the issues are re-politicised, and the potential benefits of depoliticisation are 
lost.  Therefore, access to primary documents is invaluable for establishing a 
credible case that state managers employed a strategy of depoliticisation.  Secondly, 
for a convincing depoliticisation argument to be made, it is necessary to identify 
intention on the part of policy-makers.  Without being able to demonstrate the 
intention to depoliticise the consequences of potentially unpopular policy changes, 
they cannot be described as part of a strategic attempt at governing the economy, and 
as such do not fit accepted definitions of depoliticisation.  
 
The accounts of Steve Ludlam (1992) and Douglas Wass (2008) have played an 
important role in showing the depoliticisation hypothesis to be plausible with 
reference to the 1976 IMF crisis by demonstrating clearly and empirically the fact 
that policy changes had begun well in advance of the application of Fund 
conditionality.  However, neither author makes the case explicitly.  Ludlam offers 
the closest suggestion of such an approach in his assertion that the adoption of 
policies in accord with monetarist discourses was geared more at forming public 
opinion than theoretical conversion (1992, 723), however he stops short of 
suggesting that this was part of a fully formed governing strategy, and indeed with 
his focus on the ideational aspects of policies lends itself more to support of the 
social learning thesis than it does to the depoliticisation thesis.  Furthermore, the fact 
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that primary documents on the crisis only became available under the thirty-year rule 
on 1 January 2007 means that demonstrating the government’s intentions and 
understanding its full range of preferences would have made it difficult to make a 
convincing case for the depoliticisation thesis that went beyond mere assertion; such 
a case would have had to rely principally on assumptions about the unrevealed 
preferences of policy-makers.   
 
Douglass Wass did not face the same practical limitations with regard to his access 
to a full range of sources, both because of his involvement in events and the 
declassification of government records, however his judgement was that the 
documents offer no evidence that a strategy of depoliticisation was employed.  In 
fact, he argues to the contrary, that the documents reveal no underlying strategy to 
deal with the events of 1976 (Wass, 2008, 345).  However, this conceals the extent to 
which, from 1974-76, economic policy preferences and the way in which they were 
implemented displayed a remarkable consistency, and reflects a continuing theme 
throughout Wass’ account that selectively absolves the Treasury for responsibility 
for certain policy decisions at certain times on political grounds, draws on Wass’ 
own undocumented impression of events, or justifies the selective dismissal of 
certain evidence.1 Despite the author’s intention to distance himself from the events 
therefore, there are a number of aspects of the work that suggest his interpretation of                                                         
1 For example, his assertion that it was no place for the Treasury to question the 
adequacy of the Social Contract, his impression about the way in which policy 
would be made more collaboratively during the 1974 spring Budget, and his 
discounting of reserves figures.  See pages 80, 114-5, 175 fn3 above.  
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events reflects, at least in part, an intention to defend the Treasury’s role in policy-
making during this period. 
 
In contrast, this thesis has shown how policy changed in a way that accurately 
reflects the way in which state managers aim to act in favour of creating favourable 
conditions for accumulation within its national boundaries by capping public 
expenditure and using incomes policies to control inflation, whilst attempting to 
depoliticise these austerity measures in order to negate social antagonisms by 
attributing the necessity of such measures to the logic of the market and the rules of 
its institutions, which ultimately, in 1976, came in the form of IMF conditionality.  
This can be demonstrated by looking at the period 1974-76 in three stages. 
 
In the first of the stages, between February and October 1975, it is possible to see the 
interests of labour reflected in the Labour Party’s commitments to the redistribution 
of income and wealth and voluntarism in collective bargaining in Labour’s 
Programme 1973, Economic Policy and the Cost of Living, and the 1974 general 
election manifestoes (see Labour Party, 1973; TUC / Labour Party Liaison 
Committee, 1973; Labour Party, 1974a and 1974b).  However, it is also possible to 
see that the Treasury and key members of the core executive, including the 
Chancellor, also favoured the diversion of resources into exports and restoring 
incentives to British industries through reform of the price code, which came at the 
expense of the government’s commitments to extensive social expenditure in the 
March Budget.  The potential for measures that took decisive action to reduce British 
inflation and bring the balance of payments quickly into equilibrium to exacerbate 
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social conflict however, was also recognised, and policies were chosen and 
implemented with an awareness of the need to balance political and economic 
concerns. 
 
The first phase of policy making however, was highly politicised and carried the 
possibility that a continuation of such a strategy would translate the beginning of an 
economic crisis into a political crisis.  As such, in the second phase, there was a 
decisive re-orientation of economic strategy that demonstrated the extent to which 
state managers prioritised the demands of correcting the disequilibrium in the 
balance of payments, restoring British industry to competitiveness, and 
implementing a credible and decisive counter-inflation strategy.  This was informed 
by the Treasury’s experiences of managing sterling in a historical perspective, and its 
particular sensitivity to crises of confidence in the foreign exchange markets.  In 
December 1974 the Treasury argued that it had no faith in current policies, and 
argued that it was necessary to limit the public sector’s claim on resources by cutting 
public expenditure, allow sterling to depreciate for gains in competitiveness, and 
implementing a formal incomes policy to restrict the rate of pay increases in order to 
control inflation and sustain confidence in sterling investments.  It was also 
recognised that implementing these measures may not be possible in the immediate 
context because of the potential they would have to provoke political unrest, but that 
an external crisis would open up possibilities for the government to rally support for 
policies of this kind.  The documents relating to this period clearly reflect the 
preferences of state managers for pursuing policies geared towards renewing 
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conditions for accumulation, and their recognition of the potential for market 
rhetoric and rules to assist them in this endeavour.   
 
Throughout 1975, the government successfully employed a strategy of 
depoliticisation in order to introduce an incomes policy, reform the system of public 
expenditure planning, and make public expenditure cuts, by justifying them with 
reference to two ‘non-crises’.  The first of these was in the foreign exchange 
markets.  As sterling came under pressure, the Treasury and the Chancellor argued 
that the fall in the rate was the consequence of a fundamental lack of faith in British 
counter-inflationary strategy, and that if the slide was to be reversed, the immediate 
introduction of a credible incomes policy was necessary.  This argument was made 
despite the fact that the Treasury also had clear preferences for depreciation of 
sterling, had been adamant that the reserves should not be spent on defending the 
rate, and so had contributed to the fall in the pound indirectly by authorising only 
parsimonious intervention for smoothing the depreciation.  The second ‘non-crisis’ 
of 1975 related to the demands of external financing, when it was argued that Britain 
would not be able to attract sterling inflows or borrow bilaterally to finance the 
deficit, and that as a result, Britain should draw the first credit tranche and the oil 
facility loans from the IMF.  It was argued that because Britain’s creditworthiness 
was still poor, and because Britain was being forced to use the last unconditional 
facilities available to it, cuts from the 1976 Public Expenditure White Paper would 
be required otherwise Britain would be forced to go to the IMF for a highly 
conditional loan that would make even more severe cuts inevitable.  However, this 
loan was drawn in spite of the IMF’s doubts about Britain’s ability to demonstrate 
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need on the basis of reserves loss when the approach was being discussed, and was 
eventually drawn largely on the grounds that an external financing crisis was 
possible, not imminent, and that funds available from the oil facility would otherwise 
be lost at the end of the calendar year.  In combination, the manipulation of external 
confidence in this way offers strong evidence of state managers’ intention to 
depoliticise economic policy-making.  
 
In the final stage, throughout 1976, ‘non-crises’ increasingly translated themselves 
into real crises, but the strategy of using market rhetoric and institutional rules in 
order to justify acting on pre-existing preferences for further public expenditure cuts 
continued.  This focussed on the argument that the degree of dependence implied by 
Britain’s involvement in the global financial and political communities had made the 
adoption of any alternative strategy unworkable on the grounds that it would be 
necessary to accompany them with even more severe deflation – and possibly 
rationing, too – than those measures otherwise proposed.  This strategy was 
employed twice, firstly, and ultimately with only moderate success, in July, and 
secondly, and more successfully, during the IMF crisis of December 1976 itself.    
 
The context of the first round of public expenditure cuts was one in which the 
Treasury and the Chancellor continued to believe that a further depreciation in 
sterling was required, along with a further reduction in the PSBR to ensure that 
Britain would be able to continue financing its deficit in the medium-term and until 
British industry had regained its competitiveness and the balance of payments was 
supplemented by the revenues of North Sea Oil.  Once again, the fall in the rate was 
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used in order to make further retrenchment seem inevitable on the grounds that 
confidence needed to be restored.  This need was amplified by the short-term loan 
taken from the G10 in June, which allowed the argument that Britain had to make 
further expenditure cuts if it wished to avoid a harsher, conditional drawing from the 
Fund later in the year, to be redeployed in order to secure Cabinet agreement for the 
cuts in planned expenditure announced on 22 July.   
 
These cuts, however, were not of the extent that officials of the Treasury or the Bank 
of England had desired, and in light of admittedly uncertain forecasts for the growth 
of the economy and the size of the PSBR, it was argued that an approach to the Fund 
was essential, in full knowledge of the conditionality that would be associated with 
this.  It was also argued that any other attempt to stabilise sterling, such as through 
the arrangement of a safety net for the sterling balances, would be entirely secondary 
to a Fund loan and only achieved on more onerous terms.  Further pressure on 
sterling in September and October demonstrated the extent to which the Chancellor 
was aware of the potential for the appearance of IMF conditionality to ease political 
objections to further cuts.  At this time he acknowledged that it was clearly desirable 
to take further deflationary action, but that in light of the widespread expectation of 
conditionality, it was preferred to wait until after the negotiation to make any 
announcement.  In this instance, the intention of the government to use market rules 
in order to justify retrenchment through a strategy of depoliticisation is demonstrated 
most visibly.   
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The IMF negotiation itself was also a sophisticated expression of a strategy in which 
the Treasury and the Chancellor presented events in such a way so as to create the 
impression to the population at large, and sceptics of its proposals within the 
Cabinet, that they had fought strongly against further deflationary measures, and that 
the size of the package eventually proposed had been demanded by the Fund.  This 
began by refusing to discuss any figures for adjustment or policy changes with the 
Fund, and asking its officers to make the first proposals, with which, in private, 
British officials were broadly agreed.  The political argument was then won once 
again by presenting alternative strategies and demonstrating the reasons why they 
would inevitably involve greater sacrifices than the course proposed by the Fund, 
either by forcing Britain towards bankruptcy, or contributing to shortages of 
consumer goods caused by import restraints.    
 
What is clear from economic policy-making in Britain in the period 1974-76, is that 
policy-making was not characterised by uncertainty and indecision. Preferences for 
measures designed to improve the competitiveness of British industry, reduce the 
public sector’s claim on resources, and tackle inflation, had in each instance been 
clearly designed and expressed prior to the onset of crises or the appearance of 
crises.  The crises of 1975 and 1976 were then subsequently used in order to argue 
that decisions on politically contentious issues such as incomes policy, public 
expenditure, and the size of the PSBR, lay beyond the control of the government 
because of its dependence on overseas confidence.  The clearly understood 
implications of Fund conditionality was the perfect justification of this position in 
December 1976, and far from representing an abject failure of the Labour 
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government’s economic strategy and the disciplinary potential of market forces, in 
many respects represents the pinnacle of its economic statecraft.   
 
Final remarks: not so ‘new’ Labour?  
 
Evidence from British economic policy-making in the run-up to and during the 1976 
IMF crisis therefore tends to reinforce the claim that it is beneficial to understand the 
state as social form, conditioned by the class antagonisms inherent in the social 
relations of capitalist production.  There is also strong documentary evidence 
suggesting that state managers attempted to depoliticise difficult aspects of policy-
making with reference to market rhetoric and ultimately, Fund conditionality.  The 
topic, however, also leads to some new research questions about the ‘newness’ of 
New Labour, given the apparent similarities in statecraft between the Blair 
administration and the Wilson / Callaghan administration.  The fact that New Labour 
has couched its governing project in the rhetoric of ‘the third way’ and the principles 
of social inclusion will remain unique.  However, in light of suggestions that 
strategies of depoliticisation have driven the New Labour governing project and the 
argument presented here, there are clear signs that the differences between the 
Labour governments in the two periods are largely superficial; the statecraft of the 
New Labour governing project has clearly identifiable roots in the statecraft of ‘old’ 
Labour’s last term in office.  Given the historical emphasis of this study, it is not 
possible to make a definitive judgement on this issue here, and the acid test will only 
come with the availability of a wide range of documentary sources relating to policy-
making under New Labour, but if the ‘newness’ of New Labour is not to be seen 
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simply as a cynical re-branding exercise allowed by the terminal decline of Britain’s 
primary sectors and the rise of the information based industries during the Thatcher 
period, considerable work needs to be done in order to demonstrate this uniqueness 
with specific reference to Labour’s time in office in previous eras.  The conclusions 
of this thesis suggest that the principal things that are ‘new’ about New Labour in 
terms of they way it has identified its preferences and implemented them, and given 
the extent to which the population at large now seems so ready to accept the 
imperatives of globalisation as justification for the government’s neglect of the 
demand side of the economy, are the significantly less volatile social climate within 
which it has governed (itself a legacy of the ‘free economy and the strong state’2 
established in the Thatcher era), and its name.   
 
                                                        
2 On the ‘free economy and the strong state’, see Gamble (1988). 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Annex 
 
Index of names and offices 
 
Office relate to those held between 1974 and 1976 unless stated.  Where only a 
year is given, office relates to the Civil Service Year Book entry for that year. 
 
Allen, Sir Douglas, HM Treasury, Permanent Secretary, until spring 
1974, Head of the Home Civil Service and 
Permanent Secretary to the Civil Service 
Department from Spring 1974 
Barber, Anthony P. J.,  Chancellor of the Exchequer, 25 July 1970 – 4 
March 1974 
Barnett, Joel,  Chief Secretary to the Treasury  
Barratt, F. Russell,  HM Treasury, Overseas Finance Division, 
Reserves and Development 
Benn, A. N. W. ‘Tony’, Secretary of State for Industry, 10 May 1974 – 4 
August 1975; Secretary of State for Energy, 4 
August 1975, 4 May 1979 
Berrill, Sir Kenneth, Central Policy Review Staff, Head 
Britton, A. J. C.,  HM DHSS, Senior Economic Advisor, Economic 
Advisor’s Office, 1975, HM Treasury, Senior 
Economic Advisor, Medium Term and Policy 
Analysis Group, 1976    
Burns, Arthur F.,   Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Chairman of 
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the Board 
Callaghan, L. James,   Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, 4 March 1974 – 5 April 1976; Prime 
Minister, 5 April 1976 – 4 May 1979  
Carey, Peter, HM Department of Industry, Secretary (Industry) 
Cassell, F.,  HM Treasury, Overseas Finance Division, 
International Monetary Division, Undersecretary 
(Economic) 
Castle, Mrs. Barbara A., Secretary of State for Social Services, 4 March 
1974 – 8 April 1976 
Couzens, K. E.,  HM Treasury, National Economy, Deputy 
Secretary Prices and Incomes Division, 1975, 
Counter Inflation and Public Finance, 1976  
Crosland, C. Anthony R., Secretary of State for the Environment, 5 March 
1974 – 8 April 1976; Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, 8 April 1976 – 19 
February 1977 
Dell, Edmund E., Paymaster General, 5 March 1974 – 10 September 
1976  
Donoughue, Bernard,  Downing Street Policy Unit, Head 
Elkan, Peter,  Independent Economist 
Finch, David, International Monetary Fund, Exchange and Trade 
Restrictions Department; member of negotiating 
team, December 1976 
Fogarty, C. W.,  HM Treasury, Overseas Finance Division, Deputy 
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Secretary, International Monetary Division 
Folger, M. T.,  HM Treasury, Private Secretary (higher executive 
officer) 1975, Defence Policy and Materiel Group 
Principal, 1976  
Foot, Michael M.,  Secretary of State for Employment, 5 March 1974 – 
8 April 1976; Lord President of the Council, 8 
April 1976 – 4 May 1979 
Ford, Gerald R.  President of the United States of America, 9 August 
1974 – 20 January 1977 
France, C. W.  HM Treasury, Principal Private Secretary to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1974-75   
Godley, Wynne,  Government Economic Advisor 
Haines, Joe,   Downing Street Press Officer 
Healey, Denis W.,   Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Heath, Edward, R. G.,  Leader of the opposition, 4 March 1974 – 4 
February 1975 
Hedley-Miller, Mrs. Mary E., HM Treasury, Undersecretary, Overseas Finance 
Division, Reserves and Development 1975, 
Overseas Finance General Group, 1976  
Henley, Sir Douglas,   HM Treasury, Second Permanent Secretary 
(Public Sector) 1975, Exchequer and Audit 
Department, Comptroller and Auditor General, 
1976  
Hopkin, Sir Bryan,  HM Treasury, Chief Economic Advisor 
Hudson, N. B.,   HM Department of Industry, Head of Division, 
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South East Asia Department (Senior Economic 
Advisor) 
Hunt, Sir John,  Cabinet Office, Secretary of the Cabinet 
Jones, James L. ‘Jack’, Transport and General Workers’ Union, General 
Secretary 
Jordan-Moss, Nick,  HM DHSS, Deputy Secretary, Services 
Development Group 
Kaldor, Nicholas,  Special Advisor to the Chancellor 
Kissinger, H. A.,   United States Secretary of State, 22 September 
1973 – 20 January 1977 
Lever, N. Harold,  Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
Lord, Alan, HM Department of Industry, Deputy Secretary, 
Industrial Planning, 1975, HM Treasury, Second 
Permanent Secretary (Domestic Economy) 1976 
McMahon, C. W. ‘Kit’, Bank of England, Overseas Executive Director 
Marshall, J. A., Cabinet Office Undersecretary 
Mitchell, Sir Derek J., HM Treasury, Second Permanent Secretary, 
Overseas Finance Division 
Monck, Nick, HM Treasury, Assistant Secretary, Social Services 
Division I, 1975, Principal Private Secretary to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer 1976 
Murray, Lionel ‘Len’,  TUC, General Secretary 
Pliatzky, Leo,   HM Treasury, Deputy Secretary, Public Sector B, 
1974-75, Second Permanent Secretary, Public 
Services, 1976 
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Pöhl, Karl Otto,  German Ministry of Finance, State Secretary  
Posner, M. V.,  HM Treasury, Deputy Chief Economic Advisor, 
Chief Economic Advisor’s Sector, 1976 
Ramsbotham, Sir Peter E., UK Ambassador to the United States 
Richardson, Gordon, Bank of England, Governor 
Ryrie, William S., HM Treasury, Undersecretary, Public Sector B 
(Agriculture and Trade) 1975, IMF, UK Executive 
Director, 1976 
Scanlon, Hugh P., Amalgamated Union of General Engineering 
Workers, General Secretary 
Schmidt, Helmüt,  Chancellor of Germany, 16 May 1974 – 1 October 
1982 
Simon, William, US Treasury, Secretary 
Shore, Peter,  Secretary of State for Trade, 4 March 1974 – 8 
April 1976; Secretary of State for the Environment, 
8 April 1976 – 4 May 1979 
St. Clair, W. L.,  HM Treasury, National Economy, Assistant 
Secretary, Prices and Incomes, 1975, Assistant 
Secretary Industrial Policy Group, 1976 
Stowe, K. R.   Cabinet Office Undersecretary 1975, Principal 
Private Secretary to James Callaghan 1976 
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret, H., Leader of the Opposition, 11 February 1975 – 4 
May 1979 
Walker, David A., HM Treasury, Overseas Finance Division, 
Reserves and Development (Assistant Secretary) 
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Walsh, H. G.,   Cabinet Office, Principal Private Secretary 
Wass, Sir Douglas,  HM Treasury, Permanent Secretary, from spring 
1974 
Whittome, Alan, International Monetary Fund, European 
Department, Head; leader of negotiating team, 
December 1976 
Williams, Mrs. Shirley,  Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer 
Protection, 28 February 1974 – 8 April 1976; 
Secretary of State for Education and Science, and 
Paymaster General, 10 September 1976 – 4 May 
1979,  
Wilson, J. Harold,   Prime Minister, 4 March 1974 – 5 April 1976  
Witteveen, H. Johannes, International Monetary Fund, Managing Director 
Yeo, Edwin,   US Treasury, Undersecretary 
Ziljstra, Jelle,   President of the Netherlands National Bank 
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Bank of England, Threadneedle Street 
 
C 40: Chief Cashier’s Policy Files 
 
C 40/1429, Monetary Policy Misc. 1 January 1976 – 30 June 1976 
C 40/1430, Monetary Policy Misc. 1 July 1976 – 31 December 1976 
 
OV 38: International Monetary Fund 1941-1976 
 
OV 38/121, International Monetary Fund 
 
3A 38: Sterling and Monetary Policy 
 
3A 38/4, Sterling and Monetary Policy 
 
Other files 
 
2A 77/1, Central Bank assistance: US $5.3 billion standby credit, 21 January 
1975-30 June 1976 
2A 77/2, Central Bank assistance: US $5.3 billion standby credit, 1 July 1976 – 
27 July 1976 
6A 399/1, IMF consultations and drawings 
 
  301 
International Monetary Fund, Washington D. C.  
 
Executive board minutes and files 
 
EBM/76/65, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting 76/65, 23 April 1976 
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